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ABSTRACT 
The question of the nature of human activity, its 
specific formulation and function in social production 
and reproduction is a fundamental one for any theory 
of social formation, existence and evolution. 
There are various forces to account for which do 
not remain static as they are categories of human needs 
and consciousness and they are transformed as society 
changes. Nonetheless theoretical pre-suppositions in 
general have rested on the validity of rigid argumenta-
tions embedded in a tradition of conservative ideology, 
with their central feature the a priori reduction of 
population dynamics and social values to eternal natural 
laws. In this "Hobbesian society" concepts, categories 
and methods are the products of the very phenomena they 
are designed to describe; the effect is empirical closure, 
artificial separation of the object from its history, and 
the application in any field of the "true or false" 
hypotheses, which once categorized remain ever so~ 
However, an understanding of the reality depends on 
the question we ask. Rather than seeking comparabilities 
in statistical terms and countings according to some 
unstated value scheme considered as proven, the Marxist 
commitment is to detailed study of societies, with written 
or non-written history, based on th~ dialectical-
historical analysis of relationships and contradictions 
that must be elaborated, refined and tested both through 
theory and praxis; and this is the concern of the 
following thesis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Anthropology, however it is defined, is enmeshed in the 
particular social structure and economy to which it belongs in a 
highly complex kind of way: it can hardly be discussed in isolation. 
Sven the most abstract theoretical discourses ann scientific 
endeavours are the productsof particular societies in a particular 
historical period. F.ven the most concrete empirical investigations 
at any level of information or analysis are subject to particular 
constitutional forms and traditions and are! therefore, part of 
particular historical, economic, political and ideological co"J\io~c:.tures 
Because human beings live in societies and because these societies 
have a temporal dimension, the products of the human mind always 
have a social and historical determinant. 
Anthropology has traditionally studied the relations of hullian 
kind to nature and the relations within society, the original 
condition~ of the human being, its material, mental or artistic 
expression. In thet sense it is closely connected with a~chaeology. 
Anthropology is founded on tl:e supposition of the structJJi:'i~of human 
populations. the differences between the~ and the varieties in the 
development, existence and composition of each. r1 • an .• 1n that sense is 
related to demography. P.uman populations tend to have distinctive 
features and trends in their productive and reproductive activities 
~ both as activities in society ani as a specific discourse Qn 
/ society- that i~, methods and decisions concerning these processes-
and in that sense anthropolocy is connected with economy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Anthropology, however it is defined, is enmeshed in the-
particular social structure and economy to which it belongs in a 
highly complex kind of way: it can hardly be discussed in isolation. 
Even the most abstract theoretical discourses and scientific 
endeavours are the products of particular societies in a particular 
historical period. Even the most concrete empirical investigations 
at any level of information or analysis are subject to particular 
constitutional forms and traditions and are, therefore, part of 
particular historical, economic, political and ideological conjunctures. 
Because human beings live in societies and because these societies 
have a temporal dimension~ the products of the human mind always 
have a social and historical determinant. 
Anthropology has traditionally studied the relations of human 
kind of nature and the relations within society, the original 
condition of the human being, its material, mental or artistic 
expression. In that sense it is closely connected with archaeology. 
Anthropology is founded on the supposition of the structuring of human 
populations, the differences between them and the varieties in the 
development, existence and composition of each, and in that sense is 
related to demography. Human populations tend to have distinctive 
features and trends in their productive and reproductive activities -
both as activities in society and as a specific ditcourse in 
society - that is methods and decisions concerning these processes -
and in tha.t: sense anthropr;lnjy ir connect:~~d wJ.th ec.onomy. 
2 
.Anthropology is a social science which has only recently separated 
itself from a conservative natural-science view of humanity which 
had given birth to a variety of racism, the reduction of cultural 
differences to natural or innate differences and-the assignment-a( 
these to a scale of higher or lower races. The theorists of this 
anthropology argued that principles of population should be seen 
as related to, and determined by, the laws of social organization 
in general, which should themselves be studied by the methods of 
natural sciences. The consequence was the claim to have established 
universal, iron laws, invariant abstractions of human nature in 
the name of objective science) palaeodemography and prehistoric 
archaeology remained faithful to this tradition, of a homogeneous 
space of facts and phenomena grouped together under typological 
classifications, naturalistic constructions and pre-fixed patterns 
_ of a given ideology. This empiricist ideology which, with few 
exceptions, dominates every variety of history, lives in the 
illusion that it can do without theory in the strong sense, without 
a theory of its objects; what seems to take the place of that theory 
is the methodology and the rules that govern its effective practices. 
It is not paradoxical then, that the Marxist conception of society 
has been neglected and a dialectical materialist interpretation of 
history was scarcely if at all realized.-
Marx and Engels worked on the construction of a systematic 
theory, with inter-related concepts, designed to formulate new 
patterns of determination. In contrast to a concern with unique 
events or institutions, the central concepts of historical materialism, 
- . ----:: 
such as forces and relations of proiuction. are not forme3 by the 
I 
/ one-sidei accentuation of one or more points of view and by the 
' 
1 
' 
·' 
synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present 
individual phenomena; their function is not to constitute· ideal 
limiting concepts with which the real situation or action is 
explained. In this respect the concept construction of historical 
mFterialism is outside the empiricist problematic, in which concepts 
nre abstracte1 nut of reality, either as accentuated ideals or as 
averHge~ .. instead of produced through theoretical work. 
It is now more than twenty years since the French discussion 
among ~arxists on the nature of society traditjonally studied by 
s1hCe 
anthropologists and more than thirty years ~Childe's attempt to 
explain archaeological evidence in Varxist terms. The latter's view. 
not only failed to exert any significant impact on archaeological 
reesoning and research. but his attempt has been used by archaeo-
logists to sho~ the failure of the historical materialistic theory. 
Although this rather demonstrated the failure of the different 
authors to distinguish and/or relate theory science and evidence, 
it undoubtedly reflected a general and widespreai tr~nd among 
archaeologists/anthropologists, mainly and foremost in the Anglo-
Saxon tradition. And it is not surprising in view of the intellectual 
traditions of these countries the social origins of the above two 
disciplines, the particuler nature of these societies and of the 
colonielism they exerted (or the neo-colonialism they do exert) 
that the practice of archaeology/anthropology in the fieli appeared 
to proiuce a theoretical orientation in which the essential problem 
was that of socio-economic crier and the ways in ~hich that was 
4 
maintained. 
Nevertheless t~e intervening years have seen a proliferation 
of writin[;S by l:'arxists Rni non-~-'arxists alike on tr,e above issues. 
It wouli seem that tte initial negative reaction among Anglo-Saxone, 
based as it was on i:leoloeical grounis, has to some extent been 
alleviate.] an:i that it is becoming possible for antl':ropologists/ 
archaeologists to step back eni take stock of these writings. to 
place them in the context of historicel materialiem. Historical 
materialism is not synonymous with economic theory and history: 
~ Y it is rather a science of historical social totalities comprising 
economic bases end politico-jurirlical and ideological superstructures. 
The question then is whether it is possi~le to formulate these 
differences and explain their respective specific dynamics, at the 
level of the relations of production and reproduction. From that 
point of view, the following work intends to contribute to the 
answer of a Varxist anthropology, on the basis of an analysis of 
the concept ''h " i ,urnan essence 1 an, can be described as an attempt to 
society as takes place within nature-conceived in its widest sense4 
com?rising population settlement econnmy ani culture - ani the extent 
t...., wtich ·•;e can use an:i apply t:r,e Yarxist theory for the interpretation 
of "primitive" ani/or prehistoric communities in general. From a 
theoretical point of vie·v_, thus. the main contribution that prehistoric 
archaeology is likely to make in the near future will concern these 
issues. ttet is the manner in which specific economic, social ani 
demographic variebles interact with one another in specific environ-
mental settings over long periois of time. Subject to its own 
·: 
i: 
·.-: 
:_;. 
'· 
~-.• 
'· 
~-' 
"·': 
:! 
...... · 
-~. 
J ·• 
•; 
.;"! 
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l imitations "palaeolithic" archaeoloffy (ani palaeo·iemography to 
that extent) has a unique contribution to ma~e to an understaniing 
oT the manner in which economy, society ani culture evolve~. 
This "'ork also WRY be considerei "selective" in the sense that it 
adopts the ~arxist theory of society as its approa~h and tries to 
analyse some palaeolithic societies in Greece within this framework. 
The intention will be unierstooJ by the relevant workers in the field, 
but hardly any of them could explicate its meaning in a form which is 
acceptable by others. The problem is not only that no generally 
accepted definitions exist for iialectics and ~arxism but that also 
inherent difficulties exist in the analysis of prehistoric societies. 
The Uarxist concept refers to the connection between different types 
of technical organiz!ltion of laoour and different types of economic 
ar:d social system. In rarx' s theory "forces of proiuction" was 
transfor~ei into a ne~ concept. Productive capacity is no longer 
merely a quantitative phenomenon: the io:nins~t concern is no longer 
·.••ith its quantitative improvement. but ~ith the ~ualitatively 
different technical forms of la oour. This c!:an,?e of focus is 
conve.1:ed b;:; this very important fo;:mulation in Capital (III) 
of the core of historical m~terialisc: the relatio~s of pro~uction 
are here said to corresponi to a definite stage in the development 
of the methods of labour ani therebi its social productivity. 
No concrete analysis exists in Uarx-Engels theory for preJ:listor"ic 
societies,and the relevant material for~s an orzanic whole dispersed 
through tl:eir writing~,mainly. The German Ideology, The Econo~ic &. Philo-. 
sophical-"'Manusc·ripts of- is4·4 and l8S7~1859; Capital (Vols ·I, III) · The Origin 
"' ~-1 
..... 
~ .... 
. ,, 
. :.-
.·~"t"_=;..! 
~~~j 
;-t] 
•-s-.:·r. 
':~·::r~:~ 
~:~-I~}:~ 
-~-:-::.{ ~ 
~~~~{:3~f 
~: .. ~-- ·.I 
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of the Family, Private Property an:i the State, Letters l""!f l:arx 
F.V. Annenkov,ani ~ncels t~ Lassalle. 
J. Bl6ch, C. Schmidt, ~. Borgius, Lafargue ani ~autsky. The stuiy 
of social reality as motion ani process misht be said to be more 
central to historical materialism than to ~~st other strands of 
social thought~ 
The orier of presentation within this thesis pose1 certain 
problems because of the use of 1ifferential criteria of 1etermination. 
On the other hand, views of particular writers ani scho~ls of thought 
had to be set against views on particular subjects, such as: 
dynamics of primitive societies, ethnographic interpretations, 
population· relationships, ani pal a eo,i emographic quest ions, such as 
economy ani demography, the cultural context of iemography or the 
demographic reasoning of settlement ani its regional expectations • 
As it was impossible to include the vist literature involved 
iri the various aspects of the relevant subject, ~~at is not referred 
.to in the text but was read or consul ted is presented in the 
bibliography. Because of its dialectisal ctaracter, historical 
materialism involves a new kind of scientific determinations, which 
cannot be ''summarised.". This is the purpose of t!:.e copious quotations 
from the works of rarx, ~ngels and Lenin (some may iniee:i fini them 
all too plentiful). But every quotation is also an interpretation. 
And it seems to us that many relevant aspects of the rarxist method 
have been totally neglected (when not ienorei),above all those wtich, 
we think, are in3ispensable for understaniing the coherent ntructure 
~f that methoi from the point of view or loric as ~ell as content. 
This view, iifficult per se. ac1uire~ a new context ani exte~is to 
'" ,,
-~ -~ 
····· 
. ~ '. 
·:.·' 
. ' . 
.... : 
'· .. ·· 
' . 
... :. 
7 
a new :l.imension, when one cnnsi::l.ers tr.at ~here does not exist a,ny 
concrete, coherent theory in Kerxisffi as far as it concerns palaeo-
lithic societies, \-hich is why many ieny its application ia-- the 
explanation of the mechanisms involved in the evolution and survival 
of these societies. 
But .this . met~od, we are not seeking any rea1y:...made 
answers to ready-maie definitions. '.':e muet extract tr.e practical 
essence of the t~eory from the rnethoi a~i its relation to the object. 
~arx.· defined the conditions in wtich a rel9tion bet~een theory ani 
practice· becanes p_ossible ;in ~s ~.itique of P.egel' s Philosopl:y of Right: 
''It is not enougt that thoug~t shoul.i see': to realise 
itself; reality must also strive tow~u.is thought" 
Since this study concerns both palaeodemography and historical 
materialism it was felt that in orier to explain the constitutive 
eleme~ts and the specific development of palaeolithic societies it 
was necessary to iiviie the subject into six major parts. F.istorical 
materialism emerged fro~ a definite theoretical context, but at the 
same time forme:i- itself_ to a iistinctive bo:l.y of thoug::t by breaking 
wit~ this context at :iecisive pointg. 
Ch?.pter nne ex?.mines these es~entiel iistinctions in connection 
with the dynamics of primitive societie~, their mete~ial production 
in relation to the :iifferent elements of labour processes and to the 
social con·iitions inherent in these processes. The objective is to 
prese~t the bssic theoretical co-oriinates ielimitinf t~e spa~~ in 
which patterns of socio-economic 1etermination CAn be iiscoverej 
an1 explaine1. ' materialistic app~oach cannot consist merely of 
8 
the precaution of constructing the concept of the object; the 
reality of a given fact is tte iniiviiual th~t for~s e society. 
"l.'y standpoint, from ·~·hie~ the evolution of the ~conorni-c formation 
of society is viewei es a p~ocess of natural histori. can less than 
any other, make the in~iviiual re~ponsible for relations whose 
creature he socially remains, however much he may subjectively raise 
himself above them" (Capital Vol. I, Preface to the first edition). 
Chapter Two discusses the concepts of ·iemography ani population 
relating t~ese to the 'Marxist appro.sches on population proble.ns. 
Basically the static aspects of genetics is of little interest to 
deQographers. It is certainly more importa"t to know at a given 
moment the distribution of certain characteristics within a population. 
Such date obviously enable valid comparisons to be made elsewhere. 
;;; Geneticists speak about genetic drift and selection, frequently 
. ~­.... 
.-:-1 
.·~: : ignoring the fact ttat the object o~ their observation is controlled 
by demographic factors that ca~ be interpretei at only t7rO levels: 
fertility end mortElity ~hich in their turn may be (ani are) iepen~ent 
ori factors out £-ide biological r!'! tiona lfty • 
. 
In t~e fiel~ of palaeodemographic phenomena as related to 
settlement patterns and human occupation the con~ept of linear 
causality can no longer be applied to them as it has been hitherto. 
Subsistence regimes develop under the stimulus of a sequence of 
distinct elements - yet these elements are closely linked by the 
dynamics of their historical circumstances. On the one hand, are 
the people, t~eir productive ani repro1uctive activities; on the 
other hani is a Given ~prce wittin wtich people move. The crucial 
point ,..,,., .. ,.,-;-.r~l.· ~"' t iOr" ._) ~~ n 1-
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a given space has been produced, ani to ielimit its contents _ 
that is of the people using that space, people who perhaps are 
opposed to the physical form or ''purpose" of that space. One of 
t~e key factors which t~arx rlefined concerning population an.i region 
was the extent to which the spatial concentration of population in 
certain areas was not caused primarily by raw material deposits or 
by other ecological "opportunities" but by the concentration of 
production in certain areas. Relations of production ienote social 
relations among men. Settlement forms are conditioned rather by 
their particular productive relationships and shaped by endogenous 
socio-economic structures, than by exogenous mechanisms. Population 
"variables" such as density, growth rate, etc., are thus closely 
related to their spatial environment as it is created by specific 
productive activities. It is 8hapter Three thAt deals with the 
,bove probl&ms. 
Chapter Four, :l.iccusses palaeodemography from an economic 
perspective and to wtat exter.t demography- which has been considere:l. 
more a~ a cause of biological proceeBes than related to coniitions 
of production - can be analysed within the hierarchy of relations 
determining its form and content at any level of its formation -
particularly the con1itions of reproduction which comprise the 
material and social infrastructure of this formation. Laws of 
~. change refer to "constants" because they r·eflect tl:e properties of 
,/ / 
socioeconomic relations. T~e apparent difficulties involvei in the 
interpretation on tl:Rt leve:l of huntine;-gaU:ering societies stems 
not only from the fact of unsatisfactory data but from an unsatisfactory 
theoretical control over that data. Palaeoeconoruic conceptualizstions 
perpet\Aate tr·e notion of tl'e ''mechanical'' exploitation of nature by 
,, 
.. 
.. ~ ·' 
':• 
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men invariably linke1 witt tteir immediate environmental system. 
Hut economic phenomena are not properties of nature. The rar~ist 
for'tllulation refers to t"he comoection bet,.;een iifferent types or 
technical organization of labour, through which a eiven productivity 
is manifested and tte extent to which this effects the appropriation 
of nature. There are, therefore, internal coniitions for each 
society and at the serue time common conditions for all tte societies. 
The system of their function or transformation is determined by the 
active conditions of the pro?ess of production, by the structural 
causalities of the economy in society and at the same ti~e by the 
general specific structure of this society. 
The cultural context of demography is the subject of Chapter 
Five. Culture is that sphere in <>rhich social experience and knowledge 
are handed down from one ge~eration to anotter. t~at is the sphere 
where social inforr.;ation is stored up, thereby making it possitle 
for culture to develop ani for new values to appear. Culture exists 
in society as a definite aggregation of mRteriel sni non-material 
values, constituting the environment in ~~ich ~en ljve ani act. In 
tera::s of tt.e activity patterns of t!:e total population it is the 
reaction to or acce?tance of certain c~ltural elements which allow us 
to assess the significa~ce of objects eni eve~te by examining the 
social disposition to act with respect to trem. T~is framework is 
one in which d.ernograpr.y takes on meaning in terms of ''significant 
relationships" and. a ~_igr.ific~nt rel?.tionf'hip cennot be ::letermined. 
~nd.eped.e!"t of the context in wtic'l:?. populntion finis iteelf. :'.'ith 
"ect t~ t~e l·nter~Ctl·on between demo_~.rAP.·t~ ~~i culture •. traiition?.llv res,., ·.- "· '" "' "' 
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populations, as two separate units which neede1 differential, 
sometimes opposing sets of explanation. That ~ituation conjitioned 
the subject-matter o'!' demography in a self-reproducing reality that 
could be determined from a simple summation or fects. It ~oul1 appear 
though that demographic balances are affectei by quite complex 
cultural and socio-economic processes, endogenous relationships and 
interfering external factors wl:ich cover both material and ''non-
materiel" realities; these 1emani an explanatory understantiing 
outside ~te rationally adaptive, self-intere~ted calculations of the 
historically undifferentiated categorief' of the eiven demographic 
''package". 
Chapter Six discusses the significance of tte historical 
explanation for population settlement~, economy ani culture. in 
relation to the artefactual evidence of three Greek regions where 
the continuity of Palaeolithic occupation is visible, first of all 
at the local level and secondly in inter-connection with the 
surrounding areas. As stone tool meteriel i~ the only "!:ard data" 
;,. available for the moment in Greece, a sa~?le o'!' 10~~ artefacts was 
,, 
; taken froru each region and all in~ormation was coded ani transferred 
onto computer file. Asfe~blages were then analysed using the SPSS 
programs. 2stiwations on patterns of variation ar.d tte spatial 
representation of the 3000 stone tool~ were obtained by the use of 
multivariate an?.lysis (non-metric multi1imensional scaling). 
Computer results have a deceptive exactness about them which 
is not con:l.ucive to a critical attitu1e, or to new h:,·pot'heses; 
their results gre as valueble af.' t~1e idea~ they are "testing". 
12 
and relationally meanings w:r.ich are regarded as "moveable" as a 
part of the process through which society accepts certain lines of 
thoughtin ord~r to rationalize certain lines of action. In that. 
senf!e a dialectic~! approec~ to Ueas, events 'lrd "things'' as they 
arise in particular historical contexts is at tre same time a 
verification achieved t:r.rough practice; iialectics is practice and 
becomes practice through use. It is not a methon covering explanations 
once ani for all, but an opel'! net'•10rk of metl:odological principles 
incorporating categories and concepts with complex practical 
applicatiO!'!S- quite apart fi'Om any tra:iitional hi-valued positivistic 
logic where hypothe~es are true or false and once categorized remain 
ever so. Lastly it is a methoj which allows for contradiction and 
the testing of hypotheses by inv~rting analyses if necessary, by 
regarding solutions pointing to new problems and questio~s pointing 
to new solutions. 
The thesis therefore presents an analysis of the problems of 
the evolution of palaeolithic societies ani a criticsl evaluation 
of their socio-economic structure, but 1oes not atte~pt to presume 
a determinate solution thereof. 
'~ -
~ 
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CH.APTER I 
Demography and the Significance of Historical 
Explanation 
1.1 The Interdependence of ~anand Nature 
Natural phenomenR snd all consciousness of nature have been 
reduced in the course of history more and more to functions of 
objective social ~rocesses. Marx showed, however, that society 
itself was a natural environment. This was meant not only in the 
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immediately critical sense that men are still not in control of their 
own productive forces in relation to nature, that these forces 
confront them as the organized, rigid fo-rm of an opaque society, as 
a second nature, which sets its o~n essence against its creators, but 
also in the "metaphysical" sense th!!t ~arx' s theory is a theory of 
the world as a whole. The human life process, even when understood 
and controlled, remains in a natural environment. Under all forms of 
production human labour power is only a manifestation of a force 
~~ of nature. In his world man "opposes himself to nature as one of 
:1 
:~ 
··' :) 
_, 
--· 
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1 her own forces." By acting on the external worlj and changing it, 
be at the same time changes his own nature. The dialectic of subject 
and object is for Marx a dialectic of the constituent elements of 
nature. 
~arx questioned the doctrine of the social organism because it 
related to no particular and concrete bo~y of scientific data, on the 
one hand, ani as the basis for unguided progress, was related to no 
' 
• 
. ; 
~ i 
particular human met on the other. Progress, accoriing to the 
2 
evolutionary school of that period, is located outside the human 
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sphere and unrelated to anything that ~an does or knows; the general 
disposition to progress lies as much outside human control, as it is 
conceived by these thinkers in the 20th century as it 1id in the 19th 
and as did the action of provi:ience in the 17th century. Progress 
is brought to the order of nature by man's abstract conception, just 
as providence is brought to it by his mystical conception, neither 
progress nor providence being directly connected with the actual 
processes of natur~. 
The question of Varx's concept of nature necessarily extends 
outwards to the question of the relationship between the materialist 
conception of history and philosophical materialism in general, Most 
of the existing literature, while it correctly brings out the 
qualitative distinction between Marx's materialism as a theory 
oriented primarily towards history an:i society ani all the forms of 
materialism which had arisen in the history of philosophy, fails to 
take into account sufficiently those aspects of Uarxist thought which 
link him to the materialists of.antiquity. 3 
Here the question of the connection between the materialist con-
ception of history and philosophical materialism is by no means 
0 second$ry or purely of terminological interest. ~arx described 
extra-human reality which is both independent of men and mediated or 
at least, capable of ·being mediated with them, by using different 
terms such a·s. "material", ''nature", "objective moments of labour's 
existence''; since men constitute a component of this reality, the 
~! concept of nature is identical with the whole of reslity in the 
, 
-· 
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Marxist vie~. This 1i1 not result in an ultimate or dogmatic meta-
physic but simply circumscribed the horizon of thought within which 
the new materialism moved. In the wor1s of ~ngels, materialist 
- - - 4 philosophy, consists in E!_xplaining the worl1 from the world- itself. 
This concept was iog~atic enough to exclude from the theoretical 
construction anything Uarx called mysticism; at the same time it was 
conceive1 unriogmatica!.lyand broadl-y_enoughtoprevent -nature itself from 
receiving a metaphysical consecration or indeed ossifying into a 
final ontological principle. 
As distinct from_ the materialism of Feuerbac)1, whe_re man does not 
emerge as productive force but remains round to pre-human nature and 
for which nature as a whole was an unhistorical homogeneous substratum, 
the essence of Uarxist critique is the dissolution of this homogeneity 
into a-dialectic of subject and object. Nature was for Uarx both an 
element of human practice and the totality of everything t~at exists. 
The sensuous world and the finite men in their existing social 
setting (the essence and the appearance at the same time) are ~he 
only quantities taken into account. At bottom, there existed for 
l'arx only "men an1 his labour on the one side, nature and its materials 
on the other." On tbe basis of the objective logic of the human work 
situation he attempted to comprehend the other areas of life as well. 
"Technology 1i scloses man • s mode of dealing "''i th nature, the process 
of production by which he sustains his life and thereby also lays 
bare the mode of formation of his social relations and of the mental 
conception that flows from them."5 What is essential is that historically 
there is incompatibility of man and nature. i.e. in the last 
-..~.: 
~? analysis the necessity of labour triumphs over the unity of man and 
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nature. As long as nature remAins unworkerl it is aconomically value-
less or rather. has a purely potential value which awaits its 
realization; "the material of nature alone insofar as no human 
labour is e~bodie~ in it, insofar as it is merely material and exists 
independently of human labour. has no value, since value is only 
embojiei labour." 6 This leads us to a further point. Natural factors 
do not affect human relations directly, but only in a mediated fo~m. 
Natural geographical situations have not "changed" drastically since 
prehistory, but they have taken a wholly different meaning, (for 
example, a sea which separates two p~oples from each other at a 
primitive stage is, at a higher stage, their means of communication). 
The effect of natural factors therefore depends on the mediation of 
the economic (i.e. human) relations, which have arisen on the 
foundations of these natural factors. These effects are changed in 
the histo~cal process. The connection between human relatione and 
the effects of natural factors is basically a twofold one. It consists 
of both a decrease and an increase in the importance of natural factors 
to social life. Natural factors are lees important no~ than they were 
for primitive man (less iependent now on harvest, soil· fertility! 
weather etc. - factors which for the most part can be offe~t by 
technical means). But in other ~ays their importance increases, since 
man exploits nature more than be did in for~er times. Both the 
decrease and increase in man's dependence on nature are what is 
called "socialization of nature" an.j is actually the increased inter-
locking of society with nature. Nature's influence over man takes 
a "mediated" form, while it is social relationships which hAve 
"direct" influence. 1!arx differed both from idealism and from abstract 
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metaphysical materialism. Ee differed from them. but he also 
represented their synthesis, where he was able to arrive by removing 
any sort of "abstract speculations" by inserting reality where it 
belongs. Feuerbach has already taken the first step towards this, 
by recognizing that the essence of philosophy lay in anthropology, 
the science of man. But Feuerbach regarded man only as a species, 
a mere product of nature; for Marx, nature and man form a unity; in 
that sense social reality knows itself, and the philosophical problem 
becomes an anthropological sociological one. 
The reference to the history of philosophy inj(he Holy Family 
provides further examples of philosophical-methodological motives 
not otherwise made explicit by Marx. Here we meet a general character-
ization of the Hegelian system which shows that Marx's materialism is 
not to be understood ontologically. According to Hegel the world is 
1 the applied logic of the self-development of the Absolute Idea. 
This means that the logical has priority over the historical and pre-
determines it. Regel comprehended society in its unity, ~arx in its 
internal opposition; common to the two is the formation of "civil" 
society as the achievement of the civilized condition, which is a 
process of general development on the one side, of the particular 
history on the other, and the relation between the general and the 
particular. The achievement of "civilized" condition as the human 
agency is at the same time Marx's comprehension of Hegel. The formation 
of mutually antagonistic collectivities, internalized as collective 
interests in this opposition to each other, is the difference between 
Hegel and ~arx. This difference is objective in itself, it is at the 
same time the difference between Hegel's subjectivity and ~arx's 
objectivity, and is the positing of the relation of the subjective 
to the objective in society, which is wholly on the side of Marx. 8 
1.2 The Historical Dialectics of Society and Nature 
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The traditional philosophical problem of the meaning of history 
and of the world is very important for the understanding of the relation 
between Marxist materialism and philosophical materialism in general. 
History is neither a chaotic collection of facts nor is it connected 
together to form a whole with a uniform, spiritual meaning as in Hegel. 
Marx did not give to history a "pantheistic" independence. 
It is true that the social formations which replace each other 
according to a law bring something like an all-embracing structure 
into human history. But this is not to be understood in the sense 
of an immanent "teleology". All goals and purposes arising in reality 
can be traced to men acting in accordance with their changing. situations. 
There ·is no meaning in isolation from these situations. This is 
certainly an extremely abstract expression of the real logic of 
knowledge. But it is precisely this abstract quality which makes it 
possible to determine the essence of "historicism" as a method of 
cognition. "Historicism" in its extreme expression is a variant of 
diachronic analysis, if only because it is oriented towards studying 
the transitions from one state of the object to others on a definite 
time scale. But that is not enough) "historicism" as methodology 
includes the diachronic approach as one of its elements, but essentially 
modifies at least one of the postu~ates of the diachronic approach; 
it gives up syncretic analysis and relies on a certain decomposition 
of the "object" itself, singling out those components that are 
responsible for the change. These circumstances- emphasis on 
dynamics and functioning- make it necessary to take into account 
\"(\. 
temporal characteristics, to which the time concept becomes a 
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necessary element of description. But, obviously one is not dealing 
here with the historical time with which the development of the 
object is concerned, but with a special type of time that might be 
called the time of functioning. Leaving aside the specificity of 
the social time and taking into account only the fact that the concept 
of the social time is far from identical to mere external chronology 
expressed in absolute units, one may insist that the distinction 
between historical time and the time of functioning is based on the 
distinction between respective temporal scales. 9 
The inner historical time has its own, special units of measure-
ment. Taken generally, they are correlated with certain major changes 
in the structure of the object, in the forms of its interaction with 
the environment and its modes of vital activity. The unit of 
"measurement'' is related ~·,ith the realization of an interconnected 
totality of functions. Translated in the language of chronology they 
become essentially different. But this difference is not absolute, 
so that these types of tirue frequently overlap when complicated social 
processes are described. In that sense, knowing the composition of 
the object into a time-scale does not imply knowledge of its structure. 
Structure is not the dead cast of the frozen object, but a character-
istic of those of its invariant aspects which are only revealed 
during the analysis of its actual dynamics. One of the assumptions 
on that, is that the elements or ''parts'' of the object are not (or 
I 
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not only) determined by their substantial substratum properties, 
but by their position within the investigated qhole. The point is 
that a complete abstraction from anr ti~e is only possible in s 
strictly limited_class of problems- i.e., dealing-~ith the investi-
gation of the anatomy or morphology of the object. Considered in this 
way, it becomes clear that the most essential specific feature of 
~arxism is that in the analysis of social reality it combines 
"historicism" and dialectics as a definite general approach to the 
explanation of development mechanisms. For Marx, questions directed 
to pre-human and pre-social existence of development should not be 
posed abstractly; in each case they presuppose a definite stage of 
the theoretical and practical appropriation of nature. All putatively 
primeval substrata are always already involved with what is supposed 
to emerge from this activity and are for precisely that reason by no 
means absolutely primeval. The question of the act of "creation" of 
man and nature is therefore less a metaphysical than a historico-
social question. Marx set forth the history of the individual 
interests in their conflicting relations to each other, resolved in 
the collective interest, of the soci~l formation, within itself; the 
resolution of the conflict is not ~hole, partly beceuse the process 
of establishment of the "new" forms of society is incomplete (in 
which the former communal relations are carried forward albeit 
proforma); partly, however, the conflict is never resolved in the 
new form of society because the interest of the subject is not wholly 
subordinated to the objective interest; the interest of the subject 
is at the same time objective and subjective~ being botr. internal and 
externalized in t.he behaviour, relations and product-. .i.on of t.he group 
:i.n the society. 
I 
-~~· . 
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When ~arx treated the history of previous human societies as 
a process of natural history this had first of all the critical 
meaning that the "laws of economics confront men in all ••• planless 
and incoherent product_ion as objective laws over which they have no 
power, therefore in the form of laws of nature"10 Marx had in mind 
the experience gained in the course of the perennial "prehistory" 
of man, that in spite of all technical triumphs, it is still_always 
"nature" (under special exploitative conditions) which is victorious 
in the last resort and not man. All the contrived machinery of modern 
industrial society is merely nature tearing _itself to pieces, in that 
11 it is not socially controlled. 
However, in addition to this accentuation of its critical aspects, 
Marx used the concept of natural history in the broader sense given 
to it by the evolutionist theories of the 19th century. When he 
reproached the ''abstract materialism of natural science" for excluding 
the "historical process", 12 be had in mind nature as well as society. 
Marx's approach in which the development of the economic formation of 
a society was conceived as a process of netural history, meant that 
he viewed the historical process in its strict necessity without 
engaging in aprioristic construction or using meta-psychological 
principles of explanation. 13 
Lenin, discussing in particular the natural-historical character 
of the Marxist method of investigation and its relation to Darwinian 
evolutionism1writes: 
"Just as Darwin put an end to the view that animal and plant 
species are unconnected. that they arose fortuitously "created 
by God" and are immutable, just as he we s the first to place 
~ 
. ' 
··-.· 
22 
biology on a fully scientific foundation by establishing the 
mutability and the succession of the species, so ~arx put an 
end to the view that society is a mechanical aggregate of 
individuals. in which the desired cr.anges c~ be brought about 
at the will of the authorities (or if·you like of society and 
government) an1 which emerges and changes casually and was 
therefore the first to place sociology on a scientific foundation 
by laying down the concept of the economic formation of society 
as the totality of existing productive relations and by establish-
ing that the development of such formations is ~process of 
14 
natural history" 
Marx himself, while recognising the specificity of social laws 
was aware of the relation of his theory to that of Darwin: 
"Darwin has interested us in the history of nature's technology 
i.e., in the formation of the organs of plants and animals 
which organs serve as instruments of production for sustaining 
their life. Does not the history of the productive organs of 
man, of organs that are the material basis of ell social 
organization deserve equal attention? And would not such a 
history be easier to compile, since, as Vico says, human history 
differs from natural history in this, that we have made the 
former, but not the latter"l5 
Engels distinguished natural from human history in a very similar 
manner: "the whole of nature also is now merged in hi story, and 
history is only differentiated from natural history as the evolutionary 
l . ,16 process of se f-conscious organlsms. 
Natural and human hi story together con sti tu te a differ en tis ted 
unity. On the one hand the history of society is a real part of 
"natural history" in that facts characteristic of pre-human history 
continue to exist in human society. Marx was thus able to describe 
the instruments of production by whose construction and application 
men are essentially distinguished from animals as "extended bodily 
organs". On the other hand, one should not neglect the specific 
history between the course of history in "development" and in society. 
This makes non-permissible the simple translation of natural laws to 
social relations, as in the many varieties of social Darwinism. 17 
jl\. 
In a letter to Kugelma~~ Marx, criticizing Lang~wrote: 
"Herr Lange bas •• made a great discovery. The whole of history 
can be brought under a single great natural law. This natural 
law is the phrase (in this application Darwin's expression 
becomes nothing but a phrase) "struggle for life" and the 
content of this phrase is the :!lalthusian law of population, or 
rather over-population. So, instead of analyzing the "struggle 
for life" as represented historically in various definite forms 
of society, all that has to be done is to translate every 
concrete struggle into the phrase "struggle for life" and this 
phrase itself into the Malthusian population fantasy." 18 
Engels showed that certain theories borrowed from the bourgeois 
relations and their reflection in the realms of idea13-~ were applied 
to the development of organic nature and then put forward by the social 
Darwinists as supposedly pure natural laws of society: 
"the whole Darwinist teaching of the struggle for existence is 
simPly a transference from society to living nature of Robbe's 
doctrine of "bellum omnium contra omnes" and of the bourgeois 
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economic doctrine of competition together with Valthus theory 
of population. When this conjurer's trick has been performed 
••• the same theories are transferred back again from organic 
nature into history and it is now claimed that their validity 
as eternal laws of human society has been proved. ,l9 
Finally, one aspect of the relation between nature and history 
is of relevance for the method and theory of science. Since the work 
of the· Neokantians, "it has 
_-, become customary to a seign to the 
historical and the natural sciences modes of investigation which are 
different in principle. Some distinguish between the method of causal 
"explanation" peculiar to the natural sciences and the method of 
intuitive "understanding" peculiar to the historical, human sciences. 
Others divide reality into two entirely distinct parts. Nature was 
conceived in-Kantian form as the existence of things subject to laws. 
The "nomothetic" character of the natural sciences corresponded to 
this conception. History wes said to cpnsist of a profusion of value-
oriented, basic ally unconnected "individual" data only accessible to 
a descriptive "ideographic" method. 20 
It thus became something beyond rat~onal analysis. Marx admitted 
no absolute division between nature and society and hence no fundamental 
methodological distinction between the natural and historical sciences. 
An opposition between nature and history is created by certain 
approaches in that they exclude from history the productive relation-
u ship of man to nature. Marxism insists on the necessity of concrete I 
research into historical phenomena and events in order to reveal their 
objective interrelationship with other phenomena and facts, and to 
·{ 
~ -~st~blish th~ir essential tr~5ts. No general Jana oxjnt in their 
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pure form. They operate under diverse conditions embr_acing the unique 
traits of a given social environment. They manifest themselves in 
various situations reflecting the dialects of the universality and 
diversity of historical processes. Comparative analysis reveals 
similarities of the objective tendencies in social development in 
spite of the diversity of natural environment, history, culture and 
demographic structure of the given societies. 21 
The reproach that Marx proceeded too "naturalistically" when he 
wrote in "Capital" of the historical process of the economic formation 
of society, as a process of natural history, is misguided, because it 
presupposes precisely the thesis that there is a fundamental methodo-
logical distinction between the attitude of research into nature and 
that of research into history. Scientific thought cannot recognize 
any area "sui generis':) absolutely inaccessible to explanation in _'X_ 
accordance with uniform laws. 
Materialistic approach on the other hand, presupposes a thorough 
study of any process or phenomenon of social life in its historical 
perspective. Empirical knowledge and theoretical generalizations 
should be combined in such an inquiry. As Lenin stressed, ''Uarxism 
does not base itself on anything other than the facts of history and 
reality." 22 Accumulating facts is the first stage of a scientific 
investigation. What Y.arxism objects to is the factual work being 
confined merely to discovering and describing facts, without inter-
preting them from the point of view of the historic regularities which 
are revealed by those facts. This understan~ing of history develops 
in correspondence with the concrete historical situation. as a result 
of the analysis of new facts and phenomena. In the case of man-made 
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objects such as social history, methods of inquiry and presentation 
are, despite all their formal differences, internally related to each 
other, whereas the interpretation of a nature separated from all human 
practice must ultimately remain a matter of indifference to the nature 
Before the existence of human societies, nature could only achieve 
polarities and oppositions of moments external to each other; at 
best interactions but not dialectical contradictions. In the Marxist 
view, all natural being has already been worked on economically, and 
hence conceived. The question of the dialectical and non-dialectical 
structure of this being, since it is isolated from practice, is a 
purely scholastic one. The concept of nature cannot be separated, 
either in philosophy or in the natural sciences, from the degree of 
power exercised by social practice over nature at any given time. 
Although even Marx occasionally used the concept of matter alongside 
that of nature, the "practical" character of his theory ensured from 
the outset that materialist economics,not physical factors or 
)z speculative notion~, determined the reality which these concepts coverec 
1.3 Vatter and Labour- Content and Form. 
The epistemological definition of matter as objective reality 
existing outside and independently of all consciousness corresponds 
entirely with the definition of matter given by Marx, from the point 
of view of social labour. Man has not created matter itself. And 
he cannot even create any productive capacity if the matter does not 
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exist beforehand. In the "Paris '!lanu scripts" he adopts a similarly 
objective viewpoint ani the theme is again taken up in "Capital". 
~ 
-: 
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Here t~e economic analysis presupposes the philosophical-materialistic 
view that labour,itself only the manifestation of a natural force, is 
always dependent on a substratum which cannot be reduced to labour 
alone. If labour is the formal "creator of value" the stuff of 
nature is its material creator. Renee, the division of natural 
material and labour cannot be absolute. At the level of the innividual 
use-value, it may in abstracto be possible to make a distinction 
.,..\: between what derives from labour,i.e. from the activity of men, and 
what is provided by nature as the material substratum of the commodity. 
But as far ~s the world of experience as a whole is concerned, the 
material provided by nature cannot be distinguished from the practice -
social modes of its transformation. Ruman productive forces leave 
their mark on the material of nature intellectually and practically. 
This process however completely confirms nature's independince of 
consciousness rather than destroying it. The materials .of nature -
hav.ing undergone the labour-process- remain componentsof the sensuous 
world. The form of wood, for instance, is altered when one makes a 
table from it. Yet, for all that, the table continues to be that 
common, sensuous thing, woo1. In the ftnishe1 article which is the 
result of labour, the motion ~hich mediates it is extinguished, but 
inversely if the product of labour undergoes further processes, it is 
reduc e1 again to a mere moment of the mediating "moment". What is 
26 immediate at one stage of production is mediated at another. The 
;~ objectification as loss of object which defines the labour-process 
~·· 
~ 
:~ 1 has in addition a more general theoretical content. 
Human labour is a unitary process, the purposeful expenditure 
of J.ahov:r process. In all forms of :society it ::l.s e. social relat:lon 
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and in all forms of society, whether primitive or not, it is relation 
to nature whereby natural materials are transformed. That unitary 
process in its concrete form is useful labour and as such it is labour 
in society wllose purpose is the production of objects useful to. the 
particul~r society. In its abstract form, labour in society is taken 
up in relation to the process of circulation rather than to that of 
production and of consumption. 
We have therefore two types of production in society, the first 
or most primitive being that in which production takes place in direct 
relation to consumption, the unit of production an-i of consumption 
being the same. In this moae of production there is no significant 
amount of exchange of products between the social unities that are 
the units of production, whether family or kinship group,tribe, 
village etc. Ln its pre1ominant form, labour here takes the concrete 
form of production for direct consumption. The second· type of labour 
is that in which the unit of production is clearly sep~rated from the 
unit of consumption, and exchange of products on a considerable scale 
takes place between the produc~ng units. At this point one now 
considers the distinction bet~een social labour as abstract and 
concrete in relati9nto nature and in society, and at the sa:ne time the 
.::l.istinction between direct and indirect labour processes. or the dual 
forms of labour in relation to nature ani in society. The increasingly 
indirect relation to nature is measured by the increasing number of 
steps in the concrete labour process or in the number of instruments 
to make instruments; and this constitutes a simple index of the 
alienation from nature, for it is the primary measurement of that 
I form. It is production for further production. The increasingly 
! 
I 
'· 
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indirect relation of labour in society is at the same time production 
in society for further circulation through exchange; it is production 
for indirect consumption. With the introduction of the relation of 
concrete and abstract social labour, the direct and indirect relations 
of production and circulation in society are promulgated. These are 
iialectical moments of transformation of society. They are ranged 
on a "chronological" scale; the simpler or more direct takes place 
earlier in time, nearer to the beginnings of culture; the more 
complex with more numerous stages of mediation in production takes 
place later. The dialectical moments of labour in society are real; 
being at once actual, typical and temporal. They take place in the 
brain and in society, for the relation of labour to nature and in 
society are not merely correlative to one another out are mutually 
determinant in their evolution from simple to complex forms. 27 
Engels directe1 attention to the distinction between labour and work, 
· .wiilich has a, parallel in t:arx' s distinction bet-:veen abstract and 
~oncrete labour; as concrete labour it is work, the production of 
use-J~alues; as abstract labour, is in- sh-ort the production of 
~ ·~ commodity value. Labour as the creator of use-values is independent 
.of any particular social end, purpose, relation, condition of human 
existence; as abstract labou~ it is abstracted from any given society, 
being the general material interchange between the human kind and the 
natural environment. Wants and desires are not natural nor are they 
-...;: 
~ invariable. They are formed from one society to the next, they are 
l-'i-. 
.~ ..• 
culturally variable; human nature is absorbed into culture but the 
process ":Usappears" in the product. The generality of the human 
nature is absorbed in the human being; but the human being is the 
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product of t~o iialectical moments, one abstract -i.e.culture in 
general- an1 the other concrGte _i.e·the particular culture. Marx's 
category of labour was expressed in parallel with his category of 
culture but only the-former was worked 6ut. Both are necessary in 
reference to the problem of the place in nature of the human kind. 
Once the materials have been extracted from nature they move 
about for a time in society _before their eventual return to nature. 
The movement of the products of concrete labour in society-is the 
metamorphosis of the form of goods into commodities, commoiities into 
"money" and back into commodities. The formal interchange in circu-
lation has systematically been elaborated by ~arx, whereas the 
material interchange with nature was set forth in aphoristic insights. 
The labour of the body is the means of comportment by the human 
kind as a whole with regard to the resources of nature. It is the 
material condition of human existence in particular and the material 
condition of organic existence in general. It is an unceasing process 
of ecological an1 economic relations. This ceaseless interchange 
between the living body ani the natural worli is effected in the 
production of useful things; concrete wants are t!lereby met in 
concrete ways. The labour of the body is concrete labour, the original 
and ultimate form of labour, shared with all living organisms. But 
in man, as concrete labour, the work of the hands is the production 
of useful things- it is production ~ith an end in view. 
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1.4 Labour Hierarchy of Functions 
The fundamental problem for Y.arx is how the laws of human and 
'/ natural history are related, and how they-.. Jchange. The way to 
effect the required changes is subject in part to human control. We 
are faced with the problem ~of changes in the dialectical moments of ~ 
form in relation to function, accumulation of differences and production 
in relation to reproduction. Marx distinguished between accumulation 
in general and capitalist accumulation in particular, showing the 
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error of ~althus and Jones 1 who failed to make this distinction. 
The process of capital formation comes from the labour process which 
means to expand the value of capital; reproduction is an economic 
process both in primitive and in civilized societies and in any mode 
of production whether Asiatic or capitalist. In its simpler forms, 
e.g. in primitive society, or in the Asiatic mode of production, it 
is simple accumulation. But even the simpler forms, have likewise 
gone through their internal development. In primitive societies the 
process of development is slow; consi1ered as an economic category, 
reproduction has under ell human conditions a time factor to which 
it is associated, but under "civilized" conditions this time factor 
comes under social control to an increasing degree. The time factor 
in reproduction is fixed by natural and political-social inventions. 
The key to reproduction is accumulation, but in order to accumulate, 
one must first store up; immediate consumption is to be avoided. 
The physical storage of primitive economies is replaced in the capitelist 
mode of production by accumulation on constant capital, in means of 
production, in machines to make machines; in both primitive and 
capitalist modes of production, however, the skill of the le.bourers 
29 is stored up an1 accumulated. 
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(adapted from different authors an1 R. Cleaver, 1979) 
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The specifically Marxist discovery tl:at "historical relations 
'p/ 
are objectified in the form of commodity can be misinterpreted so ~ 
as to produce the idealist coriclusion that, since Marx reduces all 
economic categories to relationships between human beings, the world 
is composed of relations and processes and not of bodily material 
th . 30 lngs. One of the main endeavours of Marxist analysis is no doubt 
to penetrate the surface of economic reality which has hardened into 
things in order to get at the essence behind it - the social relations 
of men. Production is always social. To quote from Marx: 
11 
••• the social relations within which individuals produce, 
the social relations of production, change, are transformed, 
with the change and development of the material means of 
production, the productive forces. The relations of production 
in their totality constitute what are called the social relations, 
society, and specifically. a. society at a definite stage of 
historical development, a society with a peculiar distinctive 
character. Ancient society, feudal society, bourgeois society, 
are such totalities of production relations, each of which at 
the same time denotes a special stage of development in the 
hstory of mankind." 31 (Fig. l) 
The use-values of the things produced by them is realized without 
32 
exchange "by means of a direct relation between the objects and man·" 
The social character of private labour which has taken place 
independently of each otter is first revealed in the exchange of 
the products of labour i.e. in the total social process. The pre-
bourgeois forms of production, whose essence consists in personal 
relations of dependence between men, are transparent enough to prevent 
34 
labour and products of labour from taking on a "fantastic form 
different from their reality. "33 The products of labour do not 
become commodities. The mode of production is a unity of two 
indissolubly connected sides of productionr the productive forces 
and the relations of production, which respectively express two sets 
of relations among men: namely their relations with nature and with 
each other. 
The productive forces express the relations of men and society 
with nature and the level of their development. In the most abstract 
terms, production is the process of labour, that is, the active, 
conscious and purposeful material activity of men aimed at adapting 
natural resources to human needs. The objects of labour itself are 
the general and necessary elements in the process of labour. However, 
they have a different role to play in the process of production. The 
objects of labour are passive. They are everything that is subjected 
in the process of production to some treatment and change as it is 
converted into a product required by man with the help of the means 
of labour. In contrast to the objects of labour, the means of labour 
have an active role to play in production. But they can be used only 
in contact with living labour, witt human activity. (Fig. 2) .~an has the 
decisive part to play in production and consequently it is the active 
elements of their labour process, that is, the means of labour and 
men, with productive skills, knowledge and experience carrying out 
the production of material goods, that constitute the productive 
forces of society. 
The distinction between the means and the objects of labour is 
a relative one because the same things can be used for different 
MateriaL 0 
Energy 0 
Equipment 0 
Manpower 0 
Knowledge 0 
Input-Output 
Production-operation of 
a technological system 
Energy 1 
Energy 1 
ECJ,Jipment 1 
Manpower 1 
Knowledge 1 
FIG 1.2 a representation of how production operates 
under "any" technological system. 
35 
36 
purposes in production. However a fundamental distinction does 
exist. The'objects',being passive elements of production, do not 
characterize the quality of sooiety's relations with nature, but 
the properties of nature which man uees in pro::iuctio~. It may, of 
course be said, that the materials man uses also characterize the 
level of development of the productive forces. be~ause progress in 
production also involves the inclusion of new m~terials, which 
enable man to make use of a wider range of the properties of nature. 
But, these new materials play an active role in production only if 
they enter production as a means of labour and if their properties 
are used to act on the objects of labour. Consequently, objects of 
labou::.; , are that part of nature which is involved in production an::i 
which is transformed. Objects of labour are a "record" of the 
properties of nature which man is able to use in production, at a 
given period, but only the existence of corresponding means of labour 
makes it possible to turn this possibility into reality. 
The process of production .has three abstract moments: raw 
material instruments of labour,and form which, as labour,constitute~ 
a material relation among moments, themselve~ material. All ~aterials 
. 
of nature appropriated through labour are use-values. But not all 
use-values are appropriated, i.e. humanly me1iete1, materials of 
nature. The means of labour, the instrument of production is in 
general "a thing or a complex of things which the labourer i'nter-
poses between himself and the object of his labour, and which serves 
to conduct his activity to that object."34 While individual con-
sumption consumes use-values as the means of subsistence of the 
living individual, productive consumption consumes theo as the means 
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whereby labour, the labour-power of the living individual is enabled 
to act. 35 In order to maintain the products of past labour in 
their objective existence as use-values, it is necessary for them to 
remain in contact with living labour, to be "thrown" as Marx put it, 
into the labour-process as the result and the conditions of existence 
of that process. If the possibilities inherent in a use-value are 
realized, neither in the sense of the indivi1ual nor in that of 
productive consumption, if it is not put to the service of human 
purposes, it reverts to the sphere of the "metabolism of nature". 36 
With the destruction of the use-value, the quantum of labour embedded 
in its material is similarly lost. We are dealing here with a merely X 
relative "indifference" of form towards material; when a product 
composed of natural material is incorporated into further labour-
processes, the amount and type of labour already concealed within 
the product is by no means a matter of "indifference". It is 
characteristic of the simple process of production that in it, the 
qualitative determinacy of the labour already expended continues to 
be upheld. This maintenance of quality in the process of creating 
value simultaneously involves the maintenance of the quantity of 
la bout.-. 
It is true that living labour adds a new quantity of labour to 
that already objectified. But it is not the added quantity of 
labour which maintains the objectified labour in general. When added 
to the product, it transcends the mutual "indifference" of the form 
and the material subsisting with it. The material which has been 
worked on assumes a form more suitable to human consumption as stage 
follows stage in the process of production "until at last it acquires 
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a form in which it can be the direct object of consumption, in which 
the consumption of the material and the abolition of the form results 
from its enjoyment by man.- and in wl:.icl: its transformatio_n is its 
utilization.,) 7 
While natural processes independent of men are essentially 
transformations of material and energy, human production itself does 
not fall outside the sphere of nature. The socially active man 
confronts the material of nature as one of her own forces. In 
referring to the action· of man on nature, Marx was seeking to explain 
that the things which serve to satisfy human needs undergo a 
qualitative change. For iialectical, as opposed to mec~anical 
materialism, motion, that essential category of dialectical thought, 
is not merely a change of place, but also, in fields higher than 
h . h f l"t 38 mec an~cs, a c ange -o qua ~ y. 
Wi t-b this concept Karx introduced a completely new unierstanding 
of man's relation to nature. Although the notion ~as alreaiy presented 
by the Enlightenment that nature should be seen essentially from the 
point of view of its usefulness to man. the new dimension is, the 
analysis of the notion. The epoch of t~e Enlightenment was incapable 
of analysing labour as the means of appropriation, of moving from 
this to the necessity of the division of labour and the accompanying 
class divisions and finally of revealing the class character of 
bourgeois society, since this was an epoch when the bourgeois posited 
itself as an absolute, and viewed the concept of class, if did so 
at all, purely as a moment of past history. 
P.ence the real background of the Uarxist concept .of trans-
forma~ion did not even enter the field of vi~ion of the Enlightenment. 
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Nature was seen as something immediately given, instantly capable 
of apprehension, whereas 1-:arx stated that "the object of labour can 
only become raw material, when it has already undergone a change 
mediated through labour."39 
1.5 The Individual in Society: Knowledge and Value 
Whereas the animal is bound, in this appropriation of tee world 
of objects, to the biological peculiarities of his species and hence 
confined to definite regions of the world, the universality of man 
is signified by the fact that he can appropriate, at least potentially, 
the whole of nature. Through labour he can make nature his inorganic 
body, both as a direct means of life and as the matter, the object 
and the instrument of his life-activity. The externalization of 
wants and their internalization as satisfactions are social relations 
on the one side and human relations with nature on the other, the 
latter being intermediated by human work, with tools, which were 
conceived (by ~arx and 3egel as well) as the social instruments of 
labour. Thus man, unlike ani:nals, "is free in the face of his 
40 product" because his relation to nature does not consist purely 
in the satisfaction of imme:liate physical needs: "Hunger is hunger. 
But the huncrer which is satisfied with cooked meat, eaten 'Ni th knife 
and fork is another hunger than that which swallows raw meat with the 
aid of hands, nails and teeth. The mode of production produces, 
both objectively and subjectively, not only the object consumed but 
41 I ) 
also the manner of the consumption." \Fig. 3 
Human nature, that totality of "needs an:l drives" is only to be 
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FIG 1.3 Series of diagrems (1-7) to show the effect and 
interaction of economy in general (iools, 
production and population) in a society. 
S = subject. I = instrument. O(=)o':Jject. 
S transfers 0 bv the use of I. l If then we 
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(D (c) ) So. - accumulating nature of knowledge, 
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two objects are means of production (labour 
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(a~apted from ?. P.oubaud 1900) 
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conceived as a dialectical historical process, involving not only 
the unme1iated coexistence of a constant and a variable component 
but rather the constitution of the life of the general through the 
t . 1 42 par 1cu ar. The essence of man arises in each case from a 
definite form of society; it is "not an abstraction inherent in 
each single individual" but rather the "ensemble of social relations."L 
Turning to the relations of society one must consider first the 
nature of the society itself. Society is an object that can be 
perceived with the senses, but it is at the same time a suprasensory 
object, a set of relations and the symbolic representation both of 
the sensory and the suprasensory object. In his treatment of 
commodity fetishism, Marx begins with the opposition between 
mysticism and senso~y investigation. The mystification of \ 
commodities arises from their social character, their character as 
the products not of social production but of the social relations 
b~tween human beings, who now stand with each other not as producers, 
but as buyers and sellers of the product. It is the social relation 
that is carried over into the commodity relation~ the mystification .( 
of the social relation is the germ that has infected the commodity 
relation with the same disease. 44 Society is not a passive category 
into which the human relations are poured, but is the nexus of 
individual relations, just as the individual is the nexus of social 
relations. These reciprocal relations form an interaction, an 
agency whereby social conditions are formed and changed. Moreover, 
the relations of human beings in society are various; there is no 
species-specific behaviour for mankind as there is for animal 
species. This is the error of modern ethologists (for example 
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K. Lorenz) and their insistence o" "non-un1erstanriing", that 
relations of human beings vary from one society to the next, and 
from one era in the same society to the next. We are not confronted 
here with a problem to be decided purely theoretically. a problem 
of the insufficiently determined riiale.ctic of the "particular" and 
the "general". We have rather to deal with the fact that historical 
reality itself, includes eternal categories which are on the one 
hand relatively independent of all change, but which on the other 
hand do change through societal relations. The dialectical element 
of Marxist thought does not consist in the denial that matter has 
its own laws and its own movement, but in the understanding that 
these laws can only be recognized and appropriately applied by men 
through the agency of mediating practice - that is society. 
This is why Marx distingtiished between the laws valid in general 
for a social formation and their more or less developed forms of 
appearance. The political economists of the 18th and 19th centuries 
fastened upon the story by D. Defoe. It is a convenient fiction, 
which Marx understood rightly to have concealed within it the myth 
of the capitalist individual. The ideological bu~den of this fiction, 
or its mythical core, is the self-made man, the rugged individual, 
who does not need society; society presupposes human individuals; 
these individuals, on the contrary do not presuppose society. 45 
Marx, as we have already seen, raised the question of the 
subjective and objective aspects of man and society relative to the 
identity of interest of the individual within the collectivity, 
which is in turn connected to the identity of the individual and 
to the process of formation of the individual in society as a human 
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being; man does not become a human being in general, but becomes 
human only in a particular way, within the particular collectivities. 
In the process of formation of a complex society of antagonistic 
social interests, he becomes an internally antagonistic creature 
alienated within the collectivities from which he derives his 
particular social nature. The further question of that nature of 
human nature in the complex condition of society is thereby posited. 46 
Deterministic approaches do not differentiate between that which 
is brought about by the conscious intervention of man and that which 
takes place without the specifically human agency. Uan is part of 
nature, and as such the natural processes take place upon and across 
hi~ physical body; but this body has already been modified culturally. 
Therefore, the natural processes in question take place in part 
mediately, in part immediately or directly upon the human organism 
and through it, by means of it. As such, they are related, in both 
ways, to concrete and particular human qualities- human work and 
human social relations. 
Since man has at no time left the natural order, the same 
forces continue to act upon him and through him as those which act 
upon and through the bee or the chimpanzee. At the same time his 
brain and hand, which have set man aside within the natural order, 
are interactive with the natural processes. Thus, the same forces 
which have enlarged the brain and shaped the hand lie at once within 
and without the human being; they are not the sole forces at work 
upon man, but these natural prehuman forces are part of the materials 
which man applies in the shaping of his work-tools. These human 
processes are not determinate nor can they be considered as part of 
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any determinism in a precise way. First, they are subject in part 
to the social variations derived by the human conceptualizations. 
The brain conceives in a way that is solely human and pan-human, 
but what it conceives and the material that it has to work with, 
varies from people to people and from society to society. Both the 
universally and solely human culture and the particular cultural 
variations are at work in their interaction in the conceptualization 
of the brain. They are not determinate, still less are they 
deterministic, in the sense that knowledge of natural working, 
whether animate or inanimate and of the human brain, is still 
. 1 t 47 ~ncomp e e. 
Teleological explanation on the other hand, introduces the 
extra-human knowledge of man. his work .. relation to other men and to '{ 
nature; it has become associated by tr.ose who have recognized the 
inadequacy of man and the power of his brain in the face of these 
problems which are insuperable at the given stage of development, 
with an appeal to an extra-human source of knowledge; the knower 
outside this sphere is the deity who sees the direction in which 
men are going, in some version can change the direction on appeal, 
in others is the do-nothing god. 
Marx opposed any kind of naively teleological interpretation 
of extra-human nature. He praised Darwin's "Origin of Species" in 
a letter to Lassalle, on the ground that it "not only dealt the 
death-blow for the first time to teleology in the natural sciences, 
. . 11 1 . .l . t t. 1 . 1148 but also emp~r~ca y exp a~ne·~ ~ s ra ~ona mean~ng •• 
Although Hegel ridiculed the opinion which sees the hand of a 
purposeful Creator in all possible natural phenomena as "childish" 
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his own id0alist philosophy did, nevertheless, contain the idas of 
a "final universal goal". It is precisely the denial of such a 
final goal, and such 8 previously given meaning of the world, which -
unites Y.arxism with the tradition of philosophical materialism and 
scepticism since classical times, and with all anti-metaphysical, 
anti-rationalist philosophy in the wider sense. For Marx, the world 
was not a metaphysically conceived universe. but the world of man 
I 
and purpose~ in the strict sense, is always a category of human 
practice·. 
Engels, in the "~ialectics of Nature" wrftes: 
••• "How jid the innumerable varieties of animals and plants 
arise? And how, above all, did man arise, since after all it 
was certain that he was not present from all eternity? To 
such questions natural science only too frequently answered 
by making the creator of all things responsible. Copernicus, 
at the beginning of the period, writes a letter renouncing 
theology; Newton closes the period with the postulate of a 
divine first impulse. The highest general idea to which thiB 
natural ~cience attained was t~at of the purposiveness of the 
arrangements of nature, the shallow teleology of ~olff, 
according to which cats were created to eat mice, mice to be 
eaten by cats, and the whole of nature to testify to the 
wisdom of the creator. It is to the highest credit of the 
philosophy of the time that it did not let itself be led 
astray by the restricted state of contemporary natural knowledge, 
an1 that - from Spinoza to the French materialists - it 
insistod on explnining the world from the world its~lf ~~d 
left the justification in detail to the natural science of the 
future." 
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1.6 ~aterial Production as thQ Basis of Social LifG 
The fundamental materialist tenet could be summ&d up as follnwa: 
the laws of nature exist independently of and outside the conscious-
ness and will of men. 49 Dialectical maierialism also holds to this,_ 
but with the consideration that men can only become certain of the 
operation of the laws of nature through the forms provided by their 
labour-processes. This provides the important connectiorr 
between the independence and the social determination of tte laws of 
nature. 
Since classical times and right up to Machiavelli and even -
Pareto, alterations in the configuration of society have been under-
stood as pert of a cyclical movement according to natural laws. A 
notion which frequently appears in this connection is that of the 
exchange of commodities an:l money or the inverse. -Thus in the 
dialectics of ~eraclitus: "All things- can be exchanged for fire, 
and fire can be exchanged for all things in the same way as 
commodities exchange for gold an'i gold for commodities" In rarxism 
we meet an analogous conception, but placed at a different level: 
" •• As the exchangeable values of r.ommodities are only ~ocial 
functions of those things, and have nothing to do with their 
natural qualities we must first ask, what is the common social 
substance of all commodities? It is labour. To produce a 
commodity a certain amount of labour must be bestowed upon it, 
or worked up in it. An:l. I say not only labour but social 
labour. A man who produces an article for his own immediate 
use, to consume it himself, creates a product, but not a 
commodity. As a self-sustaining producer he has nothing to 
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do "fith sociaty. But to produce a commo1ity, a man must not 
only produce an article satisfying some social want, but his 
labour itself must form part and parcel of the total sum of 
labour expended by society. It must subor1inate to the division 
of Labour within Society •• •·5° 
The point that rarx bas made is ttat production, distribution, 
exchange, wants and their satisfaction, the division of labour, are 
social relations and undertakings to which social categories correspond. 
These relationships which, in primitive society, are direct and 
concrete, private labour for the immediate satisfaction of the wants 
of the individual, family or community, give way in civil society to 
differentiated forms, ~nd the o~position of private t6 
social labour. Production in civil society is me1iated. By increasing 
division of labour, the unit of production is ever more separated f_rom 
the unit of consumption; it is no longer the productio~ of useful 
things directly consumed by the immediate pro1ucers; on the contrary. 
they are met by the labours of others i.e. by commodity exchange and 
production. The products of the social labour are given an abstract 
expres~ion in order to effect the exchange. 51 Apart from this, such 
an important phenomenon for the understan1ing of social processes as 
the division of labour does not simply result from the development of 
one factor (as economy for example). It is also a response to a 
situation found in nature: " •• it is not the absolute fertility of 
the soil, but its differentiation, and the variety of its natural 
products, which form the natural foundation for the social division 
of labour, and which, by changes in the surroundings within which he 
lives, spur man on the multiplication of his needs, his capacities, 
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his means and modes of labour." In its material aspect, the labour-
process does not undergo any change radically dividing the stages 
of production from each other. The stages of production are dis-
~i~g~i~h~d_fEo~ ~a:h_o~h~r_not by ~h~t_i~ ~r~d~c~d_b~t_bl the way 
in which it is produced.52 
- - - - - - - - - - - -
The "way in which it is produced" refers obviously to the economic 
"status" of society. A first step in the dialectic of society is the 
relations between the economic factor and the superstructure raised 
upon it in history: the state, law, philosophy, science. religion, 
ethics. (Fig. 4) 
The importance of these categories lies above all in the fact 
that they help to discover, in concrete terms, the influence exerted 
by the mode of production on all the other aspects of social life. 
Socio-economic formations are social organisms which differ from each 
other; the definite role of the productive forces consists in the 
fact that they re~uire relations of production which correspond to 
them, and they exert an influence on the other cultural structures 
indirectly, through the medium of these relations. But because the 
development of the productive forces does not automatically result 
in a change of relations of production, a country with more developed 
productive forces may, for a certain period, remain at a lower stage 
of social development. Although the development of the productive 
forces constitutes the basis of the historical process as a whole, it 
is the relations of production that determine the specific features 
of all the social phenomena which distinguish one formation from 
another. 
Thus, the economic basis of society is the aggregation of relations 
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of production, rslations in tba sphere of production, exchange and 
distribution. This base influences all the other social relations 
(ideas, views, institutions) of a society which are defined as super-
structure. A~though the superstructure is made up of heterogeneous 
elements these have some common features and common laws of develoP-
ment, and this makes it possibls to regard superstructure as a whole 
as being a specific social phenomenon. Thus, the concepts ''base" and 
"superstructure" are interconnected and related to social functions.53 
The base is the economic frame of the whole social organism and 
determines the qualitative expression of each socio-economic formation, 
while the superstructure characterises the specifics of the social 
and intellectual sphere in each formation. It must be stressed here, 
of course, that socio-economic ties of production in pre-capitalist 
societies, particularly in ''primitive", differ essentially from 
capitalist ties. 
The relationships between the bases and the superstructure of 
primitive societieshas a very specific cl':aracter. The operation of 
the historical law according to which the mode of production of 
mate~ial life ''conditions" the correspon1ing formative proc•sses in 
. 
general, is characteristic of the life of peoples at different stages 
in their history. Primitive society was no exception and developed 
on the same basis. It was not stagnant. but the rate of its development 
was very slow. 
Superstructure is a Marxist concept ~ith a very broad meaning. 
embracing tl':e whole of social life apart from its real base, the 
direct relations of production. The economy is assigned a special 
place in the totality of social relations, the foundation of which is 
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the production of immediate subsistence. This does not mean that 
economic relations are to be strictly separated from the rest, nor 
that they can be! even in a purely conceptual sense. The unity of 
social life is so strong that the only possible distinction is a 
methodological one. Marxist differentiation between base and super-
structure is not an absolute distinction between two different 
overlapping spheres. The point here is not so much to try to 
demonstrate that the "individual" spheres of the superstructure and 
their connection with the base are correlative; few would dispute 
that they influence each other, and there is a multitude of cases 
where this can be verified. The point is that Marxism differs from 
all other theories by regarding the various spheres as moments of a 
whole, (not in the "holistic" sense). That whole is social life which 
is founded on the production of material life. Every economic era 
creates the kind of "state" which corresponds to its needs, but this 
must not be looked upon as a mere formula, but examined in concrete 
ways. One of the basic principles of the dialectic is the law of 
uneven development. This diversity (unner any mode of production, 
primitive, feudal, asiatic, capitalist or other) cannot be accounted 
for, only by the differences in natural factors (climate, "race", 
geography etc.) but there is also a whole series of socio-historical 
factors which come into play. 
The dependence of ideological superstructure on its material base 
is generally indirect. Economy creates nothing directly, but it 
determines the way in which the existing material is transformed and 
developed. It should be relatively "easy to prove" the connection 
in cases where the division of labour is not so highly developed; 
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for example. the connection bGtween a primitive religion or kin 
structure or nature and art, an~ the economic relations of a tribe. 
In- Engels' words. "-there is no inconsistency in the fact that ideal 
-driving forces are recognised; the inconsistency comes about when 
the investigation is not carried beyond these and back into their 
motive cause- which lies in the economic and social situation." 
The primacy of the production for Marx indi_cates 
local relationships among productive agents 9 but the whole social 
process whereby individuals are allocated to different branches of 
production 9 thet is9 the distribution of agents which determine their 
sphere in the total social product. This should be particularly 
important in societies with a low level of development of the 
productive forces but which 9 at the same time. have sometimes a highly 
developed set of social categories of production. In this sense it 
is understandable why " •• still higher ideologies 
are still further removed from the material, economic basis, take the 
form of philosophy and religion. Hence the interconnection between 
conceptio~and _their material conditions of existence become more and 
more complicated, more ani more obscuraflby intermediate links; but 
the interconnection exists" (Engels-;). 
/ 
The significant distinction in this connection then is that the 
superstructure will develop according to its "own" logic as well as 
in response to the development of the base. 
Just as there is an interrelation between the substructure and 
superstructure in the social ~hole 9 so there is a relation between 
the individual and society 9 each of these interrelations implying 
' ~- ~-;-· . .:.. 
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The state is an institution of civil sociQty and not an 
institution of society in general. On the one hand, it ia not a 
universal feature of human eocietyi on the other band it is not the 
ultimate end of_society_, nor is it the perfection-of society, rather 
than the economi~ basis, Aristotle held, the Greek city-state 
is the ultimate nature of man, or the final and of human society. 
Opposed to Aristotle is the tenet that the state is a passing phase 
of social evolution. It will be abolished when the conditions that 
gave rise to it in the first place themselves disappear. The common 
root in human society is- life in the community, in which the 
opposition of the private and the public is not to be found or is 
foun1 only in a modest degree. Humanity lived prior to the formation 
of the state in collectivities whose common interests predominated 
over individual interests. 
The free social individual can only come into existence with 
the abolition of the division of labour,and the division of labour 
is fundamentally identical with the division of society into classes. 
It is not only labour itself, and a particular mode of its division, 
which remains in existence indefinitely. If labour remains, the time 
-
socially necessary for the manufacture of specific goods is still 
decisive, despite the fact that the products of labour will not take 
on the character of commodities. Time determines the measure of 
"freedom" avails ble beyond the necessary me terial practice. Inversely 9 
time also determines the level of humanization attainable within this 
practice~ This is how the economic role of time as labour-time in 
a society free from commo1i ty-feti shi sm is seen in "Capital". 54 
Prodnc tion (in capitalism) takes place for "social needs". 
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but it is not regulated socially. Individual capitalists produce 
what they want and exchange their product for others. In this kind 
of social order the various products must be reduced, regardless of 
the qualitative diversity, to a uniform quantitative measure so that 
they can be compared and exchanged. The products of human labour 
thus take on the character of commodities, which confront each other 
in value as quantitatively comparable. (Fig. 5) 
Now the significant thing about labour and production in tribal/ 
primeval societies is that it is always concrete, that is, it is 
always a specific form of labour! male labour, female labour, kin 
labour; labour power is not a commodity and there are numerous social 
boundaries to its mobility. For this reason it is not superficial to 
assume (as Godelier does, 1978) that different concrete labours produce 
different quantitative values. But the point is that different 
concrete labours are qualitatively distinct and in a way not inter-
changeable. This leads to the problem and the question of the process 
whereby people are assigned in the first place to socially-distinct 
branches of production. This process cannot be understood in terms 
of relations of production as narrowly defined by the Althusserians 
and particularly by the property/possession distinctions taken up by 
Hinde~ and Hirst. As numerous anthropologists have also pointed out, 
"rank" in tribal societies does not stem from differential access to 
the means of production. Rather differential "rank" stems from the 
social allocation of agents to qualitatively distinct branches of 
production, that is, their performance in distinct, concrete labour. 
It is this, and not their ownership/non-ownership of the means of 
production which determines their share of the social product. Just 
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Exchange-value has two aspects as well Ql,~u, 
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exchange value is only the form of appearance. 
But then we have different operating mechanisms 
leading to the aspects shown above. (where At = 
attributes, V = measure, Ul = useful labour, 
Alt = actual labour time, S = substance, Al = 
abstract labour ani Snlt = socially necessary labour 
time). The key distinction to see is that between 
Ul that produces commodities as use values and Al 
that proiuces them as values. The direct measure 
of Alt can only be the measure of Ul ani not that 
of value. Between that tiseful labour time and 
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actual amount of Ul require;! to produce iniividual 
commoiities of a given type may very in different 
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will give t!:e ''normal'' conditions of proctuction 
prevalent in any given··period (as always with ~arx 
the social determination is central) 
(adapte~ from H. Cleaver 1979) 
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like the so-called internal categories, eo these "tribal" distinctions 
are at the same time different, concrete forms of labour. To argue !) 
that this social allocation of agents to different "branches" of 
production canno_t be un:iersto-:>ri in terms of rela-tions of prod-uction-
or£.) that they include different sorts of "investment" and "exploitation", 
means that J:arxist s cannot recognize the riirection ~hich 
might be taken for a Yarxist analysis of primitive and/or palaeolithic 
societies. 
If it is approached from a iialectical materialistic perspective, 
the analysis of prehistoric socio-economic organization acquires a 
"new" aspect. .It is important to stress that the "task" lies 
not in the formulation of some common theory of pre-capitalist 
formations. That cannot be, since each pre-capitalist formation has 
its own laws of function and development, distinct from those of other 
formations. But, similarly, there is unlikely to be any doubt as to 
the qualitative, basic difference between the classless, primitive 
socio-economic formation and the antagonistic class formation that 
replaced it. This is why historical materialistic analysis can never 
consist of "divisions", each .,f which is applicable merely to one 
formation or even to a group of similar formations. 
Another point is, that so far as it concerns certain interacting 
"elements" within society, it is necessary to recognize the dynamic 
transformation of their process. If we take into consideration that 
certain experiences, meanings, or practices are "residual", that is, 
they have been effectively formed in the past, but are still active 
in the present - albeit in an alternative or even oppositional 
relation, the "exegesis" of the past from the present is possible end 
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can make sense. Thus cultural emergence in relation to the emergence 
and growing strength of a class, is always important and complex. 
In the case of pre-capitalist cooperation we can speak of it from 
the perspective of capitalist cooperation: it is based on the one 
hand on ownership in common as the means of production, and, on the 
other hand, on the fact that in those cases all the members were in 
direct daily contact with one another remaining close to their tribe 
or community. Correspondingly, what Uarx called the natural division 
of labour within a tribe or a family is based on differences of sex 
and age i.e, on a purely physiological foundation. 
The division of labour gradually begins to receive a truly social 
basis to the extent that individuals, the particular organs of an 
a bstrac;t, , being>- a "directly interrelated whole", 55 become progressively 
separ~ted from each other. The introduction of the exchange of 
products with communities in other places is the reason for this "dis-
integration" of the natural connection between men. The exchange of 
products is made possible by the fact that different communities find 
different means of production and nourishment in their "natural 
environment": it is the spontaneously developed difference which, 
'>!hen ·different communi ties come in to contact, calls forth the mutual 
exchange of products and the consequent gradual conversion of those 
products into commodities.5 6 In this way, the connection between 
individuals is restored, but as a socio-historical connection. 
However, as long as the greater part of production is for the needs 
of the community itself, there is scarcely any community-production. 
A particular division of labour, once "legally" fixed~ continues to 
operate over great periods of time, and the community leads, as it 
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were, an "unhistorical" existence. This character of pre-bourgeois 
history is made particularly clear in that theoretically important 
section of the "Grundrisse" which deals with the economic formations 
which precede capitalist production. 57 As this section shows, the 
dialectic must become absorbed into the actual writing of history if 
it is not to decay into an empty schema. 
As his point of departure, Marx took the historical conditions 
for the formation of the capital relation. Capital presupposes on 
the one side, free labour an1 its exchange against money, which is 
thereby reproduced and converted into values, and on the other the 
separation of the indivi1ual, from the natural immediacy of the 
community. In Uarx's view, this original natural immediacy was based 
on the similarly natural ''unity of labour with its material pre-
requisi tea" •58 In pre-capitalist societies the relationship of the 
worker to the objective conditions of his labour is one of ownership ••• 
the individual is related to himself as proprietor, as master of the 
conditions of his reality. The same relation holds between one 
individual and the rest •• either in the form of joint ownership ••• or 
h th th . d d t . . t. . th h. " 59 w en e o ers are ln epen en owners coex1s lng wl 1m ••• The 
individuals are however "labourers", since they are active as members 
of a community which is endeavouring simply to maintain itself and 
not to create value. 
Since Marx proceeded from the assumption that pastoralism was 
the first form of maintaining existence, the tribal community appeared 
to him to be the precondition rather than the result of the (initially, 
of course, temporary) appropriation of the soil. Once men become 
settled, the degree to which this original community is modified is 
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1ependent upon a large range of external natural factors, as well as 
on the natural and anthropological characteristics of the tribe 
itself. Whether they are nomads, hunters or agriculturalists, it is >( 
always 60 " ••• the community of blood, language and customs" which 
forms the most important prerequisite for the appropriation of the 
"objective conditions of their life". This practical attitude of 
the individual, who, (as opposed to the proletarian of a later era) 
never appears merely in abstraction as a labourer, but always has an 
objective mode of existence insofar as he has the land at his disposal, 
is mediated from the outset through his existence as a member of a 
whole, already more or less subject to history. 
1. 7 "Industria 1" Relations in Pre hi story 
When man emerges from his mythical subjection to nature, his 
labour casts off its first, "instinctual" form. In place of a 
utilization of nature solely through the medium of· the organs of the 
body, there emerges conscious production directed to a purpose. This 
higher unity of man and nature, mediated through the tool, was what 
rarx understood by the word "industry". Primitive tools are copies 
of human bodily organs. Later tools depart from this model, develop 
their own forms, "de-organize" themselves but remain bodily organs 
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man. of 
It is the work of history to discover the various uses of tools, 
said Marx. The tool is a portion of nature which has already been 
incorporated by man. With its help progressively more and more 
objects are transformed into results of subjective activity, more 
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ani more areas of nature are opened up. Consequently the tool under-
goes considerable changes in the course of history of technology' 
from being just an implement of the human organism, it expands and 
multiplies into the implement of a mechanism created by man. 62 There 
can be hardly any doubt that the most basic and abstract concepts 
tave arisen in the context of tool making. 
Hegel as well as Marx was aware of the historical interpenetration 
of intelligence, language and tool, which connects man's purposes with 
the object of his labour. The labourer is not in an immediate 
connection with the object of his labour (unappropriated nature) but 
with the instrument of labour, which is identical with the tool. 
Marx defined this view in the following way: "the instrument 
of labour is a thing, or complex of things, which the labourer inter-
poses between himself and the object of his labour, and which serves 
to conduct his activity onto it. He makes use of the mechanical, 
physical and chemical properties of some things in order to set them 
to work on other things in accordance with his purposes." 63 If vre keep 
to that definition, we can distinguish three forms of tool, according 
to the role played by each of them in the labour process. First, the 
tool can maintain itself in its identical form, secondly it can enter 
materially into the produce of labour, and finally it can be com-
pletely consumed without becooing part of the product of labour. All 
human technology thus, arises out of natural materials, on a natural 
base, ani in a natural context as an effort of man to survive and to 
realize his powers. Despite his awareness of the historical role of 
the tool, Uarx tad a far lower estimation of it than Eegel. He had 
no intention of deriving any arguments against the satisfactions of 
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the senses from their transitory nature. He was wary of fetishising 
the tool in relation to the immediate use-values created with its 
help, as Hegel has done. The latter's formulation presupposed a 
situation in which men were turned more and more into appendages 
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of their own uncontrolled productive forces. Although it had an 
element of truth in it, in that most tools remain the same in use, 
and are foreign to their product, Marx made the following implicit 
reply to Hegel in "Capital". "The instruments of labour properly so-
called, the material vehicles of the fixed capital, are consumed only 
productively and cannot enter into individual consumption because 
they do not enter into the product of the use-value, which they helped 
to create, but retain their independent form with reference to it until 
they are completely worn out.n 65 
. 66 Lenin po~nted out that Hegel was a precursor of historical 
materialism because he emphasized the role played by the tool both 
in the labour process and in the process of cognition. Just as Hegel 
overcame the metaphysical rigidity which dominated all pre-dialectical 
conceptions of the problem of freedom and necessity, so also he 
dissolved the reifie1 opposition between teleology and natural 
causality. Marx took the view that the cunning of man consisted in 
his "use of the mechanical, physical and chemical properties of some 
things in order to set them to work on other things in accordance 
with his purposes." In view of this, it is not surprising that Marx 
also wrote of the nneutral product" in the "Grundrisse" when be wanted 
to express the fact that in the use-value the material of nature and 
human labour are bound up together, but at the same time remain 
external to each other. 67 Even when dealing with the experience of 
64 
natural objects as such, their natural character is determined by 
their contrast with the social world and is to that extent dependent 
on it. Men use largely the same ideas to realize their own caps-
bilities by the practical construction of an objective world and to 
comprehend that world theoretically. The problem of knowledge - if 
it truly exists by itself~cannot be separated from a whole ensemble 
of more or less well-defined historical conditions. There is no such 
problem until the concrete, practical functions of it have been 
exercised; and this exercise does not occur by chance or in itself, 
but in the situations which give it form. Every physical action that 
men undertake' teaches them that they are dealing with real natural 
things and not with "aggregates of sensation". This is how we under-
stand Lenin's methodological remark that, in the dialectic, the 
complete "definition" of an object must include the whole of human 
experience, both as the criterion of truth and as the practical 
indicator of its connection with human needs. 68 
Human products exist in a network of norms, of social rules of 
use (generally having the character of "customs") through which they 
acquire their identity, their meaning, and which circumscribes the 
proper aim and mode of their employment. And since the object is 
effectively created for this use and materially adapted to it and 
only to it, the norm is, as it were, embodied in its physical frame. 
It is in this sense that man-made objects are objectifications of 
human abilities: they materially represent modes and ways of action 
which each individual must "appropriate", (in the sense of interior-
izing the corresponding rules of use), at least in respect of the 
most common elements of his environment, to be able to lead a (for 
his society) normal human life. So, as against nature, social life, 
even in its most elementary forms, appears as patterned by norms, 
and the products of labour function as material vehicles of these 
norms. 
Only because man lives in such a humanized world, because the 
human abilities ani needs, evolved in the past, confront him from his 
birth onwards in a rea1y material form, and because he ha~ at his 
disposal in this objectified fashion, the results of the whole preceding 
social development, and only because of all this, he is able not to 
begin anew, but to continue this development at the point reached by 
the earlier generations. In the process of "appropriation" of 
humanized objects (which constitutes one of the main dimensions of 
socialization) the individual transforms into living-personal needs 
an~ skills the historically created social wants an1 abilities 
objectified in the elements of his milieu, an1 in this way a material-
practical transmission of tradition is realized in society, which 
constitutes the basis of historical antiquity ani at the same time 
renders social progress possible. So it is that ~rk only as object-
ification of human essence creates the possibility of history as 
such. Men have history because they must produce _their life, in a 
definite way. 69 Work, however, changes not only the object at which 
it is directed, but also the labouring subject itself; it transforms 
not only external nature, but human nature also. Not only the 
objective conditions change in the act of reproduction, but the 
producers change also, in that they bring out new qualities in them-
selves, develop new powers and ideas, new modes of intercourse, new 
needs and new languages. 
---~-
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~The appropriation of these forces (i.e. forces of production) 
is itself nothing more than the development of individual 
capacities corresponding to the material instruments of 
productiQn. For this very reason, the appropriation-of a 
totality of instruments of production is the development of a 
totality of capabilities in the individual themselves."70 
The historically first production of an object i.s usually, as 
far as subjective skills are concerned, not yet adequate. usually, 
it is due to "fortunate accidents", to a conjunction of circum-
stances in which the object can be c_reated by the help of extant 
"imperfect" capacities. 
This "accident" can naturally occur without any human intervention, 
but may be on a higher stage - the result of active human exploration, 
too. On~y in the regularly recurring process of production can man 
master his own form of activity, the "play of his own forces", and 
develop in himself the corresponding skill as "an integral ability." 71 
The universality of man in this sense characterizes only a 
tendency "inherent" in work as a specifically human activity. This 
philosophical concept of work is not reducible to merely technical 
action, but designates the material activity ~f h~an self-transformation 
existing always in some social form. And it is this social form in 
its historical concreteness- i.e. as some historical type of social 
relations of production - that determines the mode, the rate and the 
limits of realization of this tendency, in each historical epoch, 
within any given socio-economic formation. Marx definitely stresses 
tba t it is the relations of production tba t ''determine the whole 
character and the whole movement of production. "72 They do not simply 
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accelerate or decelerate, "promote or hinder" a supposedly 
irresistible process of "technical" development, but they define the 
real social con-:ii tiona of its materialization in general. (Fig. 6) 
Marx views work in a two-fold dimension and significance·. P.e 
examines human productive activity pri~arily as a process of anthro-
pological~-sociological character, as that of the self-creation and 
self-transformation of .men in the course of history. He also regards 
work as a process of natural-evolutionary character as the highest 
form and type of the evolution of nature. 
The two aspects of human sociality- communal character and socio-
historic determinateness- reciprocally presuppose each other. The 
historically created and objectified material ani mental powers can 
be appropriated by the individual only within a human community, 
through the intercourse ~ith other human beings. Marx does not stop 
at such gene~al, philosophical descriptions of the social character 
of human material life activity. What he aims at, is first of all to 
understand the socio-productive life of a historically given con-
creteness, that is, of a given population, 73 simultaneously as a social 
totality capable of self-reproduction, and as a moment in the process 
of historical development. Marx regards the economic structure of any 
society as a system of relations and institutions ensuring the 
continuous reproduction of the material elements and_ condi tiona of 
its own functioning. In each viable society there must be first of 
all social mechanisms securing the constant recurrent unification of 
the basic potential factors of production, of its objective and 
subjective conditions; the unification of the means of production 
(instru~ents and materials of labour, natural resources included) 
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69 
with the active, living ability of labour, existing as a labour force 
of a given historic specification an1 embodied in the population as 
a whole. 
The soci~l mechanism which realizes this connection and 
unification of the potential elements of pro1uction process equals the 
relations of production. Their core is constituted by a ''d.istribution 
of the elements of production •.'vhich precedes the 1istribution of social 
products and is presupposed by it". 74 by a distribution which is 
comprised within the process of production itself and determines the 
structure of production. 75 This distribution has a two-fold character: 
it means the distribution of the means of production among the 
different groups of population and the distribution of the members of 
society among the great "classes" of the means of production 
corresponding to the basic social branches and kinds of production and 
econo;y in general (relations of division of labour). 76 Through this 
two-fold distribution, the population, the living totality of society 
becomes divided, stratified into basic social groups, so that the 
indivi1uals belonging to them acquire thereby a definite social 
character; they become particular historic agents of production. 
Thus, men's relations to things as objective factors of conditions 
of their production process mediate the social relations among men. 
And through this mediation these things themselves acquire some 
definite socio-economic quality. In the real process of social 
production the objects have not only a "material content" a socio-
bistorically created utility, but a social form too. So, we may 
perhaps say that in social life human products function not only 
use", but also in a network of social relations which define the 
··~-~ ~_ • .,.,.,...... ...... ~"'.t•<-'1.~ ··-~-;-~ ....... , ... , ...... -···-·· 
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conditions an"i character of their social employment. Of course the 
social cr.aracter of man is not confined to the sphere an1 acts of 
production alone. 77 
Sociality characterizes the whole indivi~ual, permeates all the 
forms of life activity. Uarx analyses the historical processes as 
a result of which there emerge specific and relatively independent 
institutional spheres of social activity. The examination of the 
interrelationship of these spheres with that of material production 
constitutes one of the most basic aspects of the materialist con-
ception_of history, which it is not possible to 1iscuss in detail 
here. What one has to underline once more is that these spheres 
cannot be conceived as something external to the individuals involved 
in them. They develop their own, historically changing norms, they 
make demands on the in-divi1uals concerned whic:r. are, again, to a 
historically and socially variable degree; internalized, accepted or 
actively rejected b7 the persons involved in, or affected by, these 
activities. 
These '' distinctions" and relationships have different significance 
in different periods. It is in this way that in the Harxist conception, 
historical development appears as a p~ocess in ~hich man progressively 
becomes a universal natural being and within the same process there 
appears a universal social being; the life of every an1 each 
individual becomes dependent upon the activity of a growing circle 
of other indiviiuals, that is the community in the broader sense. 
~arx's intended meaning is this: every interaction between ~an 
and nature which goes beyond the embryonic animal stage occurs within 
the·f.i.'nmewor'r: of a definite social form 1 but not_ev.ery ore of these 
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forms is a "society", in the sense of bourgeois society, society par 
excellence. He therefore avoided using this concept to refer to 
pre-capitalist relations. He used instead the terms "community of 
II 
natural origin", ''kinship group/, or ''tribe". The distinction between 
what is "naturally" given and what has "historically" evolved may 
perhaps be valid for the individual phases of pre-capitalist history, 
although Karx repeatedly pointed out that all naturally given forms 
are also the "results of a historical process".?? However the 
distinction between Asiatic despotism, the slave economy of classical 
antiquity, and medieval feudalism (three forrns of social relationship 
which are all determined by land ownership), fades into insignificance 
in face of bourgeois societ~whose emergence constitutes a decisive 
rupture in worl:i history. Like Hegel's form.S.of nature, the different ~ 
forms of t~e pre-capitalist community stand beside each other as 
"indifferent". ''unconnected,. forms of existence. Only through the 
eyes of theory does the modification of a form, without itself arising 
from that form, prove to oe its higher stage of development. For 
r.larx, therefore, the course of history is far less linear than has 
commonly been assumed; it does not proceed in accordance with a 
uniforrn interpretative idea, but is composed of constantly changing 
individual processes. 
The bourgeois social forrnation has a methodologically decisive 
role in dialectical materialism in that it provides the starting point 
for disclosing both the past and possibilities of the future. ~arx 
was the very opposite of a simple evolutionist. In itself, the 
historically higher stage is grounded in the lower; but the 
qualitative distinction between the lower form and the higher form 
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is fully develope1 and has already become the object of an immanent 
critique: "the anatomy of man is key to the anatomy of the ape." 
But the intimations of a higher animal in lo•.Yer ones can o'nly be 
understood if the higher animal is already known. The bourgeois 
economy furnishes the key to the economy of feudal, H,.. 5- tv classical 
etc. But not with tte method of those of the economists, who erase 
·all historical differences and see bourgeois society in ev~ry 
social formation. 78 The so-calle1 historical development rests on 
this basis, t~at the last form considers its predecessors as stages 
leading up to itself, ani always conceives them one-sidedly ••• as it 
is seldom ••• capable of self-criticism ••••• Thus the bourgeois 
economy first came to understand the feudal, the classical and the 
oriental economies as soon as the self criticism of bourgeois society 
79 has begun. 
1.8 Unity and Diversity of the Eistorical Process 
The process of progressive broadening of the range of human 
activity at the sarue time coincides- with regard to tte general trend 
of human history- with a process of the growth of men's autonomy in 
relation to their immediate environment 2nd social group. The 
individual becomes and is a human indiviiual precisely because he 
actively engages and participates in this process, and this is possible 
only because he has appropriated some of the pbjectified resulte and 
achievements of previous human progress within tte limits of his time 
end on the scale of his own soci~:l possibilities. Thus the real unity 
of the human species itself cannnt be truly comprehendei apart from 
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this historical process, but only in and through it. 
So if we mean by ''anthropology" some extra- or suprahistorical 
(or even simply ahistorical) characterization of human traits, then 
!.1arx hae no anthropology, ani he would deny the usefulness of such 
an anthropology for the understanding of man's essence. 
If, on the other hand, we would understand by anthropology an 
answer given to tr.e question about human essenc~an attempted 
"' resolution of the question: "whP.t is essentially man? then there is 
a Uarxist anthropology~ only it is not an abstraction from history~ 
but rather an abstraction of history itself. 80 
Thus Varx's conception is diametrically opposed to all those 
trends of thought which sharply divide and counterpose anthropology 
and sociology or archaeology which set the study of man's essence in 
opposition to the socio-historical study of man. For Marx, the '!human 
essence" lies precisely in the essence _o'r' inner unity of the total 
social development of hurne1nity.81 The bearer or subject of the "human 
essence" for l'arx is not the single individual, but human society 
apprehended in the continuity of its historical change and develop~ent. 
This fact is utilized by all who- like K. Popper- accuse rarx of 
t l.. h t . f . t . t . d. . d 1 
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r,e ~YPOS azat1.on o soc1.e y l.n o a super-l.n, l.Vl. ua • Nothing could 
be more unjust than this charge. In the ~arxist ~onception society is 
nothing else but the totality of the actual relations of real, 
concrete, historical individuals; it could not therefore exist 
externally to or above those individuals as a kind of super-entity 
composed of them as subordinated elements~ nor as a v&lue independent 
of, and transcendent to, them. The separation of society as such 
frorn the life-activity of the individuals who constitute it and the 
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opposition of one to the other is for Yarx a typical ideological 
illusion occasioned by the realities of the historical period of 
alienation; it is the distorted reflection of the facts of alienated 
. 83 SOC1ety. 
As Marx emphasizes, individuals always start with themselves. 84 
But as he also points out, society is not. merely a mechanical 
agglomeration of the individuals who constitute it. "Society does 
not consist of individuals but expresses the sum of interrelations 
and relations within which these individuals stand."B5 
From this perspective history appears not only as technological 
development but also as an anthropological progress. But thus far 
in history this process has not rueant, simultaneouslyPthe emergence 
of increasingly universal and free individuals. From the point of 
view of individuals there is no unified and uneq_uivocal criterion 
with the help of ·l'!hich we could comprehend history as "development". 
First history is "development", even if we consider it as a "succession" 
of individuals, understanding this term in the broad sense. in which 
it designates simply all irreversible processes. Further. even in 
prehistory there can occur (especially in the "progressive" phase of 
a society) shorter or longer historical periods when the conditions 
are created for a relatively many-sided interne l "development" for 
relatively broad groups of individuals. 
Still the above generalization stands, especially if we consider 
not the representative but the average individuals of successive 
epochs. Far from the individual's point of view, we cannot character-
ize the historical process with a single definite direction, due to 
its contradictory tendencies. This is perheps what differentiates 
= 
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mankind's "prehistory" from his future "actual" real history.· For 
the concept of prehistory which traverses 1'arx' s whole life work 'is f 
not to be understoo~ as a simple metaphor. The process of human 
"genesis" is, according to }!.erx. not completed •.Yith the formation of 
Eomo as a biological species, a species to which organisms with 
definite, constant an1 identical biological and anthropophysical 
characteristics belong. Social genesis is the process of prehistory 
which at the end, gives rise to the human species as mankind, as a 
real and conscious unity of interacting and interconnected individuals 
on the one han1, and the concrete, many-sided and ''mul tidirnen sional'' 
human individuality which truly represents the historically achieved 
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stage of development of the "genus" on the other. 
This process simultaneously appears as the transformation of all 
those determinations of individuals which, although in themselves 
social, in earlier stages of development appeared to them as unchange-
able natural traits inseparable from their concrete personality 
-r and external to .social determinations which they, 
themselves may alter through their ovm forces. This is undoubteily a 
process of "depersonalization" but it creates the subjective pre-
conditions for man's mastery over his own social relations and 
determinations. It means that the changes in social life are to be 
understood as "self-movement" from the inner dynamics of society 
itself, and not the mechanical dependence of social activity on the 
ready-made external material conditions, and thus it does not postulate 
but even excludes a fatalistic predetermination of the total historical 
87 process. ~very generation acts "unner determinant circumstances" on y 
the grounds of the forces of production, institutions and cultural 
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values inheritei and appropriated from the past. But every generation 
also modifies and transforms these factors and conditions, if only 
because these conditions have to be constantly reproduced by human 
activity. (Fig. 7) There is always a definite scope of action given 
by the objective conditions of life, a range of developmental possi-
bilities and alternatives. Men themselves choose in their actual 
practice among these possibilities. The realization of one or another 
of these alternatives is determined by the entirety of concrete human 
activities. 
Y!ha t follows is that neither the actual course of ) 
history nor the developmental tendencies of its particular epochs can 
be comprehenden through some sort of abstract formula, but only through 
an analysis of actual life relations, socio-economic conditions, and 
forms of activity growing out of them. 
1.9 Ethnographic Interpretations: Possibilities and Reality 
For a study relying on the historical-materialistic method86 the 
data provided by ethnography constitutes the material from which one 
attempts to extract the general traits which will be employed for the 
reconstruction of particular stages of social development, irrespective 
of the time and the location of the society in question. This allows 
for comparison and correlation between various peoples who represent 
one and tl:e "same" historical type. It is possible therefore (although 
this leads of course to supplementary problems) to group under one 
"type". the primitive hunter-gatherers, aborigines of Australia or 
the Kalahari desert, tbe South-In~Uan Ka-iar and the Eskimo. for in 
FIG l. 7 
11 
Factors that can be moiifiei by man ani their 
interrelationships. ~here l = logical consistency, 
2 laws of nature. 3 = scientific kno~leige. 
4 = technological knowledge. 5 = physical resources, 
6 = physical ''acceptance" and 7 = political legal 
and moral structures. 
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spite of the fact that these societies are located in different 
natural ani geographical environments an1 in different socio-historical 
conditions, they nevertheless have many aspects in common in their 
. - . 1 t. 89 sOclO-economlc re a 10ns. 
By similarity of the socio~economic relations of these societies, 
we refer to their economic structure, forms of property. division of 
labour, the role of the community as tte basic economic cell of the 
society, its composition. the relations between com~unities an~ the 
families which compose them, and the dependence of the size of the 
population of the communities on ecological conditi?ns. or the regular 
correlation between seasonal environme&tal cycles ani ~easonal 
migrations, population size. These are the main indices of the 
characteristics of the socio-economic base of these societies and are 
not superstructural or casual randomly selecte.j phenomer.a. Consequently, 
when we say that these societies belong to a historical type, we mean 
that they represent human society at a particular level of socio-
economic development, or a particular stage in their formation. This 
makes possible the discovery of general laws of the socio-historical 
process;_ an:l on this basis it is possible to reconstruct the past 
of these societies that have been through a ''definite'~ stage of social 
development, on the assumption that, to a certain extent, the same 
laws were applicable then as now. 
In principle there seems to be no reason why contemporary 
"primitive'' societiee should be substantil!lly unrepresentative of 
those in the past. The concrete application cf hi_storical naterialisrn,however 
comes up against definite difficulties arising from the question of the 
comparability or congruence of the compared entities. In-recognizing the 
character 
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of the relations that exist between the economic base and the socio-
ideological superstructure. one must also recognize that the 
relations to be foun·i in today' s ''aboril!inal" societies r.larify the 
relations that exi~ted in prehi~tory.- One of the problems arising 
is that one wouli expect greater diversity in economy and in social 
organization than occurs in mo~ern representatives of this way of 
life; interpretations based on contemporary hunting and gathering 
societies, for example, must be attempted with caution. The reason 
is, that it has been shown that most extant hunting and gathering 
societies do not exist in any "palaeolithic purity'', but have been 
considerably influenced by capitalist expansion in o~e way or another.90 
The singling out of proto- or para- or ethno-history, should be 
transferred on.to another level. Being part of total historical 
science, the history of primitive society is subdivided into history 
dealing with the perio~ ending with the emergence of most ancient 
civilizations, and the history of societi_es coexisting with the class 
society. Belonging to similAr types of primitive societies the 
"precla ss" ani "epicla ss ·· societies di:'fer in the degree of the 
"relation'' of their development. This differentiation allows one to 
avoid a possible a!llbiguity of the word 'rprimitive" and is clearer. 
as regards notions and functions; it allo-s for comparisons of socio-
economic relations along the most general lines. particularly and 
" ~ most importantly the relation~ of production and in this respect 
., 
~ changes in the whole social structure. 
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empirical considerations. Archaeological and ethnographic data on 
pre-class societies are spotty an1 ambiguous. Archaeological data 
on all but the broad outlines of socio-economic organization are 
generally suggestive, not conclusive, and to find records of a non-
literate society means, of course, that it had already come into 
contact with, and hence been in some way affected by, the relations 
of commodity production. A basic dilemma, therefore, confronts the 
attempt to reconstruct the early stages of human history from the 
evidence at hani. Reconstructing fully communal societies as they 
functioned before becoming involved in trade and warfare with Europeans 
or with the state-societies that existed elsewhere in the world, 
necessitates making certain assumptions about the social an1 political 
forms that are concomitant with living at simpler technological levels. 
Yet reconstruction itself is needed to demonstrate the correctness 
of the theoretical assumptions. Instances where data on pre-class 
social relations are "clear" are therefore of great importance. Where 
materials are available for ethnohistorical research into a given 
primitive culture, they reveal fundamental changes of the type that 
have been taking place independently in various parts of the world, or 
have been developing rapidly during recent centuries of colonial rul~v 
the breaking down of the corporate kin group into individual families 
and the individualization of property rights, the down-grading of 
women's status, the strengthening of rank, and the usurpation of 
r 
powers by chiefs);' in short, the basis for class society. 91 
I 
An essential critical point to note here seems to be that the 
greater the distance that separates a social or cultural phenomenon 
from the sphere of production, the less are the possibilities of 
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predicting this phenomenon with certainty. However, it is possible 
to predict the form of social relations which are "functionally" 
related to production and which are dependent upon the level of social 
development, as for example the form of the community which is the 
basic unit of production in primitive society. 
There is another factor to be reckoned with. The very fact that 
certain "tribes" have lagged behind in their development poses the 
question whether they may be identified with the primitive tribes of 
the "old world" which advanced at a "higher" rate and, therefore 
whether the geographic and historical factors which, among other things, 
caused "stagnation" did not play a significant role. This is connected 
especially with the less "developed" tribes of hunters and gatherers 
and even under certain circumstances - with pastoralists-agricultur-
alists. We have already discussed that one of the factors conditioning 
the specificity of the development of diverse regions was the difference 
in the speed of their evolution. Whether or not primitive history is 
"stagnant" or followed simply a slow rate of development, depends upon 
one's understanding of the term stagnation. Absolute stagnation is 
to be found neither in nature nor in history. Primitive history 
lasted at least two million years, whereas class societies have existed 
for just five thousand years. The evaluation depends on the criteria 
of comparison and on whether we are speaking of primitive society in 
its prime or of its decline. Such societies, it is true, degenerated 
in part and may be regarded as ''deformed". But the view of economic-
cultural "types" opens up possibilities for comparing societies of a 
similar type, regardless of the area of their location and cultural 
continuity; the~/ are not the equivalents therefore, but merely the 
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analogues of primitive ones. 92 And since the ethnographic method is 
restricted by limits of time and of subject matter, the method of 
survivals is an important supplement to it. It may be extended to 
all the stages of the history of primitive mankind and used for the 
study of super-structural phenomena (institutions and ideas) to the 
same extent as for basis phenomena (those pertaining to the economic 
sphere). 
It appears that there are two main points of view within the use 
\ $ l 
of the. survival'S method of interpretation. One, already mentioned,QS / 
that hardly anyone will fin'l such survivals of the past which would 
not undergo a change through conditions of a later period or become 
the elements of the system which has absorbed them; and the other 
possible one, a survival of the past which has retained its old form 
but acquired a new content. 93 In this case the analysis of the outward 
specifics alone offers certain opportunities for the reconstruction of 
phenomena of previous historical periods. Even if we cannot affirm 
that in a certain palaeolithic society there existed a certain kinship 
system (e.g. matrilineal or patrilineal because the functions of kin-
ship are not as "closely'' related to production as is the community 
and they are primarily the means of organization of family reproduction 
etc.), nevertheless we can assert that the community was the main 
structural unit of pre-agricultural society at any period and under 
any circumstances. In all casesi a certain regularity is found in 
its structure, population, relative mobility. the form of sexual and 
age division of labour, these being determined by the interaction of 
production and the natural environment as well as the conditions of 
production. It is possible thus, to "predict" in an approximate way 
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the form and magnitude of the life of a hunting community, having in 
rnin:i that this metho·i is far more "effective" when applied to socio-
economic, rather t~an to socio-iieological structures. 
Any particu~9r human society represents on~c~ncrete historical 
form of existence of a particular social for~ation. The formation and 
the single society are as essence ani phenomenon,/ ·the general 
and the particular, in which ani through which only ~hat is general 
can exist. As with any phenomenon in the material world, social 
organis~s have both general generic features and specific individual 
features. This is why any present-day .individual society, is a society 
of a particular type, one of the many societies of a given type, that 
is of a given social formation. ~ence in the analysis of a current 
society studied by ethnography, it is possible to find not only unique 
and particular traits of its development but also the general, typical 
features that create the possibilities of comparing it with societies 
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of the same type in the past. 
At any period, the internal mechanism of societies of a given 
type are always based upon concrete laws, which are "restricted" to 
the societies of the type in question; but the manifestations of the 
internal l~~s of societies af t~e same type can differ as 8 result of 
concrete causes and this diversity is present even between societies 
of the same type. 
These "ensembles"of elements. perhaps more than any others. are 
crucial for unierstanding why Uarx an·1 ':mgels attached so much more 
significance to the re-analysis of history and anthropology and they 
gave an ever-growing importance to the study ani understanding of 
~ pre-capitalist societies. The rewritinf of history was not so much a 
l 
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matter of starting again, but of making use, for a new purpose, of 
knowledge which was already available, whether in the work of philo-
sophers like Hegel, economi?ts like Ricarn.o, biologists like ~arwin 
or anthropologists like Morgan. This ne~ use, meant a severe criticism 
nf the earlier knowleige, since Marx believed that the studies he ~as 
using had originally been mane for exactly the opposite purpose to 
his own: thet they had been in order to justify the oppression which 
he saw as the core of the capitalist system. This was particularly 
true, 1~arx felt, of economists; but he 1.vas to show that it was also 
true of some anthropologists. Naturally Marx started by explaining 
the historical mechanism and inner working of the social system which 
dominated the conditions of the working class at the time he wrote on 
capitalism. However, in order to expose the nature of capitalism, hlarx 
first had to show that capitalism is ·not based on some eternal, inim'uta ble 
truth, but is the product of a long history; for example, the law of 
supply and demand was not simply a matter of eternal logic, nor were 
such rights as that of private property self-evident truths, but 
rather they were tte product of particular historical circumstances. 
Those circumstances had brought about the capit&list system and also 
created the conc~pts on which it was based. In showing capitalism 
and capitalist values to be the creation of a moment of history. Uarx 
negated the transcendental claim of capitalism to be the only possible 
natural system of the "civilized" world. One obvious way to demonstrate 
that the capitalist system was a specific historical product was to 
show that it was not always so. 
It is in this general perspective, aimed to analyse the links 
between the relations of 'production and the nature of the systems in 
~hict they ~ere located. ttat ~arx ani Engels turnei to the available 
anthropological information of pre-literate peoples. assuming t~at 
!eince t~ese ·•:ere t~e most distant fror.J the capitnlist syster.J tJ-:ey ~·:ould 
manifest tte n;ost "r1ifferent'' social relations of production. 
T~ey particularly looked for evidence relating to the topics they 
focuse1 on, that is, mainly the relationships existing between people 
engaged in the process of production, as well as the property and the 
family. 
Varx's attitude to the numerous anthropological works which came 
out between 1860 ard 18b0 was in part one of "shared enthusiasm'' for 
evolutionary theory, but elso in part one of suspicion. This suspicion 
had two r.:~ain causes: he felt that many·of the anthropologists under-
rated the significance of thought, ani secondly he suspected t~e 
political n;otives of at least sor.Je of them. 
In t~at respect it is understandable why - amongst other things -
1\'arx an0. Engels attacte-i so much more importance to t~e ·-·10rk of rorgan 
than they did to the ~ork of other anthropologists. Korgan was an 
idealist ani utopian but al~o anti-aristocratic and cor.:~r.:~unitarian in 
hin abstract opposition to property; be did not conceive that the 
modern social system is in a "crisis that •.vill end only by its 
elimination", and he never proposed concrete means to carry out tte 
programme of abolishing that which had aroused his distaste. Yet, 
Karx and Yorgan, in different ways, called for the revival of the 
archaic commune with regard to property, equality an1 the organization 
of society. 
Here of course we have to refer to the periodization discussions. 
The problem of periodization has occupied thinkers from ancient times 
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to the present. No perio1ization is capable of embracing the entire 
variety of historical development of peoples, ani of taking account 
of all its variants an1 objective ~ogic of development. 95 Marx and 
Engels were quite aware of that1 they consider the claseificatio!'l 
not as an end but as a means leading to the critique of the social process 
of social relations, and to the changing of society (by this critique). 
Uarx•s periodization is not a broad social classification but an 
economic one. P.is discussions did not have as their end the positing 
of the epochs, which are forms of society but, through their depiction, 
he intended to reach through to the process which precedes the formation 
of the capital relation and its original accumulation. This is a 
dialectic of social "statics'' and. dynamics. There is nothing fixed 
and eternal about labour in society. The method that.Uarx followed is 
set forth in-the introductory chapter and in the beginning of "Capital" 
tas well as in the "Grundrisse"). The method is not to allow the 
economic categories to succeed each other in the order in which they 
are historically determined, but rather in the _order in which th~y appear 
in "The critique of Political Economy" is determined by the relation that 
the categories bear to each other in the society. Uarx had in view 
not the forms and stages themselves but the process of social labour 
(and capital) in society. 
Morgan seems to suggest,_ however tentatively, reasons why one 
stage should change into another in the idea that the processes of 
evolution themselves lead to the destruction of the stages they 
produced. Morgan was the only one of the nineteenth century anthro-
pologists who, like Marx, was interested in what led to the transformatio 
of one social system into another, an~ in whet lei to the break-up of 
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past systems. The major shortcoming of Yorgan's periodization lies 
in tr.e fact tr.at it was not a periodization of the history of society 
itself. The scepticism of:Uarx, relative to tte use of the Iroqu~is 
96 data for example, as a model for interpretation of other societies, 
constitutes a further movement away from the fixity of categories, 
and carries the general loosening of the stages of evolution both 
forth and back in time. 97 
The development of productive forces is certainly the basis for 
the development of society. but 1oes not coincide witt it. Even major 
turning points in the evolution of productive forces do ~ot lead 
automatically or at once to a change in the relationships of production 
or other social relationships. 98 As for less significant changes, they 
may be merely accumulating, lead to changes in social relationships, 
first in the economic and then in tr.e ideological field. It is not 
change in the prQductive forces, considered alone, but the more or 
less significant reorganization of the economic relationships of 
production, which in their totality constitute the basis-or foundation 
of society, the criterion for the onset of a new stage in the develoP-
ment of society. Changes in the material relationships among men, of 
which the most important are relationships to the means of production, 
result in change in all the others. ,.,hich arise as a superstructure 
uponthe formeri i.e. brings about the transformation of society as 
a whole. 
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1.10 Historical Uaterialism and the Dynamics of "Primitive" Societ.y 
The Marxist theory of society is based on recognition of the 
primary importance of production. It is natural, then, that a 
"typology" of modes of production should be the foundation of the 
classification of social structures and periodization of the historical 
process. (Table i) Men begin to differentiate themselves from animals 
as soon as they acquire the ability to produce what they need to live. 
As they produce these means, they reproduce the social relationships 
that have developed. The methods employed to acquire the means of 
subsistence determine the stages in the evolution of social structure. 
Any production, even the most primitive, presumes a corresponding 
organization, division, and differentiation of labour. But the 
character of the organization for production, and consequently of all 
economic relationships and of social relationships as a whole, differs 
widely. At this point though, a question arises. Is the "concept" of 
the primitive society justifiable, and is it right to single out the 
primitive society as a specific social-economic structure in human 
history? In general terms a Karxist answer entails that the primitive 
society is a part of human history, and that the process of production 
(including relations) is the "economy", the mode of existence of 
humanity and the foundation of social life. The dominant relationships 
in all pre-capitalist societies were 'economic', formulated under 
different successive historical epochs and with local variations. 
In the very early stages of human history the economy was 
appropriative. This appropriation, as Engels comments, was not labour 
in the strict sense of the word, because labour begins with the making 
of tools. Still embryonic forms of production and division of labour 
:Principal Modes 
and Subtypes 
Primitive 
Communalist 
Hunting 
Lineage 
Ancient 
Asiatic 
Classic 
African 
Feudal 
Capitalist 
Petty agrarian 
l~ercantile 
Industrial/monopoly 
Socialist 
Advanced communist 
Categories of Social 
Relations of Production 
Solidarity 
Kinship 
State 
Citizen/slave 
Bureaucratic state 
Communal village 
Landlord 
Peasant 
Bourgeois 
Proletarian 
Proletarian state 
Table 1: a typology of modes of production 
(after T. Wessman, 1981) 
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Modes of Appropriation 
of Surplus 
Communal 
Taxation 
Tribute 
Rent 
T'rofit 
Social 
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appeared even ·in these early stages. Elements of organization of 
~ark are alrea~y present among gatherers. Among hunters an.l fishers 
the elements are quite explicit. Eere "!e :nay have the initial 
transition from a naturally developei division of labour based upon 
age ann sex different from one based on occupations. 
Unlike the industrial revolution, and the revolution in science 
and technology at present, the transition from an appropriative to a 
producing economy required an historical epoch of a quite considerable 
duration. This circumstance also was manifested in the evolution of 
social relationships. The long coexistence of transitional forms in 
the economy became the source of heterogeneity and polymorphism on 
the actual social organisms characteristic of that stage. 
t'arx' s argument is the t the division of labour in primitive society 
arose on a t''~O-fol1 basis. One, a pbysiolog~cal found at ion· in relation 
to production wherein the ·natural division of labour expands its 
material by the extension of the size of the community, increase of 
population and by inter-tribal arrangements. Two, the social division 
of labour is likewise based on exchange between communities, in the 
primitive condition of mankind. ~arx asserted ttat the division of 
labour within the family is further developed in that of the tribe; 
he took no position that the family is further developed into the tribe. 
~arx's statement regarding the relation between the division of labour 
in the family and in the tribe is indirectly related to that of the 
rel3tion of family and tribe. The issue next concerned the principle of 
n-
the gens in its relation to the tribe on the one side and the 
family on the other. 99 
Varx continued his systematic separation of the family from other 
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institutions of primitive society, wherein he followed ~organ's 
initiative, applying the differentiation to the separation of patriarch 
from gens/tribe, likewise to the relevant forms of property and its 
-~ 
transmission. Private property in land is not to be directly derived 
in his theory from the collective property but came gradually to 
replgce it in transition to political society, just as control over the 
gens and the family; the position of Uarx is that Uaine's conception, 
of the private family es being the basis out of which the sept and clan 
are developed, is completely wrong. Civilized society is artificial, 
being pervaded with "fictionsn, practices not found in primitive 
communities. The joint family has a secondary character and is 
separated from the primitive commune. 
The relation of the family to society at the onset of the prehistoric 
process ~is interesting from t_his point of view, only insofar as it is 
related abstractly to the question of the relation of the family a~d 
society in the period of gentile society and its transition on 
"civilization", otherwise the question of the "horde" is entirely a 
conjectural matter; the comments introduced by ~arx into the excerpts 
from Phear, ~aine, Morgan an1 Lubbock re~eal the direction that he took 
in the course of working them out. In the development of society from 
~·savagery" to ''civilization", the family in its various forrns was 
separated from society and became one of the sets of relations maintained 
by its members. 
The collective institutions of the family, community, village, 
gens and association of primitive societies are rather unitary, tnat 
is, they are not deeply riven; the effect on the indivi~ual is that 
they are subjectively comforting, ob~iectively they are not iespotic, 
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for this wouli implY the existence of an institution of hegemony 
that would contradict the relative simplicity of primitive social 
organization. Formally, most, if not all. the intermediating social 
institutio~s of community and association can be found in primitive 
societies; the difference from civilized society is that in the 
former case their interrelation is either zero or not highly developed, 
nor is their mutual opposition. On the contrary, in civilized society 
the relations or the collectivities to each other, and the individual 
within them, are divisive on the one side, privative on the other and 
the interests of the collectivities are opposed to each other within 
the same society. 
The essence of the matter is that the destruction of primitive-
communal society, which in itself was a progressive phenomenon, 
contained a "threatening danger" to the furt.her development of society. 
Actually, no matter how low the level of productive forces of primitive-
communal society may have been. it indubitably possessed one enormous 
advantage; the struggle against nature was con1ucted by a united front 
of that society. The entire primitive tribe participatei in this 
motion and of course this unity contained a vast power. However, with 
the growth of the productive forces and the breakdown of the primitive 
communal system, this unity begins to disappear and subsequently the 
individual clans or extended families into which the primitive hordes 
began to decompose remained isolated, not uniting, inasmuch as, in 
the conditions in which they usually existed, no stimulus to reunion 
on a broader basis existed. 
Certain basic considerations can be derived from the above. First 
the relation of the family to the society and its State (1ater) 9 must 
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be separated from the relation of the family to society without the 
State. The form of the family is likewise variable. Second, the 
antagonisms of society and the State are only later broadly developed 
on the large scale, and the two kinds of antagonisms are therefore 
separated both in time and in quantity. Third, the family that contains 
a relation to services is an economic unit both of production and of 
consumption - which does not happen in industrial society where the 
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As had been said earlier, the primitive community was simultane-
ously the economic unit, the whole within which the group and everyday 
life proceede~ :. and the ideological collective. Under the condi tiona 
of the technology at the time, the community served not only as a 
supplemental force of production but as a prerequisite for production. 
It is precisely this that explains the circumstances that both within 
the commune as the unit of production and daily life and outside it, 
in the more complex social organisms of primitive society. the group 
(taken on diverse forms) presents itself as a naturally developed union 
of kinsmen. Marx and Engels realized the importance of kinship systems, 
not as a category which explains but on the contrary as a category 
that has to be explained. They recognized that kinship systems are 
part of a reality whose functioning constitutes the deeper logic of 
a social historical existence; despite their distinctiveness, com-
plexity and non-uniformity for all societies, they do exhibit some 
11 regularities'' in a process of change. They are not subject, of course, 
to cumulative evolution, but under certain conditions they can 
accumulate common traits with contacting cultures for example or even 
with different economic conditions. As with language. the kinship 
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syste~ belongs to the class of phenomena which can be differentiated 
in space and they can reflect so~e historical and structural regular-
ities as their particular arid concrete ~an ifesta tion. "The tribal 
co~~unity" wr-ites V.arx in- the."Formen", "or if you will, the herd, the 
com~on ties of blood, language, custom etc., is the first precondition 
of the appropriation of the objective conditions of life and of the 
activity which reproduces and gives material expression to, or 
objectifies it (activity as herdsmen, hunters, agriculturalist, etc.)." 
What requires explanation,according to Marx, is "not the unity of living 
and active human beings with the natural. inorganic con1itions of their 
metabolism with nature, and therefore their appropriation of nature •• 
but the separation of these inorganic conditions of human existence 
from this active existence, a separation which is only fully completed 
in the relationship between wage-labour and capital." 
Marx and Engels' first concern with anthropological material was 
to show the variety that exists in the nature of social. relations and 
the historical peculiarity of a society where one group of people 
treats others only in respect of the labour they provide, labour which 
then can be bought and sold as though it was any other useful article. 
In the same way therefore as they had turned to primitive society for 
finding the opposite of capitalist relations of production, they turned 
to them for a form of family which was the opposite of the private, 
capitalist family, one that appeared in the community of a much larger, 
undivided group. 
The transformation of the primitive gens from matrilineal to patri-
lineal resulted in the break-up of the gentile commune. This is of 
course a debatable issue not only among western (mainly French) 
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llarxists but also among Soviet scientists, where it res Jed t<? the development 
of differing schools of ~arxist ethnography for the interpretation of 
certain specific questions c_oncerning primitive society such as, first 
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appearanC-e of gentile society, caste systems etc. Even with the 
evidence they had at the time, Marx and Engels tnok- account of the fact 
that whereas the decay of collective property and the appearance of 
private property necessarily give rise to a tendency for matrilineal 
filiation to be replaced by patrilineal, the effectuation of this 
tendency depended upon specific historical conditions; in certain 
cases- replacement -of matrilineal reckoning of kinship may occur rather 
early and in others, very late, sometimes not until early class society 
has been reached. Therefore, while the presence of patrilineal 
filiation and the patriarchal gens in a particular society may be 
evidence that it has already to some degree been affected by processes 
of "decay", the retention in a given society of matrilineal filiation 
and even matrilineal gens in itself, tells nothing of the stage of 
development. 
It may be a gentile society in process of establishment, or a very 
early form of class society. Sometimes the two systems may coexist. 
As a consequence, the periodization of gentile society should be based 
not upon the replacement of on-e filiation by an_other, but upon those 
profound changes unierlying this substitution, and upon changes in the 
relations ~9f production, above all in property relations. 
There is an important point here. We can always approach what 
anthropologists have calle1 kinship relations in two ways: on the one 
hand we can take the total society and ask how it forms its kinship 
groups and how they function, and on the other, we_ can look at the 
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network of relationships that ''organize" and bind individuals to 
each other in a network of kinship, that is, structures that are 
determined by social-economic relations independent of genetic-
biological hypotheses. In any case, the direct observation of the 
latter factor, as a prerequisite of changes (or resistance to them) 
allows for a more subtle analysis and reconstruction than one which 
is achieved by pre-accepted kin typologies and terminologies. 
The problem of the passage from gentile to caste system, according 
to Marx, entails the destruction of the principle of equality and 
the appearance of social stratification. Marx's comment was an hypo-
thetical query: can the gentes give rise to the formation of caste, 
particularly if conquest is added to the gens principle? This concerns 
the manner in which the one is added to the other. Thus the abstract 
principle of the gens has as its opposit~ a concrete social 
organization, caste on the one side, and conquest on the other. In 
its transition the gens, by difference in social ran~can petrify 
into its opposite, caste. This is the most explicitly dialectical 
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of all Marx's formulations in the Morgan notebook Jwhereln the 
opposition between an abstraction, the principle of gen?and a series 
of concretions, conquest, caste and differentiation in social ran~ is 
posited. 
A third problem concerns the topic linked to the relations of 
production and the family; the nature of the property. Marx's 
commentaries - in regard to Maine and upon the thesis of Morgan that 
government in primitive societies is personal and founded upon 
relations that are personal - were very clear: he responded, that 
the relations of property and government in primitive society are 
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neither personal nor impersonal but collective. 
Nevertheless, Morgan's work contained the notion that primitive 
society was totally without private property, yet organized. For 
Marx and Engels the existence of such a stage, or something like it, 
was essential in order to show fully the purely artificial and 
relative nature of both relations of production and private property. 
Their work on precapitalist systems is largely taken up with showing 
the indissoluble link between the type of property and the type of 
relations of production. The demonstration of the evolution and the 
transformation of types of property is as central as the demonstration 
of the evolution of relations of production. The very notion of 
private property far from an "inalienable right'' as it was stated to 
be. was, in fact, itself a product of certain unique economic, technical 
and social conditions, and it was therefore reasonable to expect that 
it would be superseded, when the associated relations of production 
changed. Equally important,' was the demonstration of a correlation 
,, 
( 
between private property and exploitation. 
Exploitation> for Marx, is the process by which a group of people '< 
/ 
are deprived of the full value of their labour so that what they have 
lost becomes a surplus for another group who obtain this element. In 
order to answer those who had argued that without private property 
society was impossible, Marx looked for examples of societies without 
private property, therefore also without exploitation and for this he 
turned again to Morgan. In fact. rarx and Engels did not have much 
choice among the anthropologists of the time because most of them 
were heirs to the philosophical tradition which went back to Locke 
and which glorified private property. 
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Exploitation is not at all the same as the division of labour. 
Not all groups are social classes and there is considerable dis-
agreement as to whether exploitation exists in pre-class societies. 
In the absence of social classes, age and sex are the primary 
distinctions involved in the distribution of social products. Some 
interpret discrimination by age as exploitation, others by sex. In 
considering the labour process from the angle of the relations of 
production, that is methods of appropriation of objects of production 
and final products, one is confronted by a simplicity which conceals 
complexity. One gains the right to appropriate the objects of 
production by being a member of one sex or the other. The relations 
of production define rights to the appropriation of objects of 
production for one's self and to the appropriation of the product of 
the opposite sex, the product of their surplus labour. It seems 
plausible to assume that each sex produces surplus labour for the 
other and in that sense equal rights and exchange exist. Where there 
is a division of labour between the sexes, men and women respond in 
11 similar" relationships to the means of production, and therefore 
cannot be regarded as classes. The question is: are these groups of 
people standing in different relationships to the means of production? 
(including objects). Concerning the elder-junior relationship of 
course it does exist as a temporarily distinct relationship to the 
means of production. However all indivi1uals move from one position 
to another in time, and it is unrealistic to view the relationship 
between the generations as exploitative (we refer always to the 
''primitive" mode of production). 
It seems clear though, that the ethnographic record will not 
99 
allow exploitation as a cross-cultural universal. All of the 
societies reviewed are egalitarian in one or in another way. 103 The 
central feet a bout the non-exploi ta ti ve social forma tior15 is that 
their members have free access to the basic resources neeaed to 
sustain life - all hunt. gather, and in general utilize the environ-
ment without let or hindrance. 
There are no persons whose access to resources is privileged and 
no corresponding group whose access is impaired. It is crucial to 
distinguish between societies of this egalitarian, primitive, class-
less kind and others which make distinctions between types of access 
to resources. It is privileged access to resources and the right to 
their use that allows exploitation to take place. Exploitation can 
be defined, it ·is real and its effects go far beyon1 the strictly 
economic or more or less vague opinions of ill-use on the part of the 
exploited. Exploitative societies have a characteristic set of 
institutions and while they have occupied less than one percent of 
human history, the experience of it dominates people's consciousness 
so completely the t it seems to many an integral part of "human nature". 
The diagnostic feature of any class society is the existence of 
. 
a preda 1:.ory ruling class that is based upon a definite mode of 
exploitation. The economic is connected to the political (and 
religious); the powerful use their power to protect their privileges, 
the most important of which is their "right" to exploit those from 
whom they extract a surplus. In pre-capitalist class societies 
exploitationtake~.various forms, such as taxation in the 
ancient mode, tribute in the asiatic mode an1 rent in the feudal mode. 
The capitalist mode however takes the form of profit or unpaii labour 
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which can be accumulated ani multiplied. Neither of these forms 
seems to exist in hunting-gathering societies. Where tasks demand 
more specialization and ''organization". it would seem that the 
increasing development of this contradiction leads to ownership or 
control of some particular important object of production - land for 
agriculture or grazing taking precedence, so that labour applied to 
other objects and to the final product has no bearing upon the 
appropriation of the product. 
Perhaps the most important of all ramifications of exploitatio~ 
is its relation to social inequality,inextricably interwoven with 
surplus. 
Giving a detailed account of these processes is far beyond the 
scope of this work but there is a point that makes a further elaboration 
useful, as it is connected with many recent .trends in the study of 
primitive (and palaeolithic) populations. 
It concerns surplus product. Most notions of surplus 
begin with some estimates of a human being's minimal caloric needs and 
define surplus as the difference between these needs and the total 
product. There is some precedent for this procedure in the work of 
Marx, who wrote that the cost of the prodfiction of labour power in 
capitalist society is the cost required for maintaining the worker as 
a worker an1 of developing him into a worker (Wage, Labour and Capital). 
However, Marx warned that this definition holds for the "species", not 
for individual workers. It is necessary to begin with a conception of 
the mode of production as a whole, an1 to seek an understanding of 
surplus from this basis. It has been shown, for example, (E. Wolf 1966). 
that for peasants their way of life involves varlous "funds" (replace-
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ment fund etc.) which are indispensable for their production and 
reproduction; and there are numerous examples of historical circum-
stances in which minimal subsistence needs were not met. _But to 
begin with an individual's subsistence needs rather than with the 
dynamic of reproduction of the mode of production is to take an 
historical product - e.g. the property-less worker - as a natural 
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condition. In this line of reasoning a unit of analysis is very 
important for the comprehension of a "primitive" mode of existence, 
mainly what is called a hunter-gatherer's one. • I Surplus ~accordingly, 
exploitation and inequality) is characteristic of ~ specific mode of 
production. not simply of the individual's "caloric need". 
The categgries of Marxist theory which are appropriate for calculating 
.surplus r-vdlue)(S) are variable (V) and constant (c) capital. 
Vari~ble capital is that part of the-total capital advanced as wages, 
while constant capital is the capital advanced for the instruments and 
materials of production. Although these categories were devised for 
estimating surplus-value under capitalism, they are useful in 
discussing other modes as well, because they relate togetter the 
------
reproduction of the producers and the constant renewal of the means 
of production. Both V and C "capital" are necessary for reproduction, 
not just the former. Thus the total product mntainsc.v and the surplus 
is relative to the sum of them. 
To properly understand the different relations in society, it is 
first necessary to comprehend the historically concrete social and 
economic forma tiona from which kinship, family, community, ethnici ty 
and so on, derive their identities. It is also necessary to incorporate 
an appreciation of the modern-world system. (Fig. 8) 
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FIG 1.8 : a simple -regresentatiorr of tr.e mo1ern world system 
i£ shown :fiagramm3tically above. 
(adapted from 1ifferent sources) • 
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Obviously there are "inequalities" in primitive society. The 
question remains if certain groups transform inequalities into long-
term advantages over other groups. The basic principle underlying the 
ques~ion-is that of human beings taken as property. In that sense, 
the elders may,control the means of production, but eventually juniors 
become elders, while slaves do not become masters, peasants do not 
become landlor~s an~ proletarians do not become capitalists during 
their lifetime. 
1.11 Summary 
Our understanding of complex reality depends on the questions we 
ask: these in turn depend upon the culture into which we have been 
socialized and the view--point or discipline in which we have been 
trained. A fact is only a fact in terms of theory, and p~blems are 
defined as such within an implicit or explicit theoretical framework. 
It seems clear that any attempt to explain the ordering and pattern 
of human activity _is constricted if forced into a monocausal framework. 
When anthropologists an1 archaeologists move· away from the mapping 
of a "static" situation to consider aspects of change, they inevitably 
become involved with values, both by the problems they choose to 
consider and the interpretation of the "facts" they present. This 
kind of stud'{ -has suffered individually from a parochial concern 
to defend the importance of the specific "factors" with which they 
are more concerned. The effect of this tendency to "empirical closure" of 
a system has been to make its application to any field a rigidly simple 
question of whether it "applies" or not. Applications are interpreted 
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in "all or none" termsJ it eithe~.is the case or it is not. Societies do 
not change or survive simply through the impact of one or two factors. 
When attempting to characterize the evolution and behaviour of 
"pri1Di tive" socie~ies it- is important to emphasize the interrelatedness 
of all aspects of their organization. Besides environment and 
technology, socio-economic organization is a basic component which 
provides the investigation of human relationships in that epoch, with 
the possibility of understanding and explaining adaptation and change 
through time.105 
This is doubly importanta an undue concern with biological and/or 
environmental constraints as such, not-only fails to tell us anything 
about critical differences and similarities, it also gives the 
impression that ''economy" is an abstract variable never determined by 
social formation. 
Whereas concrete socio-economic formations exist in historical 
reality only when incarnated in social organisms, within theory the 
inner essence of "single" societies appears in a pure form as something 
existing "independently". ~s the ideal social organism of a given type. 
ln that ·sense, an understanding of Marxist anthropology correspontis 
to ~ very large degree to the conception ·of "human essence". The 
unity of all that is human. cannot be found either in the identity of 
a single and singular biological organism. or in the identity of 
"spirit": this unity is not something given before history, but made 
in history. 
The problem of explaining human origins, the evolutionary 
emergence of language, tool-making, kinship systems and culture 
generally ha·s seemed almost insoluble since Darwin began to posit 
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the issue in scientific terms. Of all the problems. one of the most 
intractable has proved to be that of interpreting bow the "dominant" 
mode of most sociable higher primate species - a characteristically 
'!-egotistical" figure not given to s~rrendering or sharing either food 
or mates unless forcibly so compelled - could have been transformed 
into the very different human type of hunter-gatherer societies. It 
would be hard to understand bow the "transition" to large-scale hunting 
could have "survival value" for the species at all. 
Wi tb a Marxist formulation this transition from "nature" to 
"culture" represents a break in the continuity of the_ evolutionary 
process - a dialectical leap. This break is a break with "anarchy" 
in the sense that a baboon-harem system and, to a greater or lesser 
extent, any system of primate "dominance", is an example of ordered 
anarchy. It is a system in which sexual and economic issues are 
settled by individual dominance or force. At some pre-cultural stage 
the ancestors of Homo sapi~s - perhaps on1.y very - briefly-were organized 
-I 
in a similar manner. 
The transition to culture occurred perhaps as the result of an 
"explosion'' which blew apart a system of J}ominance which had become 
so extreme and so unstable as to lose its capacity to bold its parts 
together at all. 
The underlying determinants of this "revolution" were ecological 
or more properly economic-rooted ultimately in the requirements of 
the transition from vegetable food-gathering (or the occasional bunting 
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of small game) to regular big-game bunting. 
In the light of these considerations, the analysis of the work 
process is not simply a precondition of an e1equate understanding of 
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Marx's theory of history and society in general. Marx regarded work, 
material production, as the defining factor both in anthropogenesis 
and in subsequent human, historical development. This does not mean 
however that the genesis of human species is possible "only" with 
productive activity and without the simultaneous emergence of the 
first forms of social life and cooperation. Work, sociality and con-
sciousness are integral and indispensable constituents of the historical 
forms of social life; they are equal moments of "human existence", 
even if they are not equal as far as it concerns their "significance" 
for the theoretical explanation and the practical induction of 
historical change. 
This latter point brings out the question of how "what" and "how" 
are examined. That is, to what extent a coherent theory like 
dialectical materialism - a theory moreover "formulated" to underline 
and explain the structure and mechanism of capitalism and class 
society - can be used to reveal different aspects and relationships 
about primeval forms of society. After all, one is still obliged to 
work with limited data, not always reliable information, and investi-
gations which have not been carried far enough in a direction to yield 
the necessary information- despite the accumulation of "evidence". 
With this state of affairs, a dialectical approach would imply a 
back and forth process, whereby particular societies are analysed in 
terms of their available characteristics, in which hypotheses generated 
theoretically are used to "restructure" the data, and where the 
theoretical position itself (is further elaborated in such a way that \ 
its explanatory power is used to express the hidden structures and 
connection of the society under investigation. For such an explanation 
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two of the major categories (often misinterpreted) of Marxism must 
be considered: the formulation of evolutionary stages and that of 
economic development. 
Marx and Engels accepted Morgan's sequence of stages, but at the 
same time they took up the critique of this theory. (Morgan himself 
in fact knew the limits of his scheme, which he offered as "conv~nient 
and useful" but "provisional"). Whereas the social evolutionists of 
the latter half of the nineteenth century, considered the stage as 
though it possessed a reality in itself, and its defining features 
as a sort of "iron law" of evolution at work both in nature and in 
society, Marx treated the transition between stages as the moment of 
importance. 
In this way, he was able to move away from the "static" features 
of a society to the dynamic interconnection among humans, their 
relation to social production and to a concern with the transitional 
development of the evolution of society as a dialectic of evolution/ 
revolution - that transition being the "influential" interaction 
between man and environment, technological innovations, forms and 
division of labour and accordingly economy. Consequently men, "enter 
• 
into particular, necessary relations of production, which are 
independent of their will", these relations emerging in historical 
stages which are verifiable. Relations of production)~ correspond to )J( 
a particular level of productive forces on whose development they 
depend. That dependence might seem to demonstrate that social reality 
I( 
is determined unilaterally by natural forces (This is what PleKhanov ~ 
{ 
believed, when he traced all social relations back through the mediation 
of productive forces to natural, geographical conditions, as the 
"last instance"). In reality, this is not the case. Natural forces 
become productive forces~ because they are harnessed to human labour. 
They become social forces by being incorporated into human relations 
and applied to human needs; and only become "productive", when they 
serve the production and reproduction of human life. 
In traditional tribal societies technology has derived directly 
from human practice. Labour begins with tools and the two cannot be 
disassociated. Tools do not have an existence of their own; they 
form part of an integral interactive process which does not end with 
the "making" of the tool but extends beyond it. To discern this, it 
is necessary to reestablish the connection~>which have been severed! 
between different modes of "significance", in order to see the extent 
to which the articulation of "meaning" within each, is itself a 
socially determined phenomenon. One can no longer say that the 
function of a tool is its performance of a single isolated task. A 
range of tools perform a range of functions and the functions ere a 
product of the socio-economic environment. Thus an interpretation of 
the role of technology in society can be attempted in order to 
characterize the basic properties of production activity and the 
several subsystems which determine and/or define the nature of its 
development. As Bates writes "under the present conditions of 
archaeological development, the possibility of carrying out the 
quantification of the productive forces may seem like a subject of 
••• fiction. In reality it is a task of the ~~iure development of 
the t science •• "107 
Material changes occurring within the economic conditions of 
production can be "abstracted" and "forGJalized" as a law converting 
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quantity into quality, and vice versa. It is true that in the 
historical perioi preceding the emergence of private property, the 
products of labour do not become - according to Marx - forces 
independent of men, and ruling over them, but form their real, communal 
property- and this is supported by today's ethnographical evidence. 
Work appears here "directly" in its anthropological significance as 
an activity that develops the power and capabilities of humans. 
Equally important is the fact that there is no convergence of 
individual and social development since ''individuality" does not exist 
at this level of development. The individual is a clan person, a link 
in the community; his social relations are the self-evident frame of 
his own existence. The emergence of individuality itself, takes place 
through the formation of the "abstract" individual, i.e., through 
alienation. It is clear from the out set .. that the abolition of the 
•, 
naturally given division of labour·: means the transformation of the ~ 
character of the labour process. and of the social mechanism that 
distributes individuals among different branches of production (in 
the broad sense). and it is not directly relateJ to the question:-o+'~ 
t:) what extent individuals c?-n, during their li:fetime, vary and 
alternate the forms and types of their productive activity. Originally 
subject to collective/tribal relationships, themselves responsive to 
the natural needs of social inter-connections, work gradually became 
an economic commodity, labour power something that has to be exchanged; 
this le:i to the dissociation of working population from their social 
context, in other words their alienation. Without the concept of 
relations as internal to the processes that we call matter, change 
is by implication external to any given phenomenon. Yet, until one 
,, 
v 
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has directly faced the problem of dealing with human existence in 
material terms, one has not dealt with man, his history, his culture 
or his science. The objective conditions, technological, economic, 
env_ironmental, that preceded - hence "caused" --later-developments, cat.not 
necessarily and inevitably be located. The more remote the period 
studied, the more the internal· stresses,_ alternative choices and 
r~vol~tionary as ~gainst conservative ideologies that defined precisely 
bow, when and where major changes were initiated, are nlost" in the 
ambiguities and~spottines~;~r archaeological and historical data. 
However, despite the complexities, the question remains untouched: 
rather than seeking comparabilities in statistical terms and counting, 
according to some unstated "value" scheme considered as proven, the 
Marxist commitment is that of detailed study of societies, based on 
the dialectical-materialistic analysis of relationships and con-
tradictions that must be elaborated, refined and tested, both through 
"theory and praxis". 
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l Capital Vol. I 
-2 As, for example, Huxley, LuJbock, Maine, Morgan, Phear, Koval~vsky. 
The -Comtean positivists in the generation before Darwin made a 
cult of the progress of mankind, a doctrine which was not 
specifically rejected by the Darwinians, despite Darwin's 
generally anti-teleological direction. 
3 Nizan P.: Lee materialistes de l'antiquite. 
4 Engels F.: Dialectics of Nature. 
5 Capital Vol. I 
6 Grundrisse 
7- Hegel "The Absolute Idea alone is Being, imperishable Life, 
self-knowing truth, and the whole of truth. The Absolute Idea 
is the only object and content of philosophy. As it contains 
every determinateness, and its essence is to return to itself 
through its self-determination or particularization, it has 
various phases. It is the business of philosophy to recognize 
in its them ••• The derivation and cognizance of these particul•r 
modes is the further business of the· particular philosophical 
sciences." Hegel alludes to this passage in his Preface to the 
Philosophy of Right, where man's social and political institutions 
are understood as particular modes of the Idea and as various 
phases of its self-determination. Marx (an1 Feuerbach in that 
respect) did not doubt that P.egel's philosophy was essentially 
ll2 
theological in character, and ttat what Hegel called the 
Absolute was what the ordinary man calls God; but be is not 
charging Hegel with empirical inaccuracy; it is the philoso-_ 
phical form, not the empiricaf content whie-h he attacks in his 
Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right". l:arx is careful to 
maintain the distinction between the two, form and content, 
because of his conviction - often repeated in the course of 
the Critique - that within his speculative framework Hegel 
accurately depicts the existing institutions of political society. 
8 On that issue G. Lukacs for example und-erstood Y.arx.-s position in 
regard to society solely on the objective side. in opposition to 
Regel. For this it is necessary to go not only to the product 
of the given historical process, but to the onset of the process 
of its formation, which is to grasp it as a "temporal" phenocenon 
(diachronically). 
9 Blauberg et al, 1977· 
Averkieva - Petrova Yu. 1980. 
Western writings often contain statements about the inappl~cability 
of >t.arxist method, interpreting his.torical materialism in a way 
that leads ultimately to economic determinism, fatalism and pre-
conceived "stable" periods and stages. But the word "historicism" 
has been used in a variety of ways. U. Mandelbaum (i967) has 
defined it as· follows: "!:istoricism consists in the attempt to 
take seriously the fact of change •••••••••• Every particular 
fact is treated with relation to the process of change out of 
which it arises. and this process is seen as immanent in it." 
That l~~rx ".ras. a historicist in t:r.is sense is in.:iisputable. 
113 
Popper's statements about Marxism are well-known (see especially 
the critique in"The Poverty of Historicism", "Conjectures and 
Refutations" and "the Open Society anti its Enemies"), as well 
as his critique of historicism particularly as exemplified by 
Marx, P.egel and Plato. It is not the place here to deal with 
that, but just an example we think will suffice; in comparing 
Plato and Yarx, writers have frequently pointed to communism as 
a common doctrine. Even if we accept that opinion, for Plato 
"communism" is primarily a device to instil group solidarity in the 
ruling classes, and is restricted to the guardians and auxiliaries. 
For ~arx, it is the means of freedom and equality in a classless 
society, enveloping the whole social order. 
10 Anti-D~hring. 
11 ~•The theoretical attempt to ensure that no.man in the world should \ / 
suffer material or intellectual need any longer is something 
which does not need any metaphysical "ultimate" justification. 
Criti~al materialism disdains to continue the tradition of mere 
philosophizing by investigating "the riddles of the world". Its 
intellectual construction grew out of the definite historical 
tasks of society. Its aim is to help men out of their self-made 
prison of uncomprehended economic determination. Economic factors 
are as sharply emphasized by the theory ~s by social reality 
itself. However. neither the economy nor the proletariat was 
for ~arx a metaphysical principle of explanation. The economy 
was to be brought again from its all-powerful position to a 
"subordinate'' role. The rna teriali st character of l':arxi st theory 
does not amount to a confession of the incurable primacy of the 
I 
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economy, that antihuman abstraction achieved by the real 
situation. It is rather an attempt to direct a man's attention 
towards the internal logic of their own conditions, towards the 
pseudophysic that make their commodities ani at the same time 
provides the ideology accoriing to which they are already in 
control of their destinies"(quoted from Krader: Ethnological 
Notebooks of K. ~arx). 
12 Capital Vol. I 
13 Marx developed a series of positions in philosophical ~nthro­
pology. Jn regard to the alienation of man in society and in 
nature in Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts; the 
doctrine of man producing himself by his labour and by his 
relation in society in The German Ideology and The Holy Family; 
the opposition of the concretion to the abstraction of man in 
the Theses on Feuerbach. Later he took up the development of 
economy and society among primitive peoples in the Grundrisse, 
returning to the theme briefly in the Critique of Political 
Economy. Eis exposition of primitive. as opposed to capitalist 
production, is set forth in the chapter of the social division 
of labour in the Capital. In the Grtindriese and in Capital, 
primitive man is taken up as a category. the abstraction of the 
primitive conditions as a means and in opposition to capitalist 
economy without reference to particular primitive peoples. The 
further concretion of the particular primitive peoples in terms 
of the identified social institutions is then developed by Marx 
in the Notebooks of the period 1879-1882, according to the 
ethnological material available at the time and mainly studying 
the works of Jlorgan, Phear, Maine and Lubbock amongst others. 
14 Lenin: What the "Friends of the People" are and how they fight 
against the Social Democrats. 
15 Capital Vol. 1 
16 Engels: Dialectics of Nature. 
17 Darwin called attention to the natural history of technology. 
Marx to the cultural history of human technology. Technology 
reveals the active component and relation of human beings to 
nature. This should be understood as the relation of particular 
societies, it is not general to all mankind, and must be 
separately mastered. The mastery of their arid habitat in the 
Kalahari desert by Bushmen for example, the adaptation of means 
of detection, conduit and storage of water by these people, far 
exceed the ability of the later European intruders. who upset 
the balance between the social group and the natural ~rroundings. 
The human beings do not learn and adapt to nature as a "species" 
but only through the traditions of particular groups. Moreover, 
the problem of production by appropriate technology contains 
within itself the problem of reproduction, which later is to be 
understood in the natural sense of biological reproduction in 
the cases of the human and of plant and animal specie~; but in 
the case of humanity, in all circumstances, both of literate 
and non-literate cultures, the reproduction process is the matter 
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of the continued existence and furtherance of mankind not as 
a form of animal life. It is instead the matter of the continued 
existence and furtherance of particular economic relations, not 
merely as an abstraction - the technological basis of life and 
adaptational history "gives way" to the economic bases of human 
life and the history of these. The adaptation and techniques of 
production and reproduction of life are the same abstract 
categories in the case of human history as in the case of natural 
history; concretely they differ; the rate of development in the 
case of mankind is rapid and multivarious, while the biological 
rate of development is as a rule geologically slow. The abstract 
problems of production and reproduction of the species are the 
same, but concretely they are realized in different ways; the 
.s 
differenc,between animals and humanity, in this regard, are 
great, the differences within the human species relatively small. 
The dialectical opposition of potential unity and actual difference 
is the same as that of alienation and reunification of humanity 
and nature, and it is joined to the dialectic of the unity of 
humanity. 
Frolov I.T. 1978, Rose S. -Kamin L. et al, 1984, Ribes B. 1978. 
18 Marx to Kugelmann, 27 June 1870. 
19 Engels to P. Lavrov 1897· 
One need not belabour the evident points made by Engels which 
< 7 
stand until today and have acquired an even deeper and more 
prophetic significance. It is not by any sort of "chance and 
necessity" that we have to confront sociobiology 11 which challenges 
the integrity of culture as a distinctive and symbolic human 
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creation and in place of social constitutions of meanings offers 
a biological determination of human interactions with a source 
primarily in the general evolutionary propensity of individual 
genotypes to maximize their reproductive success ••• ") and1 as 
M. Sahlins continues "it is a new variety of sociological 
utilitarianism, but transported now to a biological calculus 
of the utilities realized in social relations. The New Synthesis 
is to include the humanities and social sciences ••• From the 
idea of differential reproduction dependent on chance, genetic 
and environmental shifts. selection successively became synonymous 
with optimization or maximization of individual genotypes and 
ultimately with the exploitation of one organism by another in 
the interest of an e3'otistical genetic fitness ••• " Ever since 
Hobbes placed the bourgeois society he knew in the state of 
nature, the ideology of capitalism has been marked by a reciprocal 
dialectic between the folk conceptions of culture and nature. 
Conceived in the image of the market system the nature thus 
culturally figured has in turn been used to explain tte human 
social order an1 vice versa, in an endless interchange between 
social Darwinism and natural capitalism. Sociobiology is only 
the latest phase in the cycle: the grounding of human social 
behaviour in an "advanced" or scientific notion of organic evolution 
which is in its own terms the representation of a cultural form 
of economic "action" and accordingly colonialism, exploitation, 
war, as inherent in the human nature. genetically controlled and 
thus "inevitable" and "justified'', 
Sahlins N. 1976, Dawkins R. 1976. ~ilson ~.n. 1985. 
et al 1984, Uonod J. 1976. 
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20 The classical ideal of science from the 19th century has been 
on "value-neutrality". In po si ti vi st thought this doctrine is 
legitimated by a theory of knowledge. The relativists absolutize 
norms of the establishment. But this is done in such a way that 
it seems as if norms are absent, and that the science is value-
free. The ·n-orms are tacitly projected into social studies and 
assumed as the height of "rationality". "Objectivity" is made 
to coincide with "rationality". That which does not coincide is 
not "objective''. not ''scientific". Basically the operation rests 
upon a form of subjectivism; its most typical form is found in 
modern-day empiricism, where the problem of objectivity is defined )( 
in terms of relationship between theory and empirical data, 
instead of a relationship between theory and objective reality. 
It may be saidv' that the theory is related to its empirical 
referent (sense data, observation statements etc.,) but not to 
its real referent (i.e. to objective reality). This is a non-
realistic view. In Marxist philosophy of sdience, it is called 
an idealist view. The empiricist finds it natural to define 
"objectivity" as some kind of "value-neutrality". Among 
observation statements and data, he distinguishes facts and 
evaluation. Research is supposed to involve only the reference 
to facts and not involve value or value-judgements. These latter 
are rejected as metaphysics. Further work in this direction was 
done by the functionalists, whose formulations and defence of the 
"value-neutrality" doctrine have been thus influential, and in 
practice served to exclude Marxist social science from the realm 
of what is considered the legitimate "framework of scientific 
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discussion". Value-neutrality belongs to a paradigm which as 
a rule relegates the scientific socialism of Uarx to the 
"unscientific". 
21 Elzinga A., 1975 
Kelle-Kovalson, 1973. 
22 Lenin Collected Works Vol. I 
23 "Industry is the actual historical relation of nature and hence 
of natural science to the human being; if industry is therefore 
taken as the exoteric revelation of the human essential powers 
then the human essence of nature or the natural essence of the 
human being will also be understood; hence natural science will 
lose its abstract material or rather idealist direction and will 
become the basis of human science just as it has already become, 
although in alienated shape, the basis of actually human life; 
and one basis for life, another for science, is a lie from the 
outset. Nature which becomes human history - the act of genesis 
of human society- is the actual nature of man; therefore nature, 
as it comes to be through industry, even though in an alienated shape, 
is true anthropological nature ••• " (Capital, Vol. I) 
24 Engels: Holy Family. Marx:Grundrisse 
25 Marx: Capital Vol. I 
26 ibid. 
27 Krader L. 1972, 1977. 
28 Malthus T.R. 1970. 
29 The storage of the computer is in this sense accumulation; it 
is not a change in direction of the process from the primitive 
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labour to the capitalist labour in factories; it is however, 
an increasing dissociation and alienation of the workers. 
30 As for example in certain passages in Bloch, whose criti1ue of 
the commodity,.though inspired in large measure by the early Lukacs, 
runs tr.e risk of abandoning the materialtst position. 
31 Wage_-Labour and Capital. 
32. Capital Vol. I 
33 ibid. 
34 ibid. 
35 ibid. 
36 ibid. 
37 Grundrisse 
38 Dialectics of Nature 
39 Capital Vol. I . 
40 Economic and Philosophical Vanuscripts of 1844. 
41 A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. 
42 Grundrisse~ Paris Manuscripts. 
43 Sixth Thesis on Feuerbach. 
44 Krader L. 1977 . 
45 Critique of Political Economy, also Capital. 
46 Krader L. 1972. 1977. 
47 ibid and 1976 
48 Marx to Lassalle, 16 January 1861. 
49 In the history of materialism, there are broadly two main 
, tendencies. ~he one leads from tne -atomism 
of Democritus, via the physics of the Ren2issance, to the one-
sided natural-scientific materialism of the 18th and 19th centuries. 
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The other tendency, which some call the "Aristotelian left" 
developed from the naturalistically inclined form/matter adopted 
by Averroie - the great me1ieval Aristotelian - via G. Bruno and 
Bacon~ whose.teaching aceor1inB' to rarx contained within itself 
"the germs of a 11-round development" (Holy Family) and finally 
to the crypto-materialistic elements of the romantic philosophy 
of nature. 
50 Wages, Price and Profit. 
51 The point to make here is that in capitalism~at movement results 
in the transformation of the thing into human by attribution of 
human qualities to the former; it is also the opposite, the 
attribution of the quality of a thing to a human being, of 
capital to the capitalist and thereby in turn the attribution of 
the quality of the reified human being, of tee reified human con-
sciousness, to the thing, capital. 
52 Capital Vol. 1 
53 A "classic" summary of the relationship between the base and the 
superstructure is Plek~anov•s distinction of five sequential 
elements I - The state of productive forces, 2 - The economic 
conditions, 3 - The sociopolitical order 4- The psychology of 
social man 5 - Various ideologies reflecting the characteristics 
of this psychology. This is a more complete formulation than 
the bare projection of a base ani a superstructure - as the notion 
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has been distinctively treated by many western scholars. 
But what is wrong with it is its description of these elements 
as sequential. when- they are in practi_ce in::l.issoluble: not in 
the sense that they cannot be distinguished for purposes of 
analysis, but in the decisive sense that these are not separate 
areas or elements, but the whole specific activities and products 
of real men. (Williams R. 1977) What is that reality in the 
materialist conception? Above all it is not the so-called "facts" 
at the surface of a society; it is not a complex of achieved 
things, but a complex of processes, in which things ~hat are 
apparently stable, no less than concepts, undergo an uninterrupted 
change of coming into being and passing away. 
54 Capital Vol. 1 . 
In a true society, it would be the needs of the i-ndividual and 
not his physically or intellectually conditioned capacity for 
labour. which. in the last analysis, provided the measure of 
his consumption. Marx continually deals with this theme first 
developed in the German Ideology. In other ~orjs, a different 
form of activity of labour does n~t justify inequality, confers 
no privileges in respect of possession and enjoyment. Social 
equality means not that all are treated alike, but that the 
richness and the diversity of the wishes of individuals come into 
their own. 
55 German Ideology 
56 Capital Vol. 1 · 
57 Grundrisse (this section of the Grunirisse .appeared in Ertglish 
-txa.ns l.a. t· .i.on ( 1.964) un-:'.or the t:i.tJ.e.~ ''Pre- CapitaJ.ist Econorn.~.(' 
For-mations". 
58 ibid. 
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62 Capital Vol. I 
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64 Krader L. 1972, Schmidt A. 1971, Dani1ova L.V. 1971, Roubaud P. 
1980. 
65 Capital Vol. II . 
66 Philosophical Notebooks. 
67 Eichhorn-Bauer et a1, 1974· Kelle and Kovalson 1973, Semenov Y. 
1981, Vasil'ev-Stuchevskii 1976 · 
68 Lenin: Once again on the Trade Unions, the current situation and 
the mistakes of Trotsky and Bucharin. 
69 The German Ideology, 
70 ibid. 
71 Grundrisse 
72 Capital Vol. III . 
73 Grundrisse . 
74 Capital Vol. III · 
7 5 Grundri sse 
7 6 ibid. 
In fact, specifically human productive activity is only possible 
when a contraposition and comparison can be made between the aim, 
the desired ineal form of the object to be brought about, and the 
actually present and perceived thing itself; that is, when 
activity is guided ann controlled by an intention, by the objective 
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to be attaine:i. "At the end of the labour process, we get a 
result that alrea:iy existed in the imagination of the labourer, 
that existed alreajy ideally at its commencement. The labourer 
no~ only effects a change of form in the natural material on which 
he works, but also he realizes in it an aim of his own that gives. 
the law to his modus operan1i and to which he must subordinate 
his will" (Capital Vol. I). 
77 Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations. 
78 Not of course with the methods of those of the anthropologists 
who see in ~very kinship relation, mode of production or personal 
disagreement in primitive societies, a form of exploitation, 
surplus-labour. hostility and similar "natural" characteristics. 
79 Pre-capitalist Economic Formations. 
80_ Uarkus G. 1978, De Ste. Croix G.E.}l. (introduction) 1981, Cohen 
G.A. 1982, McLennan G 1981, Averkieva-Petrova Y. 1960. 
81 This interpretation of the "anthropology'' of UarY-' apparently 
corresponds to a very lerge degree,, with the conception of ''human 
nature" and man in general, elaborated by A. ::7ramsci. The answer 
to tl::e question "what is man?" cannot be found, according to 
Gramsci,in the single indivi1ual man; the unity of all that is 
human, implied already by the question itself, cannot be found 
within the identity of the biological (material) nature of men, 
qor~ in the identity of "thinking" or "spirit". This unity is 
not sornet~ing given before history but made in history which is 
the actual and active process of unification, a process 
unaccomplished end ongoing. Depa:::-ting froo this, Graruti reveals 
the practico-utopical ~haracter of all philosopty ani the 
82 
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revolutionary character of the ~arxist theory of man as the 
philosophy of praxis. 
Popper K., 1972 a,b. 
F'rom German I1eology. (see also 
R. Williams). 
J. Wessman. G. ~arkus, 
84 German Ideology 
85 Grundrisse. 
This is one of the very fe\v actual statements of f/arx on which 
the Althusserian structuralist interpretation of ~arxism is based. 
And one may even agree (as M. ~arkus states) with Althusser t~at 
_ "relations of production" cannot be treated as 
•· simple hu~a n relations" (Al thusser: Reading Capital), if 
one understands by the latter the personal contacts between 
individuals._ In this sense l'arx writes: "These relations are 
~ot from the individual to the individual, but from the worker 
to tte capitalist, from the tenant to tte landowner etc." (The 
Poverty of Philosophy) Furthermore, social relations become 
objectified and institutionalized and in this form they constitute, 
as ~arx tells us;·a living unity" or1 if one prefers>a "structure". 
In t~is sense the relations have an objective ani irreiucible 
existence; and the less control ~he indivijuals have over these 
objectified and objective conditions of tteir existence, the more 
ttese conditions becoce an autonocous power over thee and appear 
as the reel subject of social life in history. Only for Karx, 
this is a historical fact characterizing a given type of social 
development (i.e. alienation), a fact that has to be negated in 
praxis and overcome, w~ile for Althusser this is tte hidden truth 
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of all history, which can only be established and revealed by 
science, theoretical practice. The possibility of abolishing 
the alienated character nf these conditions an~ relations - at 
least its abstrac~ possibility - lies for rarx in the fact that 
this alienation (the cutting free of social relations from the 
related individuals) can never be total. it never can eliminate 
the subjectivity of social individuals and reduce them to mere 
"positions" and ,. functions'' in a given system of rele tions of 
production (cocpere with Althusser, ibid) - in the fact that 
"forces of production and social relations" in the end. always 
remain only "two different sides of the development of the social 
in1ividual'' (Grundrisse), 
86 The German Ideology. 
87 Semenov Yu. 1966, Pershits_A.I. 1977, Kopnin P.V. 1974· 
88 Eistoricel mat~ialism provides the basis for a theory of social 
change and social development that is not limited, as in function-
alist approaches to social change, a change that is determined by 
and takes place within the existing "social structure" or by the 
"impact'' of outside forces. out which explains the evolution of 
different types of society as well as changes within a particular 
type of society by the emergence and development cf contradir.tions 
within them - a sort of endogenous dynamics. To go further on 
the other hand than a "structural morphology", it is necessary 
to account for the forms, functions, mode of articulation and 
conditions of transformation of the social structures within the 
concrete societies studied by the historian, the anthropologist, 
archaeologist etc. It is precisely in order to accomplish this 
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complex task. which presupposes a combination of several 
theoretical methods, that Yarx's notion of the determination in 
the last instance of the forms and the evolution of societies 
by the conditions of production and -reproduction of_ their material 
life is needed as the central hypothesis. 
Beithoud A. 1974, Godelier M. 1977, Seddon D. 1978, Slaughter C. 
1984. 
89 One question in this context is "what are the critical elements 
and limits of the system of reproduction of a group", and another 
"what are the spatial/ social boundaries of the group". Although 
the two questions are interdependent to an extent, in fact 
conditions of reproduction can be determined more adequately in 
terms of the first, according to which every relevant factor 
might not always be inside the group, but mus~ always be inside 
the system. According to En,s-els _ '' ••• the determining factor in 
history i! ,in the last resort the production and reproduction of 
real life. More than that neither 'Uarx nor I have ever asserted. 
If therefore somebody t~ists this into the statement that the 
economic element is the only determining one, he transforms it into 
a meaningless, abstract and absurd phrase •••• The economic 
situation is the basis, but the various elements of the super-
structure •••• also ••• exercise their influence upon the course 
of the historical struggles and in many cases prepon~rate in 
determining their form." There is en interaction of all these 
elements in which, amid all the endless host of accidents •••••• 
•••••• the economic movement finally asserts itself as necessary. 
(letter to J. Bloch). 
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90 It is not without reason thus, that in recent times many western 
scholars, while recognizing the validity of archaeological-
ethnographic comparisons, confine their possibility merely to 
the regions where the continuity of cultural development can be 
traced arctaeologically. This view however, in which the method 
of "controlled comparison" is used as a starting point, seems to 
be too extreme. Elaborated in Soviet ethnography, the theory of 
economic-cultural types opens up possibilities for comparing 
societies of similar types regardless of the area of their location 
and cultural continuity (Pershits 1980, Kabo V. 1982). 
91 Leacock E. 1981 Pershits A. 1982, Kobishkamov Yi 1964. 
Andrefov I 1985 (a,b) 
92 This means that in using the- historical comparative method, one 
should be guided by the general principles of drawing conclusions 
by analogy with due respect for the usual con1itions of enhancing 
the probability of suet conclusions. It is quite clear that a 
socio-economic formation in the pure sense i.e. as a distinct 
social organism, can exist in theory, but not in ''reality": in 
history, it exists in distinct societies as their inner essence, 
_their objective basis. The concept of socio-economic formation 
is not reducible simply to the idea of a social type. It is 
markedly more complex and many-sided, :r::epresenting the common elements 
shared by social organisms, falling under the same socio-economic 
structure. What, in the end, unites all these social organisms, 
and above all determines their inclusion in one type, is the 
presence within them of one and the same syste~ of productive 
reltdiona. 
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93 In ttis case, the significance of the formation of the capitalist 
system is indisputable. At the time when that system was emerging 
in Europe, Australian Aborigines' for example, were still at the 
stage of primitive structure. Capitalism was brought to Australia 
along with the white settlers, an~ the aborigines were in part 
destroyed, in part pushed back into the least desirable locations. 
Thus, although the Australian aborigines are not the equivalent 
but an analogue of ~esolithic mankind there are no other people 
as representative as they are for the study of classic primitive 
history. Things are more complicated with Bushmen: the assertion. 
that they - at least partially - lost their former high culture 
as a result of their being driven into the region they now inhabit 
is not without support. This does not mean, however, that this 
regressive culture cannot be used for historical reconstruction. 
Similar economic systems, however tEey have arisen, bring about 
"similar" socio-developmental forms. One very general principal 
assumption, for example, may be that classic primitive society 
was based mainly upon tradition, in the very broad sense of the 
word. Another, that primitive society ha1 a specific organization 
of power, which included in particular mechanisms for settling 
· conflicts. But, in contrast to power in antagonistic class-
society, power in primitive society was not separate1 from the 
people. 
This is asserted in one way or another (although heavily disputed 
concerning the "degree" of power) by all the "classical" ethno-
graphers. Again. is a matter of "in'iiviiual, politico-scientific" 
interpretation. 
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94 The inadequacy of the theoretical concepts within this area of 
studies is no longer due to the insufficient development of the 
factual case of ethnography or archaeological data, although 
certainly much m·ore informs tion is needed for the evaluation of 
pre-literate societies in general and the palaeolithic in 
particular; it is rather the consequence of a conservatism, a 
"backwardness" o_f theory in respect of the ever increasing 
factual material. This explains the perseverance in the history 
of primitive societies of the narrow procedure for the re-
construction of the past that eitter has no basis whatsoever or 
else arbitrarily adduces the facts in order to uphold a concept 
which has been develope1 a priori. For a similar point of view 
though , at different explanatory levels see, for example, Bate~ 
L.F. 1984, Bloch 1983, Friedman 1979, 1983, Kristiansen K. 1984, 
0'Laugh1in B. 1975, Leacock E. 1982, Gellner 1975, ryessman J. 
1981, Danilova L.V. 1971, Slaughter C. 1984. 
95 "A rather simple but often overlooked confusion" as Leacock (1977) 
states "has plagued subsequent discussions of historical stages. 
There is a common failure to distinguish between the definition 
of stages as a necessary preliminary step to asking meaningful 
questions about.a given period, institution or event, and stages 
seen as themselves the answers. "Stages" define major altern-
atives in the structure of productive relations; they afford 
a conceptual framework for the study of historical process. To 
place a_society in a central or transitional position in relation 
to one or more stages is a necessary preliminary step to inquiry, 
not a straitjacket that limits it." 
~~ .. ......,_ ...... ~ -.....:-; .... ...----..: .... ..._...... -· .. . ...... - ""~ ··-·~ ;.:; .... -,. .... , 
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96 Krader L. 1972. 
97 The process of acquisition of knowledge occurs as an ascent from 
concrete to abstract truth and from incomplete to more complete 
kno~ledge. Marx and Engels themselves.did not regard all their 
constructs as establisheti once and for all. They "Nere continually 
returning to questions previously considered and making "changes" 
in their conclusions. As early as 1691, corrections were made by 
Engels in the fourth edition of the "Origin of the Family", and 
contrary to what western scholars say, there is not a single 
Soviet scientist today who would insist that all of Morgan's 
and Engels' concepts are right. In particular no Soviet scholar 
accepts Morgansthesis on - periodization, on the consanguine an1 
pun~luan family,aron .the origins of exogamy. ~ngels again in the 
preface of the fourth edition of "Socialism Utopian and Scientific" 
writes: "the 14 years that have elapsed since the appearance of 
Morgan's magnum opus. have substantially enriched our material on 
the history of primeval human societies ••• As a consequence, 
certain of Morgan' s_ individual hypotheses have either been shaken 
or were actually overthrown; but the newly gathered material has 
nowhere led to a need to replace his basic tenets by others." So, 
if Soviet ethnographers do accept some of Morgan's concepts, it 
is only because contemporary scientific data corroborates them. 
(for discussion on the subject see also Gellner E., The Soviet 
and the Savage 1975, and comments by Bromley Yu. Krader 1., 
Newcomer P., Pershits A., Petrovaverkieva, S~ ani Semenov Yu. 
98 There is some considerable terminological variation in the 
li terat1n-0 CO!'H~e:rn:\.ng the notion. Thus Ponll'l~1tzas (J.97'3) d·d'inf'lf'l 
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a mo~e of production as a combination of economic, political and 
ideological instances; by contrast, some others ·define a social 
formation as the combination of the economic (production relations), 
and the political/legal and ideological super~tructure; ~imilarly, 
-
although from a different theoretical position, F.inde.ss and Hirst 
(1975) define a social formation as the mode of production 
together with its economical, ideological an~ political conditions 
of existence; Balibar (1970) defines the articulAtion of the 
mode of production with ideological and political instances as 
the social structure and reserves social formation for the com-
bination of different modes of production. (Wolpe E. 1980, 
Legros D. 1977, Soviet Anthropology an1 Arc!:!aeology 1965) , 
99 Marx in a passage from Capital writes "within a family, and 
~fter further development within a tribe, there springs up 
naturally a division of labour ••• " Engels, in a footnote to 
the third edition of Volume I of Capital explains: " •• subsequent 
very searching study of the primitive condition of man led the 
author to the conclusion that it was not the family t!:lat originally 
developed into the tribe, but that, on the contrary, the tribe 
was the primitive and spontaneously developed form of human 
association ••• " 
-
100 The subject of course is a continuous source of discussions, debates 
and different· positions both from }{;arxist; and non-~arxist .. scholar 
and the literature connected with it almost endless. As well ~s 
works cited in the text, a number -~ _.are included in the 
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annotated bibliography. 
N. Butinov, V. Bakhtov and V. Kabo holdthe view of collectivism 
but describe it~. concrete forms differently, that is the commune 
as principal social organization of pro1uction and not the clan. 
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Semenov' s conception is that the beginning of the primitive 
communal order coincides with the establishment of the clan 
system and that clan relationships are relationships of production. 
Ter-Akopian agrees with the opinion regarding the undivided 
dominance of consaguine relationships but evaluates their content 
differently: clan relationships are regarded as the result of 
the production of man. (see especially, ~anilova L.V. 1971). 
102 Krader L. 1972, 
103 The whole literature is extensive and of course it cannot be 
mentioned here. For references and relative bibliography see, 
amongst others, Diamond S. 1972. Fried M. 1967, Lee R.B. 1980 
a and b, Leacock E. 1982, Woodburn J. 1972, 1980, Soviet 3thno-
graphic Studies, 1982. 
104 Wessman J. 1981, Cohen C. 1982. 
105 Unpublished 1~.sc. F.P. Stathafd. 1981. 
106 As Mendel (1977) writes: ''·· cette th~se n'oblige pas a postuler 
une incroyable mutation touchant de sa grace le cerveau animal 
et le transformant en "cerveau symbolique" hereditaire. Car la 
chasse existe d&j~ dans certaines esp~ces .·animales: chiens, 
loups etc., qui app1iquent des tactiques d'interrelation~. C'est 
I 1a possibi1ite d'une reproduction de cette chasse sur un mode 
~largi qui se trouverait bloqu~e chez les animaux par 1a soliiarite ~ 
dynamique du corps tout entier· .•••• Ainsi un processus de nature 
homogene ce serait poursuivit dans notre esp~ce- processus dans 
" lequel hominization et humanization signifient une seule et meme 
chose: c'est. en effet, le rapport social de producti~n humain 
qui aurait ~t~ l'agent s~lectif des mutations biologiques, dans 
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C-
' ' I la mesure ou ces dernieres auraient rendu plus effiFaces, quant 
.. 
a la capture du gi bier, l' organize tion collective du travail.." 
107 Bates L.F. 1984. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Demography and Population 
2.1 The Concept of Demography: general considerations 
The central task in studying population development is to bring 
out the motive forces and laws governing this process. 
All social sciences require historical evidence, in so far as 
they deal with social reality, or attempt to falsify or verify general 
theoretical models by reference to this evidence. This is essential, 
since any kind of data collected for the purpose of any social science, 
however contemporary, becomes "historical" one moment after it has 
been collected. Indeed by the time that most of it is ready for use 
for the purpose of current analysis or future trends, it is already 
likely to be historical, for normally there must be a time lag between 
collection and utilization. To this end there is no sharp distinction 
between historical and non-historical source material. In practice 
there is some distinction, in so far as most data about the "present" 
produced for current use in the social sciences, whether by official 
or private inquiry, experiment or some other way, can be planned to 
meet a specific purpose, and the inquiry can be extended or elaborated 
or modified to meet this purpose. Historical evidence has to be taken 
as it is given. We cannot add to it, though we can try to extract all 
that is possible from it, including the answers to questions which 
were not in the mind of those who compiled it. Evaluation in history 
consists in broadening the range of human memory. 
The construction of any general and unified theory should in 
the last analysis be based on facts and their interpretation. What 
are facts? The correlation between conception and interpretation of 
"facts" is complicated, even if we give the term "fact" a strictly 
one-dimensional interpretation. "Mere facts", pure facts, hardly exist. 
The problems are real because they need to be solved. One must a~sume 
that the existence of a certain conceptual framework determines the 
very way "facts" come into existence. Objective facts are surely 
independent of human consciousness. 
However, this may create the illusion that there are pure 
scientific facts which exist in the absence of human interpretation. 
If only recognized and absorbed in tre usual non-critical way, "facts" 
cannot play an important role. They attain significance by becoming 
a part of the conceptual framework, their objective character being 
a basis for their interpretation. Thus, any theoretical construction 
expresses certain trends of thought which are in the last analysis 
socially oriented; that is, the understanding of the social needs 
and of the internal logic of the development of social reality, which 
is by its very nature contradictory and essentially dialectical. 
Here the debate on a "new" form of demography involves by definition 
the nature and concept of the historical approach. To define a concept 
does not mean to find out the sense imparted by men to the correspond-
ing term. To define a concept means defining the object. From the 
standpoint of materialism it is one and the same thing. To defibe 
demography means to define the population. The main difficulties in 
studying complex, evolving objects lies in finding a way of correlating 
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ment" of the object • In studying the functioning of the object we concentrate 
on those characteristics which guarantee its stability and immutability 
in relative variable conditions. In analyzing develop!llent we are 
interested, above all, in those characteristics and parameters of the 
object which motivate various changes in it and, at the same time, 
preserve intact those essential properties and qualities which give 
the object identity. All societies do not simply evolve into increas-
ingly advanced forms or devolve into more involuted forms by means of 
their own internal mechanisms. There are, rather, various forms of 
interlocking cycles of expansion, accumulation and- decline. We must 
examine the evolution of a population distributed in a specific way 
with respect to other types of structures in a larger totality. 
The mechanisms of ensuring "stability" and "development" operate 
largely independently of each other· and are connected as a rule with 
different components of-the population. It follows that three types 
of elaborations may in principle be formulated in relation to the 
evolving object: a) analysis of the history of the object irrespective 
of its structure; b) analysis of the structure of the object regard-
less of its history; c) structural and ~enetic analysis of the object, 
which may take the form of explaining the history of the object through 
its structure and that of explaining its structure through its history. 
As each of these elaborations is significant, it would hardly be 
correct to give a priori preference to any one of them. The structure 
and functioning of the object are just as real as its history; and 
that is why a special emphasis on the former or the latter is not 
determined by the properties of the object as such, but by the methodo-
logical considerations and interpretations. The problem than is to 
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find out in what shape and form the historical conditions of population's 
emergence and development are preserved at the different stages of its 
formation. With this is connected the essential fact of the dialectical 
relation between the historically preceding conditions of appearance 
and emergence of the population and later consequences that have 
developed on this basis. Here again, a "logical" problem is transformed 
into the problem of motive forces, contradictions, and law governing 
the correlation between historical development and its own results. 
It is of critical importance to note that demographic analysis 
has-been lacked any basically historical and evolutionary perspective 
from its beginning. 1 It has tended to advance along the road of static 
constructions and statistical probabilities ,reducing its content to 
general and abstract components, assuming "other things to be equal", 
and hoping that reality can be~approximated by gradually relaxing or 
elaborating these assumptions. However "proof" in the traditional 
legal sense is not possible. 
The correlation of two or more statistical time-series in itself 
can establish only a connection between them, but not a causal 
connection. In these sectors demogra~hers have not so much developed 
techniques and methodologies of their own. but rather adopted and 
adapted those developed in other social or even natural sciences. But, 
naturally "other things are never equal" and social reality is too 
complex for such models to describe or analyse it adequately. 
Population is not an abstract entityJ by population development 
we understand here the qualitative and quantitative changes caused by 
processes taking place in a society as a result of powers and relations 
. . 
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to stable equilibrium. We have to bear in mind the forces which tend 
to "destabilize'' societies as well as those which maintain them in 
beingJ the causes which ensure the "equilibrium" will never be 
.permanently stable, and precisely those which cause societies to change 
over time i.e., the ones with which history, and demography as a history 
of population, are essentially concerned. 
An example can be seen in the discussions of population growth 
where population growth,far from being an independent variable, is 
largely dependent upon a social demand for labour. Perhaps the greatest 
mystification of population dynamics and social evolution has been 
evident in the past 150 years. During this time capitalism matured and 
entered its highest phase, imperialism, and the population growth rate 
increased from 0.4 percent per year to 2 percent. 2 Mal thus , in response 
to the increasing human debris of eighteenth-century capitalist production 
and as an attack on the Poor Laws, argued that, 
"the power of population is indefinitely greater than the power 
in the earth to produce subsistence for man. Population, when 
unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence 
increases only in an arithmetical ratio. A slight acquaintance 
with numbers will show the immensity of the first power in com-
paris~n with the second.... By that law of our nature which 
makes food necessary to the life of man, the effects of these 
two unequal powers must be kept equal. This implies a strong 
and constantly operating check on population from the difficulty 
of subsistence. This difficulty must fall somewhere, and must 
necessarily be severely felt by a large portion of mankind •••• " 
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~althus primarily. 3 
As we shall see later, to Marx and Engels, interested as they 
were in discovering the basic laws of social change, and in particular 
the "law of motlon" of bourgeois society, any explanation of social 
phenomena such as overpopulation under capitalism in terms of an 
"eternal law" was bound to appear superficial and inadequate. This 
was the basis of their main general criticism of Kalthus's theory. 
Even in the case of those laws and conditions which have had a 
limited validity throughout the whole history of class society, ~arx 
and Engels maintained that the ma~n interesting and important thing 
about them was the different ways in which they operated in different 
types of society. Thus, they denied that "the law of population is the 
same at all times and at al1 places." On the contrary they maintained 
"every stage of development has its own law of population."4 It was 
not enough, of course, merely to assert this - it had to be "proved":-
Marx and Engels do not seem to have made any direct attempt to formulate 
the laws of population appropriate to earlier forms of society. They 
considered that the most important job they had to do was to formulate 
the actual law of population peculiar to jhe present bourgeois stage 
of development, and to demonstrate that this new, specific law fitted 
the contemporary facts better than the old "eternal" law which Yalthus 
had put forward. 
Capitalism is a mode of production in which the ~ontinueq expansion 
of production is a prime mover. But this expansion is not to accommodate 
the potential population increase as it may have been in classless 
societies; on the contrary, it is for the profits of a few. Great 
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for keeping wages low with a reserve army of oompetition for jobs. 
Marx sums up this process of capitalist productions 
"The labour population _therefore produces along with the 
accumulation of capita~ produced by it, the means by which 
itself is made relatively superfluous, is turned into a 
relatively surplus population; and it does this to an always 
increasing extent. This is a law of population peculiar to 
the capitalist mode of production; and in fact every specified 
historic mode of production has its own specific laws of 
population, historically valid within its limits alone. An 
abstract law of population exists for plants and animals only, 
and only insofar as man has not interfered with them."5 
Capitalism thus requires an expanding population because it requires an 
expa~ding production. But for those not producing under capitalism, for 
those in control of production or having an adequate share of the 
proceeds of production, population growth curves are relatively flat. 
The steep growth curves of the working classes and underdeveloped parts 
of the world are essential primarily because of the demands of capitalist 
production, ani it is only mortality that has kept the growth curves from 
being even Yarger than they are. A decrease in mortality will not 
substantially alter the causes for the high birth rate, nor will the 
basic population dynamics alter the causes. People are not poor because 
they have big families; they have~big~ families because they are poor. 
To be sure, it is producers that are involved in decisions about the 
increase or decrease in family size, but it is the dynamics of capitalist 
production that dictates which decision makes rational survival sense 
to these producers. If however. producers were in control of production, 
the lessons of history are clear - the population growth curve would 
6 flatten considerably. 
"Overpopulation" is thus not a problem of too many people, but 
of unequal forms of organization, distribution, exchange and production. 
This implies the fundamental significance of the demographic theory if 
it is conceived as an historical category and not included in a static, 
synchronous, functionalist scheme. The finest mathematical theory in 
that case ·does not represent many situations in real life in which 
different, interactive strategies are developed. Available statistical 
data shows that the birth and death rate coefficients and the natural 
increase or decrease expressed by the difference between them show great 
fluctuations. What they do not show is the conditions and reasons under 
which this happened. 
2.2 The Demographic guestion (methodology and current theories) 
The population characteristics are conventional divisions of 
processes observed in virtually all populations. 
Growth and size are based on the interaction 
of the birth rate, the death rate, and the net migration rate. Positive 
growth, decline or equ~librium will be a function of these vital events. 
Distribution and density add the dimensions of space and location. 
Composition and diversity includ~ all aspects of population and inter-
population structure including genotypic, sex and social diversity. 
The units of analysis are comprised of a hierarchy from individuals 
to higher levels of aggregation. Population characteristics can be 
.analysed at virtually all levels of aggregation? but a par-ticular 
. ...=-~-
- --=-~~$~-. 
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research problem may dictate selection of one or more units. The unit 
selected may often be dictated by the 1ata available, but for any given 
problem some units will obviously be better than others. 
Demography concerned with the characteristics of whole populations 
or sections of populations deals with three types of questions: a) the 
level of performance of the whole population in one particular unit of 
time - e.g. ·number of births, deaths that occurred in one day, year, 
century; b) the comparative performance of various populations, or 
sectors of one population, in one particular unit of time - e.g. the 
number of births in city centres versus that of suburbs, the number of 
deaths etc.; c) the performance of the whole population, or sectors of 
it, in one unit of time as compared with earlier periods. 
Changes in the numerical strength of populations result from two 
main groups of factors. First,· the characteristic features of their 
natural reproduction (primarily the correlation of birth and death 
rates specific for each society), second,· processes of the division or 
amalgamation of peoples or of their component parts. _ One of the major 
elements in demographic study is the analysis of the numbers of inter-
acting peoples, the quantitative evaluation of the composition of the 
-groups. Thus even when the total population is large the analysis 
generally deals with subdivisions of the whole. Different problems 
however, will require different population levels of analysis in the 
hierarchy from local to the species population, and in this sense the 
definition of the population becomes arbitrary and critical for com-
parative (or non-comparative) studies. As long as internal compariso~s 
are being made, the population unit may be arbitrarily defined as 
problems and foci of interes~ shift between migration patterns, re-
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production, fertility, aaortali ty or natural selection . In many cases 
different units will be appropriate. This does not mean that the 
definition should not be an operational one. However, even the local 
-"reproductive" unit may be difficult to defineJ for example, recent 
administrative changes in South America, in the Amazon region, have 
produced artificial villages, which include several previously-separate socia. 
groups with very different meting patterns. "Groups" may be 
administrative rather than interbreeding units. On the other band, 
"variation" may in part be accidental and in part a reflection of 
differences in national principles; as an example o! a contrast 
between the regions of one country, the common under-enumeration and 
under-registration of Black population in the southern u.s. in part 
reflect the whites' official sentiment that what happens to black 
Americans is not important enough to be recorded.7 These problems-
are unlikely to be solved by an exclusive concern with "pure demographic" 
data, and the collection, analysis and presentation of these, or the 
uncritical application of the latest mathematical models to populations, 
where the basic assumptions and factors can never be tested. This 
does not mean that mathematical models ~ not have any importance at 
all; ·their practical value is their application as the initial premise 
for concrete calculations. But they also have limitations and can at 
best be partially valid even at the level of such "self-contained" 
population processes as fertility, mortality or age structure. These 
"measurable" indices, which provide the ba sea of accuracy, associated 
with the best demographic statistics, however, are controlled in their 
rate and especially in their ultimate limit by such other factors as 
economic gro~th, social mobility, family norms, natural resources and 
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political organization. Thus demography may be primarily descriptive 
and quantitative, but until one sees the role of this in relation to 
other fields of inquiry, it may be difficult to comprehend the 
inherently interesting aspects of population study. 
Despite some notable exceptions (mainly French and Soviet demo-
graphers) a widespread consensus seems to be a linear descriptive 
fashion of sequential change in a set of "factors" whose covariance, 
submitted to various measures of statistical significance, is somehow 
assumed to explain itself. "Population differs from other topics of 
historical or ethnographic analysis in that it is to some degree a 
self-contained process, invariant irrespective of the culture context", 
8 W. Petersen asserts; and he continues, 
"Since any person aged 25, if he survives one year, will be 26 
years old, a series of reported ages can always be checked for 
internal consistency. Since the population of any area is equal 
to that population at an earlier data plus the intervening 
I 
natural growth (differences between births and deaihs) and the 
net migration (differences between immigration and emigration) 
if some of these elements are known the other can be derived or 
estimated. This equation, P1 = P0 + (B-D) + (I-E), simple as 
it is, has been most useful in practical demography. Since in 
any society infants and the elderly are more likely to die 
within a year than adolescents an1 young adults, and since child-
bearing is physiologically limited to "females" in the same 
9 favoured age range, there is a necessary relation among 
mortality, fertility and the age structure. As A.J. Lotca 
. pointed out as early as 1907, these three elements of any 
population are associated by the following equation: 
c(a) = be-ra p(a) 9 where c(a) is the proportion of the population 
at age a, b 9 is the birth rate, e, is the base of natural 
logarithms, r, is the annual rate of increase, and p(a), is 
the proportion surviving from birth to age a. In other words, 
if two of the three factors are known with a given degree of 
certainty, the range of the third can be stipulated." 
Reality is much more complicated. In a demographic analysis no real 
progress can be achieved until general estimates for birth/death rates 
are broken down, and specific socio-economic relations are distinguished 
10 
and compared. 
Beyond local reconstitution studies, most demographers have accepted 
nation-states and their legal subdivisions as appropriate units of 
aggregation and analysis. The compilation of routinely generated 
statistics by government offices virtually compels the adoption of 
state-territorial units, at least as a first step. For most of the 
Western European states, viable demographic data exists from the mid-
nineteenth century on. National estimates for earlier periods have 
been developed by ingenious but still very problematic methods of 
aggregating and weighing local family reconstitution studies, with data 
generated in turn from a great variety of local sources, originally 
11 
recorded by officers of church and state. 
Larger conceptual problems persist for that type of demography 
which adopts national and provincial units of analysis without any 
sustained attempt to generate regional and class breakdowns on the 
basis of relevant socio-economic categories. The multi-class and mixed-
region totals which are compiled, statistically manipulated and 
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interpreted, inevitably mask structural variation along these lines. 
The result is an excessive preoccupation with national comparisons 
(the French vs the English pattern). Class and regional variations 
are generally treated as an afterthought in a frami~ork which-is 
implicitly premised on a conservative cultural diffusionist assumption! 
lower classes and backward regions lag behind their superiors, but 
eventually follow them on the road to modernity and progress. 
The economic and political crisis of western society and the 
special features of the demographic situation in capitalist countries 
since World War II have caused a certain evolution in the traditional_ 
views on population. Instead of the definition of the subject-·matter 
of demography common in the 1930s and 1940s as "understanding of human 
populations a·nd their general movement", modern demography defines its 
field as "the empirical, statistical and mathematical study of human 
populations11 , 12 and as the study of the size, territorial distribution, 
and composition of population changes, which may be identified as 
natality, mortality, migration and mobility. 13 According tothe U.N. 
Demographic Dictionary, 1958, "demographic analysis requires precise 
data, and in order to acquire precise data it is necessary to have 
coherent concepts and definitions of events. For this reason there is 
a set of concepts that has been adopted by demographers and bas 
generally agreed upon defini tiona." Such defini tiona exactly support 
the traditional view considering de111ograpbic processes solely in con-
cret~ for111; moreover, they stress the autonomy of demographic processes, 
by reducing the theory of population to an analysis of the linkages 
between the main demographic indices. The roots of such an approach 
are in Keynesian and Nee-Keynesian conceptions of thg place of population 
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in the economic and social development of sooiety, according to which 
population is an "autonomous factor of economic growth" with a 
"decisive significance"_for • social development. In fact. we meet 8 
repeiition here of the ~ain Malthusi~n-aseumption. 14 
Malthue's theory of population, in various modernised forme, is 
still followed to-day, particularly in the United States. The basic 
idea of the neo-Yalthusians is essentially the same as that of Ualthus 
himself - that population tends to increase faster than the means of 
subsistence. Indeed such a supposition makes it possible to conclude 
that there is a disparity between the socio-
economic and the demographic, as if these two dimensions of social 
relations were materially separable under capitalism or elsewhere, and 
as if the lines of causality ran, undialectically, only one way from 
the demographic to the socio-economic and are, in this way, irreversible. 15 
In fact, this is never more than an empirical formulation untenable 
or at least presenting insoluble problems when we come to analyze 
population characteristics, their function, and their relation. In this 
case it is difficult to contrast socio-economic and demographic values 
as though they were two ''institutions" wi.th different spheres of inter-
action. One can already perceive some of the dangerous assumptions 
of the empiricist method. On the one hand,_ "institutions" are defined 
by their apparent functions, and on the other, it is presumed that 
distinct "institutions .. are necessary to carry out distinct functions. 
The epistemological consequences of such assumptions are critical 
because, as we shall see, they preclude the construction of theories, 
like the "demographic transition" theory, or the biological one which 
cannot. accept that identical population's functions or rate~ may have 
-~~ .. 
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different in eti tutional "forms" in other societies from the ones. they 
take in societies characterized by the capitalist mode of production 
(and reproduction). 
Another point of concern is related to demographic structures. 
These structures are not "prime movere" but rather the combined result 
of the action of several deeper levels, of a hierarchy of causes, the 
most important of which is again the mode of production; that is to 
say, the productive forces and the nature of social relations which 
make up the infrastructure of the society. The significance of the fact 
that demography is the synthetic result of the action of several levels, 
(Fig. 1) of a combination of causes of varying importanc~,;must not be "f... 
underestimated. It means (and it is in this that the complexity of 
the analysis of the demographic structures lies) that every type of 
social relations, each interconnected level, is subject to the function-
ing and reproduction over time of specific demographic conditions. The 
population of a society t_ is the "result" of the combined action of these 
specific demographic conditions ,'within the given socio-economic system. 
In the early 1960 1 s it was probably no exaggeration to state that the 
vast majority of demographers would have accepted the concept of 
"demographic transition". This paradigm- still used as a fundamental 
"research tool'' in many studies - has run into considerable difficulties, 
now widely acknowledged, in the light of the wealth of new local studies 
and information of the demographic transition in western Europe. 
In essence this theory held that in traditional societies both 
fertility and mortality rates were "natural" and high, tending to 
counterbalance one another in the long run so that the size of a 
community was checked at the limits of the means of subsistence available 
" , -
' 
'I 
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~~ 
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FIG 2.1 Relations between demography, ecology, biology 
anj sociocultural systems. 
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(adapted from different authors and F. Eassan 1980) 
151 
to it.16 In other words, prior to development (ae exemplified by the 
Industrial Revolution) population was either not growing or growing 
slowly. With the initiation· of development, parity between births 
and deaths is disturbed and mortality decreases as a result of a wide 
variety of interlinked causes including advances in medicine, technology 
and available resources. Later, the rate of population growth declines 
to a new "steady level" as the birth rate decreases. This decrease in 
the birth rate is caused partially by higher consumption expectations 
and the development of new social values. At first, this posing of 
the problem may appear as a counterposition_to the traditional Malthusian 
conception of overpopulation and the primacy of the biological elements 
in human reproduction. In fact, however, this is not so. "Transittion-
ists" and the Malthusians have a common base: the initial assumption 
that the social relationships and problems in a population have a 
general characte~ that does not depend on the social system - exemplified 
and formulated "outside" the socio-economic organization of the society. 
There appea~. to be at least four discernable problems in this contextr 
the first has been in determining the reality - usually assumed by 
demographers - of the lower asymptotes where high mortality and fertility 
are roughly equal. Anthropologists who have actually tried to find 
such societies have not been particularly successful.17 Palaeoanthro-
pologists have been showing that the transition between hunting and 
gathering and agriculture has b.een a gradual process characterized by 
societies with moderate fertility and mortality rates, not uniformly 
high rates as presumed by the theory. Ethnographic data indicates a 
wide variety of mortality and fertility rates for present-day non-
industrialized societies. 
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The second problem is that the transition theory was originally 
formulated to explain data from Western Europe. The characteristic 
rates need not be universal. Anthropologists have been showing that 
demographic characteristics are neither geographically nor temporally 
uniform.18Thirdly,thereisthe argument that mortality drops as a result 
of the new medical techniques, and that fertility declines after 
industrialization. It is now clear, however, that even in Western 
Europe the decline of mortality preceded medical technology while the 
decline in fertility preceded industrialization. The decreases in pre-
industrial populations appear to be the result of culture contact with 
Western civilization and the consequent epidemics, wars and slave 
trades. 19 
The rise of the Third World population,on the other hand, was a 
response to new economic opportunities, that -is, labour traded for 
cash goods, rather than a transition. High fertility is a family 
response to the new demand for labour - by colonial powers. The last 
problem concerns the upper asymptote of the transition where low mortality 
and low fertility should once again be approximately equal. Demographers 
have had difficulties finding quantitativo support for this. Transition 
theoristlhave tended to look toward modern industrial societies with 
capital-intensive economies. Anthropologists, however, have recently 
pointed out many examples of "primitive isolates" which are neither 
industrial nor capital-intensive, but which meet the transition theorist's 
criteria of low fertility and mortality. 
It is evident that there are a number of social factors that make 
the demographic transition model an inappropriate tool for prediction. 
20 Wh:Us it appears to be the t the ::stsges may e:xiat tn ·reallty the seq_uence 
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of events in one culture or country is not necessarily going to provide 
a good productive index of the sequence in another. 
To sum up, it would appear that all societies, both present and 
past, were capable of regulating growth to some extent, and often did 
so in order to prevent over-exploitation of perceived available resources. 
While it does seem to be true that cultural complexity has historically 
led to increasing population size, and~ to improved resource utilization, 
the specific processes are more varied and complex than first appears to 
be the case. The slow, steady growth exhibited in Fig. 2 is a trend 
based on the world's population. To attribute this curve to individual 
societies in various regions would be inappropriate. 
The question has been taken one step further analytically by 
limiting interest to stages of population growth and inquiring as to 
whether population pressure causes or results from socio-economic 
21 
change. Questions of population pressure become more evident if the 
nature of the pressure is specified. Population pressure though is not 
necessarily synonymous with the ecological concept of carrying capacit~ ~ 
r 
. "· but refers to the presence of a "strain" on one or more existing 
resources and can occur well below carrying capacity. Resources can 
be viewed as relatively elastic or inelastic on the basis of their 
renewability. Regulation brought about when a population reaches 
carrying capacity is presumably a common occurrence in non-human 
populations and would not be expected with human populations. Found 
(1971) and others have considered general models for a single resource 
but these tend to deal with conditions that only pertain in a modern 
market economy and are not applicable to all situations. 
It is social production that marks the critical disjunction between 
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FIG 2.2 A curve showing the estimated growth of the human 
population from 1.50 m.y ago to the present. 
The great majority of the growth has occurred 
within the last 300 Y• . 
(adapted from Ascarti-Nemesceri 1970. Deevy 1960. 
A. Swe11and 1975) 
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human society and other animal societies. It is the ability of human 
society to produce subsistence, rather than control populations in 
order to subsist. Such arguments can be tested wi t.h selected facts 
of population growth and population dynamics in human history; social 
production is that group subsistence activity which involves decisions 
about different labour allocations. 
This means the awareness of alternatives, the ability to value 
labour, and consequently to plan and thus produce activity. Social 
production cannot simply be reduced to environmental or biological 
"dependency". The critical cognitive factor in production and growth 
is the recognition or cognizance of labour potential, which could be 
described in fact 0 as the emergence of consciousnes~. "the objectifi-
,, 
cation of work. This social activity was previously unknown in 
evolutionary history, and it effectively emancipated society from 
population control by biosocial means. Population growth could be 
accommodated rather than controlled. Social production enabled the 
population growth of producers to play a progressive, rather than a 
limiting, role in the future change of society. With the cognizance 
of the value of labour comes the value of humans as social individuals 
and potential producers. It is decisions about allocation to secure 
greater returns from labour investment that mark social production, 
for these enable the group to provide for more members, members whose 
being is now significant. To utilize labour in this manner is to 
produce. 22 The objectification of activity (and thus of people) 
followed on, and emerged from actual activity. It was born of a 
struggle between the organization of activity based on biosocial 
requisites and dictates, and the organization of activity which challenged 
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or rejected this. The particular type of activity did not change 
significantly. But organizationally the differences became immense, 
and this had an effect on the demographic pattern. 
Studies in general population growth emphasize, along with 
environmental v~riables, the role of genotypic differences within 
populations. For a long time biologists have tended to ignore the 
socio-cultural factor in human adaptation. The Biological reproduction 
was taken as a boundary condition for social reproduction. Natural 
selection, for example, has often been compared to a "sieve" which 
retains the ~ew useful mutants and lets the harmful ones be lost. 
This analogy is seriously misleading, and within the framework of modern 
biological trends, it is highly deterministic and selectionist. 23 If 
it is true that every biological event is a moment in a given life, it 
is equally true that it can-only be understood when re-inserted into 
the totality of that life, and that every such event is also subject 
to the influence of the conditions of the time. In the case of human 
populations, history is not simply an accumulation of past events -
biological and other. It is also - and perhaps especially - the 
consciousness of such an accumulation. 4n understanding of the 
population theory underlying this. is usually missing. It may be asked, 
- of course, whether all the systems, divisions and subdivisions that 
make up the texture of that sort of biological discourse, are not 
"fictions" substituted for reality in order to obtain a "workable" 
image, partially emptied of substance, but accessible to the operations 
of a "scientific logic", 1 t self founded upon a conventional principle 
of identity - a convention with which, howeve~ 
unrble to diqpanse. 
human reason seems 
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'l'o cite an examplea ·had it been technically and physically 
possible in 1800 to examine the ABO groups of all the inhabitants of 
the Fiji Islands, the survey would have shown the blood group B gene 
to be present at a ~requenoy of about 9~· Such a survey today would 
give double the frequency of about 18~. A change in gene frequency as 
great as this in any other species would suggest the operation of 
natural selection and, by analogy, one might suppose that indivi1uals 
with the B gene were endowed with improved survival in the conditions 
of Fiji, greater successful fertility or a combination of both. This 
is not the explanation. It is a direct result of a succession of 
events of history, and illustrates a type of evolutionary process 
different from. the usual interpretation of natural selection as favour-
ing fitter individuals. 
The reality is that the coming of the Europeans brought about a 
disaster to Fiji. With the introduction of firearms, the nature of 
native warfare changed, and to a society geared to a relatively harmless 
system of strife, the new barbarism brought losses impossible to assess. 
There is no conception of the number of men, women and children of allages 
.lu5t~ but certainly many of the victims ~uring that period were of the 
age groups of the greatest reproductive potential. A second effect 
of the European contact was the spread of epidemic disease. This was 
particularly high' on the Fijians who, by reason of their geographical 
isolation, possess little immunity to the more usual infections of the 
outer world. 
Had it occurred in any other species, it would be interpreted as 
·interpopulation selection reflecting biological advantage in some 
. chal'-8.Cteristic. In this case, however, thara :i.a eufft~i-tlnt -mr..t~:;:o)_~l 
to allow examination of th~ mechanisms responsible for it, and to 
explore its dynamics. In a very short space of time, the human gene 
pool of a particular territory has become very much modified. There 
has been partial replacement of the indigenous presumably adapted gene 
pool by that from an "alien" population. This has been brought about 
by the difference in the demographic structure and behaviour of the 
populations. The demographic differences are a direct reflection of 
the cultural differences between them and their recent cultural history. 
There is no doubt that the changes in gene frequency in the Fiji 
Islands after the initial Indian immigration have been primarily due 
to interpopulation, differential mortality and fertility. Yet there 
is no evidence at all that they are selective, making for increased 
fitness and increased adaptation of the population to the Fijian environ-
ment. Instead, they represent the effects of intergroup cultural 
differences, which are of little, if any, relevance to the adaptive 
value of the individual's biological characters. This reasoning appears 
acceptable in respect of the fertility differential. It may be argued 
that cultural factors are not entirely responsible for the mortality 
differences, but that these have occurred in response to real but 
unidentified biological differences in ability to survive in the Fiji 
environment; but many other situations of populations replacement that 
have occurred demonstrate the cultural element in differential mortality. 
What would have happened say if the Tasmanians or the Amazon Indians 
instead of the Europeans had the guns? Is there any "demographic", 
7' 
"biological" or "ecological" explanation .rfor the fate of these populations, 
/ 
whose mistake was simply not to have invented weapons equal to those of 
Europeans? 24 It seems fairly clear that the inclusion of the historical 
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dimension is mainly the recognition of the dynamic nature of social 
living and the need to build "change" into tr.ese explanatory models. 
(Table 21 Retter than seeirig demographic processes an~ vari~bles 
a a an "inherent ten:iency'' of human_ popule. tions, it is much more 
instructive to see this tendency as a human possibility which is 
encouraged by certain institutional (in general) events, but equally 
may be discouraied by other events. This certainly leaves a great 
deal still to be understood, accepted and explained. The question of 
"reality" in scientific explanation may seem in fact rather scholastic; 
but it is much better to try to formulate the right questions than to 
offer the wrong answers. 
2 ·3 Palaeodemography: defining t-he guestion 
Given the methods and concepts outlined above, it is not surpris-
ing that Palaeodemography has been formulated more or less along 
similar lines. The result was a narrow, mechanical approach to pre-
historic popule tions and an e:xcessi ve preoccupation with the "d.escripti ve" 
categories of demography, directly analy;ed by "fixed" quantitative 
techniques; without any real consideration for the relationships between 
popu1etion dynamics and socio-economic processes. Moreover the rise 
-of ecological and biological overdeterministic paradigms within 
archaeology was limiting further analysis of the diverse, interacting 
structures involved in population development. 
Social patterns that should have theoretical explanations, not in 
standard "individual" selection terms alone, but in rel~tion to communal 
s.et:i.vities and the necessity for group ·living, -were almoe·t totally 
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Short-term Long-term 
Prehistoric X 
Historical X X 
Contemporary X 
Simulated X X 
Table 2; Population types for the study of change. X 
indicates the suitability of each type for either 
short-term or long-term change. Short-term refers 
to years, decades or generations. Long-term refers 
to multiple generations, centuries or thousand of 
years. ('adapted from Swedland 1978) 
161 
ignored and dismisse~ :~even in the cases where the necessity for 
/ 
their investigation was mentioned. 2 5 
According to Jacob (1970): 
"Evolution accounts for the fact that integration at the level 
of organisms and the relationships between organisms consist 
in an exchange of encoded information and not in interaction 
between molecules •••• Culture forms the second genetic 
system which is superior to heredity and that is why the code 
in these new integrating units goes beyond the schema of 
biological explanations. Hence research o~ man and society 
is not reducible to biology, even though it cannot be con-
ducted without reference to it." 
It is certain that palaeodemographic theory bears directly on 
an understanding of human cultural behaviour. The analysis of that 
behaviour and its evolutionary meaning must necessarily be sought in 
demographic variables such as population size, density, growth, 
fertility-mortality rates, age-sex composition. It goes without saying 
that the results obtained will be indistinct and vague, inasmuch as 
they are approached from "outside" without evaluation of their intrinsic 
composition. The question immediately arises as to how we would 
comprehend culture and change if not through preliminary defined types. 
The root of the contradictions and difficulties lies in the limited 
character of the traditional strategies that are being developed in 
contemporary demography, and equally elaborated in palaeodemography; 
accepting such an approach really means a "Farewell to Palaedemo-
26 graphy". The usual generalizations concerning the demographic 
characteristics of prehistoric man often strike one as too broad, 
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-extrapolations from a few non-random cases to a supposed typicality. 
Graphic depictions of human population history usually shows an 
extremely low and unifor_m rate of increase over tl:e Pleistocene, and 
the r~te of growth sharply increased -a~ the Pleistocene-Holocene 
transition with the advent of agriculture. The demographic transition 
model - as we have seen - assumes that, in its first stage, birth and 
death rates are in homeostatic -balance preventing any significant 
population growth. Mortality is supposed to be high and natality about 
equally high. T~ere seems to be some consensus (based among other 
tbings on demographers' views) that there was a 50% mortality between 
birth and the b&ginning of the reproductive period. (Petersen 1965, 
1975) A more detailed look at the human past - taking into consideration 
other factors as well - can give us a quite different understanding of 
population dynamics. From the statistical point of view, the analysis 
of length of life, mortality, fertility and population structure in 
general, if based on a single series, is actually a monograph and con-
sequently its results cannot be generalized for long periods or larger 
regions without reservations• (Tables 3-8)· Palaeo demographic 
analysis relies for the most part on the anthropological material of 
t . 1 t' th t · on skeletal fl'nds. 27 one- 1me popu a 1ons, a 1s Perhaps one of the 
major contributions of palaeodemographic an~lysis was the introduction 
of model life tables. (Ascadi and Nemeskeri 1970) These tables are 
based on data from several populations, thus minimizing the statistical 
and cultural "causes of error" evident in many archaeological samples. 
The life table represents the mortality history from birth to death 
of a cohort, that is, a group of people born at 9ne time, and the life 
expectancy _at various ages can thus be determined. However one of the 
A B 
Palaeolithic 19.9 20.6 
Mesolithic 31.4 26.9 
Neolithic 26.9 19.1 
Copper Age 28.4 22.2 
Bronze Age 32.1 23-7 
Iron Age 27-3 23.4 
Classical Period 27.2 24.7 
Medieval Europe 26.1 25.3 
Table-J_ Life expectancy from various periods in human history. 
A = life expectancy at birth 
B life expectancy at age 15 
(Source: Weiss 1973 ) 
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Age Sinanthrop~s Sin an thro PY'-S. Neandertho.l Afalou 
(X) type and Solo man 
0 13.0 (14.6) . . 
10 23 ·3 . 21 . 
20 17.9 22.6 . 21.9 
30 14.7 17.1 . 16.7 
40 12.5 12.2 . 11.3 
50 11.0 8.1 . 6.4 
60 
- 3·7 . . 
70 
- -
. . 
Table 4 Ancient expectation of life (both sexes) 
Source: Ascadi-Nemeskeri (1970) 
Taforalt Vassilievka 
20.8 . 
29.9 30.8 
23.9 22.8 
20.4 20.0 
18.2 17.3 
12.0 12.7 
6.8 9.8 
3.1 3.7 
Fofonovo 
. 
. 
29.8 
24.1 
14.1 
9·7 
7·7 
4.1 
Maghreb 
type 
21.1 
31.2 
2 4· 5 
19.8 
16.0 
12.2 
7.7 
3·5 
1-' 
0\ 
""'" 
Age-groups 
Series Total 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+ 
Neanderthal 
(Va1lois) 100.0 30.0 50.0 15.0 5·0 
Upper Palaeolithic 
(Vallois) 100.0 43.7 38.0 15-5 2.8 
Afa1ou ( ascadi-
Nem) 100.0 21.9 21.9 26.1 22.9 7-2 
Mesolithic 
(Vallois) 100.0 79-4 13.7 2.3 4.6 
Va ssilievka 
(Askadi-Nem) 100.0 29.2 22.2 16.2 14.3 18.1 
Table 5. Comparison of percentage age distribution of Palaeolithic 
and Mesolithic series 
(Source: Ascadi-Nemeskeri 1970) 
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Age-group 
Total 12-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 
N U M B E R 
Neanderthal 24 4 6 10 3 1 
Upper Palaeolithic 86 15 31 27 11 2 
Mesolithic 50 6 35 6 1 2 
PER c E N T 
Neanderthal 100.1 16.7 25.0 41.7 12.5 4-2 
Upper Palaeolithic 100.0 17.4 3 6.1 31.4 12.8 2 ·3 
Mesolithic 100.0 12.0 70.0 12.0 2.0 4.0 
Table>6 A comparison of distribution of death from the age of 12 
(after Vallois) 
Age 
0-11 
12-20 
21-30 
31-40 
41-50 
51-60 
Total 
Tabl~ ··1 
Number Per cent 
Neanderthal Eurasian Mesolithic Neanderthal Eurasian Mesolithic 
Upper Palaeolithic Upper Palaeolithic 
15 29 21 38·5 38.2 29·5 
4 12 6 10.3 15.8 8.5 
6 15 35 15.4 19.7 49·3 
10 11 6 25.6 14·5 8.5 
3 7 l 7·7 9.2 1.4 
1 2 2 2.5 2.6 2.8 
39 76 71 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Distribution by age and death of the Neanderthal, Upper Palaeolithic and Mesolithic men 
(after Vallois) 
~ 
"' -J 
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estimated expectation expected ag9 at death 
of life at the age of of males as a per-
Series 20 years. centage of females. 
Males Females 
Solo Man 23 23 100 
Neanderthal 
(Vallois) 15 5 140 
Upper Palaeolithic 
( Vallois) 15-5 9-8 119 
Afalou 26.8 16.8 127 
Taforalt 23.7 21.0 107 
Vassilievka 23-96 20.33 109 
Mesolithic 8.6 6.0 110 
Fofonovo 35-85 22.74 131 
c 
Together 19.1 12.7 120 
Table 8~" Sex differences in ancient expectation of life 
(Source: Ascadi-Nemesceri 1970) 
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problems of the life tables lies in assuming that the skeletal 
collection from a site represents a single population without any 
migration and without constant age-specific death and birth rates-
that is, a stable population. The situation does not often correspond 
to the demographic flux characteristic of many archaeological populations. 
(Angel 1969) Sampling, sexing and aging problems are an additional 
consideration in constructing life tables. 28 Mathematical smoothing 
and graduation of data may remedy these problems (Weiss 1973), except 
when the sample is exceedingly deficient or overstocked in a certain 
age group. It must be noted here that infant under-representation, 
which occurs frequently in archaeological samples, bas little effect 
on the estimation of the probability of dying and life expectancy outside 
the infant age group. But the effect on the survivorship curve is very 
strong (Moore et al 1975)· Ascadi and Nemeskeri (1970), when discussing 
model life table construction, point out that these models are built 
on the general characteristics of recent human mortality and, although 
not suitable for replacing historical data, are an excellent basis for 
comparisons and for reconstructing missing pieces of information. 
Indeed the summaries by Ascadi and Nemeskeri (1970) and Weiss (1973) 
are useful in showing definite trends of change in the life expectancy 
of adults, which is far below that of modern man in industrialized 
societies; however, the life span does not seem to have been much 
different (perhaps with the exception of the Australopitbecines) as 
indicated by the survival of many individuals to what is considered 
today as old age. 
Yet the conformity of facts and models suggests far-reaching 
conclusions. According to Ascadi-Nemeskeri; 
170 
"although the difference. 1 between Palaeolithic man and modern 
advanced mortality conditions ia fairly conspicuous~ it appears 
mainly in the level of mortality rather than in changes of 
biological factors. (Fig. 3,4) The relationship of ancient 
mortality with the mortality of modern man, suggests that the 
biological rules of mortality of prehistoric man were not 
basically different from those of modern man. Putting it in 
another way this would mean that the biological possibilities, 
realized in our days, were "contained" in ancient man as well. 
The demographic revolution of recent times has brought profound 
changes in the level of mortality an1 its age structure. As a ~ 
result, it has changed characteristic life span values as well. 
Historically, this change has taken place rapidly enough even 
in populations of advanced socio-economic structure •••• All 
this shows that ancient man must also have been ready biologically 
to take this step." 
For the survival of a population with a high mortality rate, a 
high rate of fertility is required. The question is, however, could 
fertility have been so high in ancient times as it is assumed to be. 
Doubtless, certain ancient populations may have hai high fertility/ 
mortality rates, but the possibility cannot be excluded that smaller 
or more isolated populations living under adverse conditions died out, 
and that other populations showed rapid multiplication and dispersion 
in proportion to ancient conditions. The very low rate of natural 
increase and the high, probably unrestricted, fertility of ancient 
times render a high rate of ancient mortality probable. (Fig. 5) 
Anthropologists however do not seem to agree with this picture; they 
FIG 2.3 
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tend to assume that the low growth rates through most of human history 
stem from low birth ani ieath rates (Dumond 19751 Polgar 1972), and, 
despite controversy over thi mechanism ~nvolved (see Cohen 1980; 
Lee 1980-; Hassan 19~0) - that the increased rate of growth at the 
Pleistocene-Holocene transition stemmed from an increase in fertility. 
Hassan (1981) supported that 1) prior to agriculture, mortality and 
fertility balanced; 2) during the initial phase of the agricultural 
transition, fertility increased and mortality may have either increased 
or stayed at prior levels; 3) fertility continued to increase while 
mortality declined, and finally 4) both fertility and mortality fell. 
Handwerker (1983) also argued that at least since the upper Palaeo-
lithic, growth rates reflected moderate birth rates, that the increased 
rate of growth at the Pleistocene-Holocene transition reflected a 
deerease in mortality, and that with the development of agrarian 
societies the rate of grow~h declined as both fertility and mortality 
rose to levels which had not previously been attained. This first 
demographic transition of Homo sapiens reflected not the impact of 
reproductive decisions, but the impact of decisions to improve the 
level and reliability of income flow. On the other hand, although the 
-
life tables give the age pattern of mortality, it is important to 
augment this by an understanding of the way in which the ac~ual forces 
of mortality bring it about. 
It is conceivable that the predominance of the proto-mortality 
pattern began to wear out at the Upper Palaeolithic or the ~esolithic. 
The demographic situation began to change some 20-40000 years ago after 
the last glacial period; at similarly high fertility, better conditions 
hav~ pr~bably led to re1uction of mortality. ~hich resulted in a Rome-
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what higher rate of population growth. Nevertheless, the density of 
population must have still been low. Estimates show that in an area 
of 100 square kilometres an average of at most 8-16 people were able 
to subsist on hunting and gathering alone. There is no doubt that 
the new type of mortality began to take shape under the economic 
revolution of neolithization in the Mesolithic. Such an increase is 
suggested by a number of studies. 29 
Braidwood and Reed (1957~ use analogies from contemporary societies 
as well as archaeological evidence to propose average densities of 3.0 
inhabitants per 100 sq. mile, for hunters and gatherers of 12.5 for more 
specialized food-collectors of the Mesolithic, of 2.500 for the primary 
village-farming community stage, and of 5,000 for the preindustrial 
urban stage. 
Nougier (1954) computes the population of France in various periods 
from the number of archaeological sites containing artifacts from 
different cultural horizons. His estimates are 10-20,000 inhabitants 
for the Lower Palaeolithic, about 50,000 for the Upper Palaeolithic and 
5,000,000 for the later Neolithic around 3,000 B.C. There are a number 
of assumptions underlying these estimates which need to be examined. 
If population growth is affected by an increase in the techno-environ-
mental efficiency, it is important to investigate the relative influences 
on the processes of fertility, mortality and migration through which 
any population change occurs. 
"Save for unforeseen developments it would be futile to expect 
to have a working knowledge of the demography of ancient 
populations if we start only from the estimations of ages at 
death. The scholars who persist in this course will only obtain 
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artefacts. ••••• Early mortality of adults, over-morality of 
women, lack of old people in those populations •••• all these 
notions were born from the misinterpretation of the available 
data." (Bocquet-Mo·~et 1982) 
Other aspects of palaeodemography that hRve hardly been touched 
upon deserve further study. Most people in most societies find that 
the conduct of their lives involves a good deal of daily struggle to 
attain some objectives, to maintain some situations, and to prevent 
others from developing. The point is that the decisions and behaviour 
affecting growth rates and other demographic variables always occur in 
the context of multiple economic, technological, social and ideological 
factors. Indications of large or small families, large nr small 
communities, high or low regional population densities are only a part 
of the complex of considerations that enter into what affects demography. 
Subtle and fairly minor shifts in these complex interrelated factors can 
lead to relatively minor changes in fertility or mortality, w~ich in 
turn affect pre-historic growth rates. The mathematics of population 
growth mean that even a very moderate rate of increase by contemporary 
standards, (for example, 5 per 1000 per year) cannot have been sustained 
for long periods, since this amounts to a ten-fold increase in about 460 
years, a 100-fold increase in about 925 years and a 1000-fold increase 
in about 1390 years. What this implies for the Pleistocene is that 
unless the world's human population increase by more than 100-fold between 
500,000 and 40,000 B.C., the overall average rate of increase cannot 
have been over 0.01 per 1000 per year. Again, unless world population 
increased by more than 100 times over between 40,000 and 7,000 B.c., 
the average annual rate of increase during that interval cannot have been 
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as much as 0.2 per 1000. Actually, overall rates were probably much 
lower; Deevey's (1960) estimates for 1.000.000 to 8.000 B.C. 
accelerate from about 0.003 to 0.03 per 1000 per year.3° 
The difficulties for using existing archaeological data (or even 
documentary data) for estimates of ancient population densities or 
relative trends are well-known. Nevertheless, if we consider growth 
rates which depend on relative rather than absolute population estimates, 
some evidence is already available that indicates that sedentary food-
producing populations themselves experience many very significant changes 
in their growth rates, and that periods of extremely slow or negligible 
growth, or even population decline, are interspersed with surges of 
relatively rapid growth. 
Some population declines have been very abrupt and drastic, clearly 
relating to other factors than a truly marginal habitat, for human 
adaptation. Yet it is obvious that the trend in growth rates. depends 
" 
on a population's natural environment and socio-economic conditions, 
and not on historic chronology, with which it is only indirectly and 
loosely connected through evolution. It is readily conceivable that 
the mortality of a later population living under less or not fully 
developed economic conditions, could have been higher than that of an 
earlier population in better circumstances. Encouraging growth does 
not simply mean having as many offspring as physiologically possible, 
for the population dynamics must be understood in terms of the con-
straints and potentialities of the system of social production. With 
regard to the results of a less "statistical" nature, the demographic 
profiles from various local areas are highly variable in rates of 
growth and occurrences of peaks, depressions and stabilization phases 
as compared with each other. The factors responsible for these 
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variations are obviously complex and include local and extra-local 
ecological, and political events and processes. When the factors are 
analysed, persistence of certain elements - atypical or typical - can 
be discerned; the question arises as to why, on the long term~ such 
elements persisted, taking under consideration conditions of change 
within a group, community or society. One of the possible answers is 
"utility'' of a certain type or structure through time. The persistence 
of a certain type does not mean that that remains unchangeable, slight 
differentiations do exist. What that means once again is that we have 
to recognize, analyze and find the reasons for this "solidity". Within 
each of these categories exists a form of horizontal solidarity tied 
to a:. homogeneity of situation and an identity of the conditions to 
which each is submitted. 
Each level of the formation .of units as a consequence of a certain 
''direction" represents an aggregate or a juxtaposition of thes-e units. ·. 
A number of relations exist between these units (for example in exchange 
of goods, population movement et al), so that within each of these 
categories there emerges what might be iermed vertical solidarity. Are 
those two ''types" in contradiction or can they complement each other? 
Dialectics require in this case that external contradi~tion of ''types" 
be interpreted as a mutually necessary manifestation of the deep rooted 
contradiction of each of them; this ~merges as an inner identity of 
mutually exclusive "moments" or ''facts" media ted through a relation to 
something elee and reflected through something else, as an internally 
contradictory relation of a thing to itself, that is, as a contradiction 
in one relation and at one and the same moment of time. A real solution 
of the contradiction between the universal la~ and the empirical form 
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of its realization, between abstraction and concrete fact,can be found 
through revealing the concrete totality of conditions. The abstractly 
expressed universal law inevitably stands in relations of mutually_ 
31 
exclusive contradiction to the fact -under study.__ From tte standpoint 
of dialectical logic, there is nothing to be afraid of here. On the 
contrary, logical contradiction is in this case only an indication and 
feature of the fact that the analysed object is understood in the &bstract; 
that not all the necessary conditions of its being are as yet discovered. 
The logical contradictions necessarily arising in cognition are thus 
solved in the unfolding of the concrete system of categories reproducing 
the object in the totality of its necessary characteristic~. of the 
objective conditions of its being. In this cognitive process. all the 
necessary conditions o~ the possitilities of the analyzed phenomenon 
are not simply listed or juxtaposed but conceived in their concrete 
historical interaction and the links between them. 
These processes are normally not observable, but we deduce them 
from their effects and their mechanisms. In a way, we must look behind 
reality for explanation, behind behaviour for the process. 
A process statement simply illustrat~s the dynamics, or specifies 
the relationship between the facts observed and the means by which these 
facts and relationships (and not others) came about. To explain 
phenomena then, we IJIUSt be able to "generate" these phenomena - to 
specify the processes by which these phenomena came to be the way they 
are (and not any other way). 
A social system or a natural ecosystem is therefore never an 
entirely integrated totality (~sis claimed by functionalists). 32 It 
is tha totnlity whose unity is the provisionally stable effect of the 
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properties of compatability existing between the elements which compose 
the whole, or between the different parts of a whole which compose the 
system. Of critical importance from this perspective becomes the 
matter of "change" within population dynamics; that is we cannot study 
(at least we should not) the effects of results of ''change" without 
considering at the same time - and equally - the causes. 
Technological changes, for example, may in themselves enable and 
help bring about qualitative shifts in social production. These shifts 
not only accommodate population growth, but also establish new laws of 
population growth and new dynamics of development. The potentialities 
of each epoch change and new contradictions come into being. That 
"reality" nevertheless can easily lead to a deterministic-mechanistic 
view (see Boserup 1965~ also Carneiro 1967; Harner 1970), if we do not 
take into consideration the whole spectrum of features involved in this 
process. There is no doubt that population growth has aided in pre-
cipitating many changes in the history of human society, but population 
dynamics change in each case and cannot be understood outside the 
particular set of social relations of production to which they are 
subject. To understand population growth, density, size etc., we need 
to know initially the inherent potentialities of the social system that 
facilitated, enabled or required these tendencies. For example. in 
human society, tools could mean increased manpower for production, 
changed land tenure or mobility patterns and different forms of 
organization: here the primary role of social production becomes clear, 
for social aspects of tool use are as important in the explanation of 
their appearance in social evolution as are their technological aspects. 
Because human societies can produce, they can accommodate population 
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growth. Population potential is a progressive result of the recognition 
of labour potential. By "progressive" we mean nothing arbitrary or 
dictionary-nominalist. Progress is increase in the social-reproductive 
powers of the society as a whole. Because that principle inv~riably 
employs a restricted definition of the term mode, the extent of 
potential development is restricted. The contradiction is defined by 
successful convergence upon the implicit limits of development defined 
by that mode. In certain societies such as agricultural or even feudal, 
the handful of technological as well as socio-organizational innovations 
on which the development of the population depends, seems -extremely 
marginal by contrast with a short period of capitalist development. 
In prehistoric society again, development seems merely relatively 
absent; in that case, (in spite of the enormous literature devoted· 
-to it) such considerations tend to appear- "preliminary", if not 
"preconceived". 
·Investigation requires correspondingly adjusted definition of 
scale to provide the fundamental features of the society. We must 
determine the intrinsic tendency for technological and related develoP-
ments and locate the "boundaries" placed upon the realization of such 
developments by a given mode of social organization. It is in this 
perspective that it seems necessary and possible to reevaluate and 
reexamine palaeodemographic data and theory in general under another 
"non-traditional" approach. 
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2.4 Marxist approaches ~o population problems 
The primary form of Marxism's traditional address to demography, 
dating back to ~arx himself; has been through a sharp denunciation of 
its Malthusian version, as we have already mentioned earlier in this 
chapter. How did it come about that the Malthusian theory was able to 
exercise this enormous influence? One of the main reasons was that the 
actual phenomenon which Malthus described and which be tried to account 
for - the widespread poverty and pauperism among the working people -
was a real phenomenon which could not be ignored and which was crying 
out for an explanation. llalthus was "right in his way" said Engels 
"in asserting that there are always more people on hand that 
can be maintained from the available means of subsistence33 
although the pressure of population was really against the means 
of employment rather-than against the means of subsistence. If 
Malthus had not taken such a one-sided view of the matter he 
could not have missed seeing that surplus population or labour 
power is always bound up with surplus wealth, surplus capital 
and surplus land property. Population is too great only when 
productive power in general is too ~rest. The state of affairs 
in every over-populated country, in particular England, from the 
time when Malthus wrote onwards, demonstrates this quite 
unmistakeably. These were the facts which Ualthus ought to have 
examined in their entirety, and whose examination ought to have 
led to the correct conclusion; iflstead, be picked out one of 
these facts, neglecting the others, and thus arrived at his own 
conclusiona."34 
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to be wrong, but they could not "argue a,-.,ay the facts which led Malthus 
to his principle. .,3 5 Thus, even apart from all the questions of what 
Marx called "party interest", 36 there presumption in favour of was a 
Ualthus's explanation of the facts until a better one had been put 
forward. "Party interest", however, played an important role in secur-
ing the wide acceptance of the theory in ruling class circles. An 
explanation of human misery in terms of an "eternal law of nature" such 
as Malthus's principle of population "has an obvious appeal for that I ~ 
class, since it diverts attention from the part played in the creation 
of this misery by class exploitation in general and by particular systems 
of class exploitation such as capitalism. 37 One cannot do away with an 
"eternal law of nature". If it is nature and not human society which 
is responsible for a particular state of affairs, all one can do, at 
the very best, is to mitigate some of the effects of this "eternal law" 
and suffer the rest without complaint. Malthus "had otter things in 
mind than a scientific treatise on population growth", says a modern 
38 
commentator on the Essay, and this is essentially one of the points 
where clarification was required. Marx and Engels felt that the most 
effective way of refuting Malthus's principle was to provide an alter-
native theory which could explain the facts of the modern world better 
than Malthus did. They were thus more concerned with the positive task 
of formulating the specific law of population peculiar to capitalism 
than with a detailed negative analysis of Malthus's theory. / 
The main proof of this demonstration is human labour. Population 
growth is a positive result of the recognition of labour potential. 
Independently of the rate of growth, "mankind is capable of increasing 
more rapidly than modern bourgeois society can stand ." 39 The question 
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that must be asked is not only what factors inhibited population growth 
but also what factors did not, for they are of most significance from 
the point of view of evolution. This requires looking at some of the 
"inhibiting" factors, however, as some of the factors traditionally 
considered to inhibit population growth are in fact properly understood 
as social means for ultimately promoting progressive population increase. 
Without the emergence of a form of society whose immediate impulse is to 
universalize self-development, the possibility of measuring displace-
ments along a "world-line" could not have occurred to man. Marx merely 
permits man to alter nature - and thus to "relocate" his existence. In 
that sense, Marx's approach contains two main elements useful for 
demography. First, it provides a basic mechanism of historical trans-
formation through the changes in the mode of human social production and 
reproduction. Secondly it provides a model which brings the other human 
social activities - that is superstructure and the specific forms of 
social consciousness and behaviour - into relation with the economic 
structure of society and with each other. Thus, looking back upon 
previous development, it is impossible to evaluate the past without 
taking into consideration the present.(Fig:6a~b) That is not such a 
defect as might be immediately supposed; it is impossible to understand 
the past from a less developed standpoint than that premised in capitalist 
development. The point is- under this understanding- not to impose 
capitalist teleology on the inner life of earlier forms of society. Such 
societies could not possibly ''understand themselves", or be understood 
generally, except in respect of that movement within them which leads 
towards capitalism. This tendency, which must be inevitable and 
unavoidable in any attempt to understand the past from the present, 
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FIG 2.6 (a) Transfor~etion o¥ the mode of life as process 
base:l esse!'ltialfy on tte :lialectic link betn:een 
the changes of the socio-economic formation 
conditions nf life and population structure. 
(adapte:l from different sources) 
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FIG 2.6 (b) To express the historical ~ovement of compared 
components: the fun:!amental divergence as well as 
the ap~earance of specific new original qualities 
of the phenomenon in a comparative diachronic 
dimension assumes the development df a historical 
model with external-internal·factors influencing 
a society. The above diagram is an example, 
(adapted from different sources) where Ul. U2 = 
external factor~. Fl, F2 = internal factors 
and t = time. 
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becomes. an error only when capital ism is "mistaken" for complete 
perfection. This error would cause one to look at prehistoric or ancient 
societies:/., for example, for their specifically capitalist "qualities". 
The only remedy for this -r is to examine the past from the standpoint 
; 
of the fundamental contradictions of capitalist development, and to 
locate in the invariant features of historical development thus adduced 
the principle which must be applied. 
However, Marx's approach also cGntains a third element; the 
relations between conscious human action and historical changes which 
are independent of men's will. Marx was at this point <Primarily con-
cerned to establish the "independence" of long-term historical development 
in general from human consciousness and acts of human will. Marx was, 
in hie general analysis, abstracted from individual cases and specific 
societies. This is a point that Marxists later elaborated at lengthi 
the coexistence of different human societies or socio-political and 
economic units of differing structures, or at different stages of 
development, but which interact. 
40 Lenin called this condition the "law of uneven development". 
The differentiation of the capitalist world into "developed and under-
developed" countries cannot be regarded as a secondary aspect in history, 
even in history considered in its most general form. On the other band, 
Marx did imply that this aspect exists, because he was aware that 
historical development was not linear. His model was to explain why 
some kinds of society develop more readily than others and why some 
(as in the prehistoric or Asiatico mode of production) tended to 
stability and resistance to development; or otherwise societies tending 
towards equilibrium of various kinds and societies tending to destabilize 
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themselves and in so doing to change (stability, as we have already 
explained is not to be confused with a stat.ic, immobile form of society; 
it means simply that change occurs, in a different, less marked way). 
The historical specificity requireS an empirical practice in under-
standing the past and has two aspects. On one side, to the extent that 
the empirical knowledge of the past is necessarily limited in several 
aspects, the primary requirement is to approach such studies with a 
profound sense of historical specificity. This means~· less attention 
to the empirical evidence in its own right than reflection upon special 
thought processes; to adopt a search for the specific ideologies of 
other societies in respect of the objective basis of such ideologies 
within the peculiarities of the sort of technology of social reproduction; 
acceptance of the limitations imposed upon the scope of man's problem-
solving actions by that technology and by the social forms and 
institutions through which action is made feasible and permitted in 
those societies. Then, with that understanding, to work the inner 
dynamics of those societies and explain their transformation, interaction 
and growth. 
To understand any society, one must determine not only what kind 
of society it has emerged to super~'ede, but what contradictions in the 
\. 
previous mode of existence made the superseder possible and necessary. · 
Marx's approach is to locate the transformations in "objective" 
technolog? in objective economic laws which most fundamentally distinguish )x 
one basic mode of production from the other. Insights such as this and 
moreover the observation that there is no general law of population 
applicable to all historic epochs41 have stimulated interest in 
population studies among Marxists, an1 a rising concern with reproduction 
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growth or decline, and constitutes a material and social relation 
which, along with environment, ~echnology, social organization and so 
on, sets problems for human groups and demands their transformation. 
A M~rxist demographic theory represents a political-economic 
perspective that operates at the level of the mode of production, not 
at the level of individual family dynamics. The meaning of all this is 
simple: demographic information and explanation cannot be reduced only 
to the estimation of biological reproduction. Demography might be 
defined as the discipline which deals with that which is never "equal" 
and cannot be supposed to _!>e "equal'~ requiring not merely calculations 
of general change but explanation of the specific outcomes of that 
change. At the level at which particular events or decision affect 
situations, the level of the "history of events" may not be open to 
detailed general explanations at all - though generalizations will still 
establish the limits within which such events can exercise an-effect. 
For example, how can one estimate effective demographic forces in slave 
societies? Demographic growth rests not on a natural increase but on 
the means devoted to the capture of foreign individuals. This permits 
a demographic manipulation of society, moiification of birth rate, death 
rate, density and distribution. Demographic variables "change" under 
concrete material conditions, that is, exploitation, control over the 
production, which means control over the population growth in general. 
It seems difficult to accept the positivist view that the scientist 
observes a reality existing outside himself or herself. There is 
indeed a very large number of ways of looking at the "reality", and 
there is immense room for "manoeuvre" in the way that demographic patterns 
c P.re w!l,~k~d, Wh;;:t we mean is that it j.s not enough to be ar.:ti~fied. w;.th 
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stating that we have alternative population patterns, since one does 
not even know if these patterns are responses to the same problems. 
Concrete analysis needs to be evaluated on a level to prove the 
exist.ence - or non-existence - of a. problem, a situation and the result 
of it. Reproductive planning for social production is not the same as 
controlling population for resource management, it i~ in fact quite the 
opposite; tha former is quality control, having little to do with 
numbers at all, for by resulting in maximally productive numbers 
population can in fact increase slowly (or stabilize), helping to bring 
about development in a society. As Marx observes: 
" •• in different modes of social production there are different 
laws of the increase of population and overpopulation; the 
latter identical with pauperism. These different laws can simply 
be reduced to the different modes of relating to the conditions 
of production, or, in respect to the living individual. the 
conditions of his reproduction as a member of a society, since 
he labours and appropriates only in society. The dissolution of 
these relations in regard to the single individual, or to part 
of the population, places them outside the reproductive conditions 
of this specific basis, and hence posits them as overpopulation 
•••••••••••• what may be overpopulation in one stage of social 
production may not be so in another and their effects may be 
different •••••• Thus overpopulation among hunting peoples was 
different from that of the Athenians, in turn different among 
the latter form than among the Germanic tribes - then so does the 
absolute rate of population increase, an~ hence tee rate of over-
population and population. The amount of population posited on 
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the basis of a specific production is thus just as determinate 
as the adequate population. Overpopulation and population, taken 
together, are the population which a specific production basis can 
create. The extent to which it goes beyond its barrier is given 
by the barrier itself, or rather by the same base which posits 
the barrier. " 42 
In palaeodemography, especially, difficulties arise when one 
proceeds to bring ''evidence" for such considerations. Non-Marxist 
investigators usually "avoid" the problem simply by not stating it, or 
focusing their attention on rates of growth, size, distributions etc. 
If one wishes to avoid certain answers, it usually suffices to 
avoid certain questions. It is true that one cannot instantly derive 
theories from a handful of facts about history. There are limitations 
- not only deriving from the information we have concerning the past in 
the quantitative sense, but also in the qualitative one. It is not 
always that we lack a sufficient quantity of facts for apprehension but 
that the judgement guiding the collection of the facts (whether by 
contemporaries of the period in question or by modern investigators) 
has ordinarily been hopelessly misguided' or nearly so. We do not have 
the right facts properly adduced and conceptualized. Yet it is important 
to try to delve beyond the difficulties and attempt to establish whether 
meaningful patterns of similarity or change occur in specific areas, 
where material is available. Uany processes of palaeolithic societies 
do not leave any "direct" evidence. Since they participate in a system 
of exchanges of energy, matter and information. it is likely that this 
can be discernible in the archaeological record. to some extent. 
Material culture, particularly stone tools, is the ''lifeline" of pre-
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historic hunter-gatherers. Ethnographers and archaeologists have not 
paid much attention to the articulation of stone tools with different 
forms of socio-economic behaviour; they have traditionally focused 
almost exclusively
4 
·on the time-space-form dynamics of these stone 7 
artifacts. This has excluded from consideration all tools - the vast 
majority- that do not fall into recurrent patterns of shape associated 
with a particular function. 43 The residual category of debitage, debris, 
or waste, usually comprising a vast percentage of all artifactual 
material, is only taken as evidence for tool-production technology. But 
since much of this material can be used for the same activities as the 
one which the archaeologist usually focuses upon. we have different 
assumptions and reconstructions of bunter-gatherer relations, based on 
biased samples. A reanalysis of those traditionally dichotomized 
assemblages and a reevaluation under another approach may provide us 
with unexpected results. Why, for example, do hunter-gatherers, however 
predictably, produce a number of highly labour-intensive items? 
Why do we find such complex production steps and such careful 
choice of raw materials? Wby invest time in the process of production 
if there is no extractive advantage in a finished tool? Is this not 
a violation of the minimal effort and least-cost assumptions associated 
with some recent models? Which realms of cultural behaviour and 
economic structure influence the choice between the least-cost alter-
native (a random flake that is suitable for the same tasks) and the 
more "expensive" finished tool? 
There are a number of questions which, when posed, may allow 
artifacts to fall within another level of communication, context and 
purpose. It is, for example, entirely possible that the degree of tool 
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elaboration correlates with the social and economic context in which 
a given activity is carried out. Tool use then, can be seen not only 
to make possible increased production, but also to be enabled by 
-
productive requirements, and comes into use when the social relations 
of production demanded them and could utilize them effectively. Any 
discussion of the role of tools should consider just what it was that 
tools did socially, and how labour potential was realized in them as 
embodied labour. Even if an adequate elaboration of these concepts 
(or a satisfying description of these activities) is not yet possible, 
it is hard t~ imagine that perceptions of population evolution must 
remain - consciously - within the limits of a single question - and a 
single set of answers. 
Palaeodemography is concerned not with societies which can be 
defined in the abstract, or in general terms, but with societies which-
are the products of their past. Complex interactions operate constantly 
with historically given "components" adapted maybe to functions for which 
th~y may not have originally been designed. Even the forms of develoP-
ment which can be presented in a linear form, such as the secular growth 
of population, require to be explained by ! mechanism of complex social 
change, since they are not directly controlled by any simple Malthusian 
relationship. 44 
Moreover~ situations which could be explained in Malthusian terms 
such as the population crises in the 14th and 15th centuries in Europe, 
or in 19th century Ireland, or to-day (no-longer crisis but a 
constant phenomenon of world-wide dispersed famine from Ettiopis to 
India and the malnutrition or undernutrition of South American 
count~iea) becaQe Maithusian because of specific external and local 
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contradictions between social relations and forces of production on 
the one hand, and uneven allocation of labour and industry on the 
other; to these it would be much more appropriate to add exploitation, 
? 
under a certain mode of production1 ~apitalism, without which tte curves 7-
of demographic growth, decline, density, migration, fertility, mortality 
and the rest, cannot be explained as there is nothing "natural" or 
''inherent" in their "tendencies" except perhaps in the explanations of 
the theorists who constructed them. 
2. 5 Summarj· 
As previously stated an attempt was made to distinguish the various 
meanings of terms such as population growth, size, density, mortality, 
fertility, related to the concept of demography and inherited in 
palaeodemographic research, and the different problems that can arise 
under a monocausal evaluation and explanation of the factors that 
produce them. Also to look more closely at the dynamics of human 
reproduction, to relate them to prehistoric societies and distinguish 
the possible effects on the demographic patterns and to what extent 
these demographic patterns are interrelated into the whole system and 
affected (or vice-versa) by it. 
A Marxist approach takes into account the type of contradictory 
relations which certain phenomena and their organisational mechanism 
have with the basic means of production, the type of relations in which 
they are articulated with the rest of the structure, and compares them 
with their equivalents at other levels; for example, the level of 
economic activity, characterised by a relative self-sufficiency under 
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certain circumstances, that is, by production for the producer's own 
consumption; hence in a small quantity and without conditions for 
generating surpluses] and how the appearance of the latter under 
capitalist develo~men~ · can have s~rious implications on certain sectors 
of population independently of their rate of growth. From the point of 
view elaborated here, the concept of population growth and other 
demographic variables is strongly connected with a special socio-economic 
formation and ~itt the causes which contributed to their appearance. 
Historically, population was the first object of statistical 
accounting and demographic phenomena, tte field in which statistics was 
developed as the quantitative method of studying these phenomena. 
Statistic s1 which Lenin called one of the most powerful tools of social 
knowledge, makes it possible to measure connections and variations within 
a structure, but tell us nothing about the character of the cause-and-
effect relations. Recognition of these methods in general in demographic 
work still does not mean that they can operate automatically. It has 
been the argument throughout that capitalistexpa~sionJcolonization and 
nee-colonization brought disruption and devastation to peoples and 
cultures of different areas, and it is ne~essary to point this out, not 
for ethical and political reasons, but also for scie.ntific reasons. 
For it is in this light, for example, that demographic ~x~ansio~ (or 
population growth)) which i~ the logical means to face the social security 
requirement, comes as a response to the colonial pressure. 
Marxist studies on pre-capitalist formations need considerable 
development, to collect the type of information which cannot be found 
in an ideologically biased anthropology, 45 archaeology and consequently· 
-pelaeodernograpby; they·--ne.ad to undertake research on such fields as 
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the relations of production, the process of reproduction, the social 
organization of labour and tee changes undergone by these formations 
through their own development or through contacts with other economic 
systems. For this purpose palaeodemography must use history and make 
better use of the available material. 
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Notes and References 
l With tbe exception of the Soviet historical demographical traditio~ 
and 1 later on, the re:evalua tion of population studies f-rom 
the French Uarxist and neo-marxist school. From a Marxist stand-
point neither of the "variables'' ~s what it seemsnor are they 
capable of varying in the way postulated by a "pure'' statistical 
analysis. Population size depends upon family life and upon the 
work habits of the society. It is interwoven ~itt the most basic 
strands of social life and cannot possibly be considered autonomous. 
The important fact is that the size and rate of growth of population 
should not be considered exogenous; population pressure does not 
impinge on a society, it is created by the society. That is, 
random events are not considered, unless it can be shown how these 
"accidents" become necessary in social process. Since these can 
never be "accounted for" in processual theory, social scientists 
can at best know enough of social dynamics to know what alternatives 
will not take place should an external Tandom ~vent be introduced. 
0 0 0 external causes are the conditions of change and internal II 
causes are the basis of change ••• external causes become operative 
through internal causes." (Mao-Tse-Tung 1970) 
2 Malthus T.R.: an E.ssay on the J;>rinciple of population. 
3 Just as it bothers contemporary population growth alarmists. 
(Erlich 1968, Huxley 1956, Osborn 1958, 1960, Taylor 1970) 
4 Marx: 
Capital Vol. I., Gr~ndrisse, 
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5 Capital ~oc. cit. 
6 China over the past twenty years furnishes a good example. The 
population growth rate .of pre-revolutionary China resembled that 
of many parts of the world underdeveloped as a consequence of 
capitalism yet firmly locked into a dependency relation with 
<' 
capitalist powers through imperialism. But following the sequence 
of revolutions in China (1949, 1966) and the firm establishment 
of producer control, China has at present brought its population 
growth rate to the low level of that of the developed capitalist 
countries. Producer control eliminates the accrual of surplus 
I 
I 
~ 
I 
labour value by an exploiting class. Planning is possible, and 
production for exchange no longer a necessary. motive factor, as 
production for use is self-correcting, (and vast reservoirs of reserve 
labour are not necessary to drive wages down). 
Farie J.-1979. 
7 Petersen W. 1967. 
8 Petersen W. 1975. 
9 Such a "fact" though is not at all, absolute. Malnutrition, for 
example, can al"tter this mechanism. Excent in severe con1itions. 
malnutrition'\ (of "females" in their fertile years does not 
generally lead to a decline in conceptions. but it does lead to 
fewer pregnancies, to a shortening of the female reproductive 
period, increased vulnerability to diseases and accordingly 
increases death rates (Leatham 1958, ~atz 1972, Keys 1950, Hans-
Harrison 1977, Scrimshaw 1976). 
It is evident that the problem of how a population is linked to 
the productive system has to be consideredj bott the ~ocial 
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definition) enter into the fertility equation here. and must be 
identified in each case. This implies that the fertility dynamics 
cannot be read as a single configuration of biological/physio-
logical forces9 but rather should be conceived as a variable 
within a set of conditione (mainly socio-economic factors of 
production and reproduction). 
1. 
10 The principle of historical specificity as applied to population 
dynamics entails also a rejection of any demographic study which 
abstracts. rates of fertility and mortality from the specific 
social structure of the community which is being studied. As ~arx 
writes in the Grtindrisse: "Population is an abstraction if we 
leave out, for example, the cla~ses of which it is composed •••• 
Population in abstract ion is a chaotic conception of the whole." 
Lenin subsequently took up this polemic in "What the Friends of the 
People are •••• ". It remains a perfectly valid point and a telling 
indictment of a great deal of contemporary demography. which is 
still involved in just such abstractions despite a growing aware-
ness within the field of the problematic nature of macro-aggregation 
devoid of detailed historical and structural specification. 
11 Demographers have long argued whether declining mortality or 
rising fertility was the driving force for the growth of Western 
Europe. In a century and half the population of Europe more than 
trebled 9 arriving at 400 millions by 1900 despite the exodus of 
some 40 million people- the largest intercontinental migration 
in history. In recent years the prevailing view has strongly 
favoured declining mortality as the prime facto~ with the centre 
i 
I 
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improvement in medicine, climate or living standards and nutrition). 
Swept up in the dynamic of polarized debates, most have argue1 for 
the unilateral role of one factor, while minimizing or denying the 
contribution of the other. 
12 Bogue D. 1969. 
13 Hauser and Duncan 1959· 
14 
Perhaps the mtist significant facto~ in re-evaluating·-_-
these disciplinary traditions has been an increasing amount of 
data on non-western populations. Demographic studies by anthro-
• pologists and biologists on these older societal forms have revealed 
patterns which cannot be adequately exp~ained by the traditional 
approaches. There are several problems and issues, all involving 
the use of demographic theory for making anthropological inference.The 
,anthropo~og~st'sunderstanding must, however, be ba~ically different 
from that of demographers, a point the~ sometimes fails to be seen, 
like Petersen 1975, or Bocquet-Masset.l982). Anthropologists can 
aspire to less mathematical accuracy, and must instead be concerned 
with questions of a more coherent scope than the study of national 
political statistics, seeking an understanding of population processes 
through social relations of production and relevant aspects which 
are reflected in demographic variables. 
... these different laws can simply be reduced to As Marx says: II 
the different modes of relating the conditions of production, or, 
in respect of the living individual, the conditions of his 
reproduction as a member of society, since he labours and 
appropriates only in society. The dissolution of these relations 
in regard to "the single individual, or to part of the population, 
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places them outside the reproductive conditions of this specific 
basis, and hence posits them as overpopulation, and not only 
lacking in means but incapable of appropriating the necessaries 
through labour ••• ". " •• Thus, what may be overpopulation at one 
stage of social production may not be so in another, and their 
effects may be different." (Grtin::lrisse- Notebook VI) 
(This point is elaborated in subsequent sections of this text). 
15 There is obviously some poverty and distress which cannot be 
associated, even by the most extreme of the neo-Malthusians, with 
any "pre.ssure of population against the means of subsistence." 
The working people of capitalist countries have not. in general. 
begun to find themselves conspicuously redundant in relation to 
the existing means of subsistence. Indeed it is the bogey of 
under-population, rather than that of over-population, which is 
generally raised up before them nowadays. But they have periodi-
cally found themselves redundant in relation to the existing means 
of employment. ~lal thus himself once wrote that "the difficulty 
of procuring the means of subsistence" is occasioned "partly by 
the necessary state of the soil, and partly by a premature check 
to the demand for produce and labour. In the great majority of 
cases it is this ''premature check" which is the really important 
phenomenon. Under capitalism, the Malthusian pressure of population 
against the means of subsistence is largely a myth, whereas the 
periodical pressure of working people against the means of employ-
ment is a grim reality. "J/althus1 theory .......... is significant 7---. 
in two respects: l) because he gives brutal expression to the 
brutal viewpoint of capital; 2) because he asserted the fact of 
overpopulation in all forms of society •••••• His conception is 
altogether false and childish because he regards overpopulation 
as being of the same kind in all the different historic phases 
-of economic development; does not understand their specific 
difference and hence ••• reduces these very complicated and varying 
relations to a single relation, two equations, in which the natural 
reproduction of humRnity appears on the one side, and the natural 
reproduction of edible plsnts (or me8ns of subsistence) on the 
other, as two natural series, the former geometric and the latter 
arithmetic in progression. In this way he transforms the 
historically distinct relations into an abstract numerical 
relation ••••••• which rests neither on natural ~or on historical 
laws." (Marx, Grundri sse Notebook VI.) 
Indeed, we are told from the neo-Malt:husians "that there is no 
hope at all for India (one of the customary text-book- examples of 
an "overpopulated" country) - any increase in food production would 
soon be followed by a corresponding increase in India • s "teeming 
millions"; if one suggests that two centuries of British rule in 
India may have had something to do w~th the present situation, and 
that experience in the '\'.'est does not seem to bear out the theory 
that_ a rise in the standard of living necessarily causes a 
corresponding rise in birth-rate, the neo-Ualthusians will reply 
to the effect that the law of pop~lation ·is an eternal law, a 
natural law and therefore cannot possibly be abrogated. (Marx on 
Malthus. intro.;. by R.L.~leek. 1~53) 
(See also ~oomsday Book by G. Taylor 1970 an1 Vogt w. 1949. Roaj 
to Survival). Others usg Ualthus's doctrine in order to reveal 
·a "dilemma of science". The application of scientific methods 
to combat diseases, to improve rural and industrial health and 
to increase the supply of medical equipment and services, must 
necessarily increase the pressure of population upon the world's 
food resources! "Had it been possible to foresee the enormous 
success of this application, would humane people have agreed that 
it could better have been held back, to keep in step with other 
parallel progress, so that development could be planned and orderly? 
Some might say yes, taking the purely biological view that if men 
will breed like rabbits they must be allowed to die like rabbits, 
until gradually improving education and the demand for a higher 
standard of life teach them better. Uost people would still say no. 
But suppose it were certain now that the pressure of increasing 
population, uncontrolled by disease, '.Yould lead not only to wide-
spread exhaustion of the soil and of other capital resources but 
also to continuing and increasing international tension and disorder, 
making it hard for civilization itself to survive: Would the 
majority of humane an1 reasonable people then change their minds? 
If ethical principles deny our right to do evil in order that good 
may come, are we justified in doing good when the foreseeable 
consequence is evil? ••• '' (Professor A.V. Hill, Presidenti!!l 
address to the British Association, 1952) 
No further comments are needed on the above. 
Indeed, unr1er "tension and disorder" it is "hard for civilization 
to survive". South African Black people, an.i Latin American 
populations have something to say on that 
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16 Natural fertility was first defined by the French demographer 
L. Henry 1961 as the absence of deliberate birth control and family 
size limitation. The term is now in widespread use among demo-
graphers, although not without ambiguities. A population is held 
to be in condition of natural fertility when birth patterns show 
no evidence of being parity-dependent. That is, if the fertility 
curve of a given cohort of women correspon~broadly to their natural ~ 
fecundity curve, (even though in their late thirties and forties) 
a regime of natural fertility is held to prevail. Customs and 
practices, which affect birth-spacin~ ~and hence fertility rate~l ·~ 
but which are not parity dependent, do not contraverse a regime of 
natural fertility. The natural/controlled dichotomy tends to 
generate a bipolar model: preindustrial peoples have natural and 
high fertility while industrialized populations exhibit controlled 
birth patterns and register low fertility rates. The nature of 
this dichotomy,so congenial to the modernization framework, is now 
ritually acknowledged by demographers although it is recognized 
that there are tremendous variations within each. 
17 See AAAS 1974, report by the Advisory Com~ittee on Cultural Factors 
in Population Progress. 
18 Anthropologists conclude that the availability of resources seems 
to determine population size and characteristics which appear to 
be better than a priori high fertility a~d mortality rates, but 
which, as we shall see (section 2.3) in almost all cases, more than 
often? has led to environmental and biological determinism. 
' 
19 Cook S.F. 1945 
20 Cowgill D.O. 1970. 
The transition theory has been formulated by w.s. Thompson and 
_later reformulated by F.W. Notestein 1945. and has been criticised 
both for sparse~ess of historic data and lack of utility for 
prediction of future events. See amongst others, Petersen 1960, 
Davis J. 1950, Taeuber I. 1952, and even Thompson 1959. 
21 Literature on the subject is much too extensive to be summarized 
here. The majority of it is included in the bibliography. 
Boserup 1965, has utilized this approach to account for agricultural 
development, while Friedlander, 1967 ani others have noted that there 
also may be demographic effects such as fertility decline or 
migration. Problems with the question in this form are that it is 
hard to measure population pressure independently of the response 
it is supposed to produ6e ~nd/or the causes of its · appearance 
in a given economic and political structure. 
22 Faris J. 1979, Leacock E. 1979· 
23 The issue has been already discussed in Chapter I - although in 
another context - and there is no need to enter here into the 
debates and controversy related to it. 
But.· see: Monod J --1972, Frolov LT. 1978. 
24 Weiss M.K. 1973, 1976, Roberts D.F. -Mohan M. 1976, 
Eglin J.- Thery H. 1982: Le pillage de l'Amazonie. 
25 See Cook S.H. 1972, Gode1ier M. 1974, Hassan F.A. 1973, 1978, 1980. 
Mei1lassoux C. 1980, Swedlund A. - Arme1agos G. 1976, Sweilund A. 
1978, Welin~er S. 1979· 
Tt 5.s cha:t>acteristic that-in a ''classic" inventory anri appraisal 
2o6 
of the study of population, Hauser and Duncan (1959) make a 
distinction between demographic analysis and population studies. 
The latter, aQcording to them, are concerned not only with 
population variables but alscr with rela t_ionships between population 
changes and other variables - social, economic, political, 
biological, genetic, geographical. The point is however that such 
a distinction does not exist: demography is dealing not with any 
abstract notion but with real people. 
26 Bocquet J.P.- Masset C. 1982. 
27 It is a truism to rely only on skeletal finds for the estimation 
(even relatively) of population indices. Even if an excavation 
is complete (in the case of palaeodemography) it is not possible 
to conclude that all the inhabitants who died were buried ~t the 
living site, or in a designated cemetery, in such a way that their 
skeletons could. thereafter be removed and identified. Two major 
sources of loss are adults killed at a distance and infants or 
young children whose bones disintegrated rapidly or who were not 
buried at all. Even more difficult ~s- to · determine duration; 
and how do we deal with open as opposed to closed systems? 
See ~ook, Hassan ibid and, Angel J.L. 1969, 1969 a,b, 1971, 1972. 
In most discussions of modern population, the analysis passes over 
the most basic question: what entity is being measured? The 
persons living in a particular juridicia1ly bounded area, typically 
a national state, or one of its subdivisions, ordinarily constitute 
a "population'', though this fact does not specify the concept • 
Archaeologists can seldom delimit· a population by a legal definition. 
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As they often use the word implicit it means those concerning any 
other demographic process. Lee: i seems to be suggesting something 
of this kind when he proposes that "instead of postulating a mean 
group of 25, or 50 or 100 for prehistoric population, it may be 
more analytically useful to think in temporal terms of the amount 
1\ 
of members spent in groups of various sizesr (also Birdsell 1972). 
The span represented in a single dig can constitute centuries -
if not millenia - during which much or nothing may have happened 
to the population that once lived there. The problem is typically 
solved by classifying whatever data the archaeologists, paleontol-
ogist or anthropologist has accumulated ann then associating a 
population with each of tte variables (Hill and Evans 1972) and 
Petersen W. 1975. 
28 Ascadi-Nemeskeri 1970, Masset C. 1971, 1973, F.owell N. 1976, Weiss 
K .:u. 1973, 197 6. 
29 Amongst others: Gladwin-Kornicts-Soffer 1984, Gilman A. 1984, 
Okladnikov A.P.- Pospelova C.A. 1982, Pershits A.I. 1980. 
30 Cowgill C.L. 1975 a,b. 
31 Ilyenkov E.V. 1982. 
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32 There is no need to restate a well-known problem here. Except 
for the Y.arxists, the main opposition and analysis to a functionalist 
approach stem from the French neo-marxists and structuralists. 
A thorough, critical approach on the subject is provided by 
Abeles U. 1976. 
33 Engels F.: The condition/of the working class in England (1844-5). 
34 Engels F.: The myth of overpopulation (1844), 
35 Ibid. 
36 Marx: Capital Vol. I. 
37 ibid. 
38 Smith K. 1951. The Malthusian controversy. 
39 Engels F. Letter to Lange 1865. The pressure of population upon 
the means of employment. 
40 Lenin, from his earliest works, (see Lenin: bibliography) paid 
attention to population problems. By analysing changes in social 
structure during the development of society! he demo~strated (in 
addition to developing new approaches for an understanding of the 
social structure of the population of pre-revolutionary Russia) the 
basic population problems of each of the socio-economic formations, 
and the effect of the relations of production on a population 
differentiated by classes and social groups. He analysed ~he role 
of population movement, (including various forms of migration), 
and the evolution of settlements as the productive forces and 
relations of production develop in relation to the patterns of the 
new distribution of population in a socialist society. 
The point here is not to say that Lenin was a "demographer':) 
but that population matters are an integral part of the Varxist 
tradition,defining the place of population in social development 
and material production an1 studying the nature of the laws of 
population, not as eternal, ~atural categories; by population 
-
we should understand the aggregate of the people carrying on their 
life activity within a certain society. Changes in the structure 
of a population suggests the mutual influence of social and 
economic conditions. The size of a population influences, in 
certain cases, social development, but the size, density, growth 
etc. of a population do not determine the character of the social system 
nor ar~ they the decisive factors in socio-economic developm~t. 
When bourgeois sociologists and demographers attribute decisive 
significance to population growth they asser~ that unavoidable, 
universal, natural conditions exist, to which every society has to 
cocply (with the exception of the ruling classes in each society). 
We will discuss later, in chapter four, "demography and economy", 
how such an ideological choice had serious implications (in theory 
and practice) for the explanation of different economic formations 
and how societies at different stages of evolution are treated as 
being basically identical. 
41 Marx K.: Capital Vol. I. 
42 llarx K. Gr'un-:irisse Notebook VI (the concept of the free labourer 
contains the pauper. Population and overpopulation etc.) 
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ft3 Differences between technology as a theoretical discipline and 
techniques as a practice procedure are discussed in chapter six. 
Nevertheless, as already mentioned (ref. 61, chapter I) tools, ( 
technology, are usually referred to by Uarx as "in1ustry" _and 
this is the meaning used here. A point of attention concerning 
material remains (tools, pottery, residential structures or what-
ever) and a particular population is that the first can change 
over time and space with no change in the other; and that the 
first remains the same over time or space does not mean a necessary 
constancy in the second (see chapter six). 
44 Marx K.: Pre-capitalist Socio-economic formations, Grundrisse 
Marx K.- Engels F.: The German Ideology. 
Engels F.: Dialectics of Nature, The Origin of the Family •••• 
Letter to Lavrov (12 Nov. 1875), Letter to J. Bloch 
(September 21 1980) 
45 Bromley YU.I. 1979, Faris J.c. 1979, Ueillassoux c. 1980. 
., 
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CHAPTER 3 
Demography and Settlement 
3.1 Space and Spatial Demography 
It is often convenient to ignore the manner in which man is 
organized within an environment which is spatially and temporally 
distributed. l This bas been the approach to many analyses of physico-
ecological and socio-economic systems and has been the approach in 
many demographic studies. The most complete set of 
statistical dat~ and the most widely accepted definitions take no 
account of the spatio-temporal relation and the fact that what dis-
tinguishes this relationship is not only ite size (that is a criterion 
of statistical delimitation) but the "diffusion~ in space of a range 
of activities, functions and groups, and their interdependence as a 
result of a social dynamic of geographical interconnections. 
Space is a material product, in relation to other material 
elements, among others, men, who themselves enter into particular 
social relations, which give to space (a~d to other elements of the 
system) a form, a function, a social significance. It is not, therefore, 
a mere expression of a total structure, but a conctete element of each 
historical ensemble in which a society is specified. It is a matter 
of establishing, in tte same way as for any other real object, the 
essential laws that govern its existence and transformation, and the 
specificity of its articuletion with the other properties of a 
~ historical reality. This means that there is no possible explanation 
i 
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Given the immediate impact of this perspective, the problem of 
the relation to space is a terrain directly connected to demographic 
research, for society is understood, above all, as a community, this 
community being defined as a system of relations between differentiated 
parts, localized, to an extent, territorially. 
Demographic organization is tr.en explained by an ensemble of 
processes which shape, distribute and relate ecological units, namely, 
any spatial expression that presents a certain specificity in relation 
to its immediate environment. This is a new dimension which .displaces 
1 the oppos~tion between demographic factors and natural factors. For 
in the deterministic problematic, in the strict sense, one does not 
include the qynamic aspect of the appropriation of space in terms of 
social activityo This displacement - although important - remains 
however '~formal" 9 insofar as the processes which explain the spatio-( 
demographic structure (or structures) observed, are not themselves 
explained by reference to a fundamental element, that is, the economic 
organization of the society. In fact, the problematic proper to any 
theory of space does not consist in opposing values to natural 
factors, but in discovering the laws and the composition of historically 
given situations, on the assumption that people's actions may be 
partially related to their perception of space and the differential 
evaluations they place upon various parts of it. 
Concepts of space vary from one cultural context to another, and 
with broad cultural configurations smaller groups may develop a 
particular conceptual apparatus witt. respect to space. This conceptual 
framework which a society develops to represent space is not static. 
Societies. learn insofar as they are affected and reshaped by inter-
~-::::;:- .• ··~. 
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act:on with environments. That learning involves activity and 
behaviour! although the two notions cannot be described under the 
same term,,· they involve a basic identity; they both consist of 
acts1 and acts have meaning; and meaning is engendered and maintained 
exclusively within and by some system of communication. Human beings~ 
and accordingly societies, can learn activities and they can learn 
behaviour. This is why not "environment~ . but dialectic interaction ~ 
with environment is decisive for them. ~ 
Concepts of space are founded on experience. In its most 
elementary form this experience is entirely visual and tactile. But_ 
there is a transition from such primary experience of space to the 
development of intuitive spatial concepts, and ultimately, to the 
formalization of such spatial concepts in terms of some geometric 
. 2 language. In the process of this transition, primary- sensory 
experience, myth and image, cultural form ~nd scientific concepts, 
interact. At the representational level, the emergence of spatial 
concepts is bound up with the structure of the culture in which such 
concepts are being developed. (Fig. 1) Most writers agree that the actual 
physical space which people experience end perceive is not measurably 
different from being Euclidean in structure. Piaget (1956)· ~however-· 
,' I 
draws attention to the perceptions of space and the representation of 
space by means of imaginary concepts. At the first level, be suggests 
children discover spatial concepts in the same order - that is, 
progressing from topological concepts to Euclidean concepts - but 
at a somewhat later age. The ability to represent space schematically 
is undoubtedly influenced by the existence of signs and symbols 
designed to represent thet space. It io influenced, therefore, by 
FIG 3.1: a diagrammatic representation of the 
relationships between percepts, concepts 
ani terms (after Gaws, 1965) 
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culture. Howard and Templeton (1966) similarly suggest that it is 
dangerous to draw conclusions about the ability to move and act 
spatially from information regarding the ability to give schematised 
-
representation of this space. Moreover, the representation of space 
'-,-
"involves the evocation of objects in their absence" (Piaget 1956). 
It involves relating concepts which have no empirical content with 
real situations. 3 In primitive societies it often seems that spatial 
concepts are rooted in the language developed to describe "concrete 
and personal situations •• ;~ ( Fig.2) P.r.imi·tfve spatial orientation·, though very 
much keener and more precise than that of more technol6gically ~dvanced: 
societies, moves wholly in the channels of concrete spatial feeling. 
Every point in their s~rroundings is exactly known to them, but to 
hold that knowledge in a spatial sche~a means a transition from mere 
"actiori" to an "empty space"; that _kind of representation needs 
another "spatial consciousness". This simply means that-spatial 
concepts may be represented by different, but appropriate, formally 
developed configurations (geometrical or non-geometrical in the strict 
sense). This is why the cultural heritage "limits or promot~s the 
manner in which, and the terms in which, }ndividuals deal with the 
spatial attributes of the world around them. If a culture does not 
provide_the terms and concepts, spatial attributes cannot even be 
~ . i n4 talked about wit~ prec1s on. Without such instruments in the 
cultural heritage certain areas of action are excluded and the 
solution of many practical problems impossible. 5 
The external environment is recognized in a number of different 
ways and weaning is attached to it from a number of different points 
of view. Characteristics of the environment, its-aesthetic appeal or 
?IG 3.2 a diagram to show how two rather different 
languages may be developed within tte same 
context of percentual exnerience ani c0n-
ceptual dev~lopm~nt (and}or wittin the same 
"space") The lenguage has only a small area 
of overlap ani hence only a fe~ terms can be 
translated from one language to the other 
(after Lenneberg 196r) 
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its historical significance, its value and its meaning to eaoh 
observer, all enter into the formation of environment that a society 
-structures over ti~e. This structure is not necessarily something 
that is already there, but is something that appears to be there 
within the limits of awareness of a culture. To exist in and to 
compre~end an environment, people learn to select and organize critical 
subsets from the mass of experiences and the sensing, storing and 
organization of bits of information for the "ultimate" use of coping 
with the tasks of living, is the process of knowledge of everyday life. 
Issues that arise from this schem&. ·include examining the relation-
; 
ships that exist between commonly defined structures (such as "village", 
"town", "city") and people's images of them, and solving problems of 
obtaining information and ~epresenting it so that degrees of 
similarity or uniqueness of the information can be recovered~ The 
concept of "area" is- related to that "point-line" information, each 
time, serving to describe a more general spatial property of the 
major components of a spatial representation of phenomena. Accordingly 
a number of critical environmental cues are "imaged" as being located 
-at specific places in the environment. Connections are established 
between the places, some in the form of remembered (physical) paths 
that can be followed on a trip and some less spatially obvious, such 
as would be the case with functional links between places. In the 
vicinity of known places, there is a spread effect of information, 
and small-scale concepts of "area" (such ss neighbourhood, vicinity, 
interaction between groups) are incorporated into the basic node-
path image. A coalescer.ce of such adjacent areas defines the concept 
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concept of "region"l in practice, however, it is inevitably 
difficult to isolate common characteristics from differential ones, 
and problems are further exacerbated when different characteristics 
are common to various subsets of properties considered. 
All such patterns have one common unifying propertyJ their 
"raison d' etre". They all have their origins in processes which 
involve the sub-division of a finite space. But concrete examples 
of what these characteristics or elements signify in relation to space 
are extremely "dangerous" and have no more than an indicative value, 
for there is no congruence between a theoretical element and an 
empirical reality, which always contains everything at once. For 
example, "settlement" is economic, political and ideological, although 
its essential contribution is placed on the level of the reproduction 
of labour power. In addition, one must recognize that common elements 
are not common to all alternatives. Any common attribute is not 
constant over all opportunities, and indeed could not be in a 
realistic spa:~ial pattern. 
It can be argued that the articulation of a demographic system 
with space is organized around: a) two essential relations, regulation 
and integration (and the places thus determined). The spatial 
expression of this system is, on the one hand, the segmentation of 
space (as bands, communes etc.); on the other, it is action on the 
economic organization of space through regulation that the institutions 
within a culture exert on the elements of the economic system~ includ-
ing the spatial translation; and b) two major groups of "measurement": 
geometric and non-geometric. The former, which include size, shape 
etc., are common to all kinds of "material" objects. The latter vary 
. ·rc- .• ....,..._ ~·- ·~>. 
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with the general ~equence of events and phenomena which represent a 
non-absolute quality. The network of spatial expression, appropri-
ation and properties of these characteristics illustrates a mutual 
interaction between the "form" and "function-" of a demographic system 
which "organizes" space by marking it with an aggregation of signs, 
whose signifiers are made up of spatial forms and whose significants 
are "ideological" contents, the effrcacy. of which must be construed 
from their effects on the social structure as a whole.5 
The selecting and ordering of spatial information can be found 
in several sources. The idealized apposition of man and nature espoused 
by Ritter, March and Richtofen remains the crucial ingredient. However, 
the "modern" concept of society and environment differs in more than 
words, by suggesting complex interaction - involving all components 
and several hierarchies. The surface of earth comprisei the totality 
of geographical space. Such space includes physical, cultural and 
economic attributes and can be examined from both idiographic and 
nomothetic viewpoints. Each of the three thematic attributes has 
dominated the prevailing paradigm of a generation of geographers!the 
physical from Richtofen to Davis, the cultural from SchlUter to Sauer 
and the economic since the i~plementation of Christaller/ and Lo~sch' s 
spatial components within geographical research.~ 
At the very time that many geographers have turned their concern 
to concrete and pressing social questions, mathematical exuberance has 
reduced the human component to dot maps of artifacts or clusters of 
people. Considered in strictly numerical terms, artifactual aggregates 
or material attributes lose much- if not all - of their cultural or 
symbolic valua. Many geographers, anthropologists and archaeologists 
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have tended to foroet that people do not generally act aa individuals 
but as members of a community. It is the community that collectively 
7 shapes attitudes or makes fundamental decisions, the result of which 
~ 
are the material components that most commonly lend them~elves ~o 
- 8 
successful computerization. Communities are the integral componenta 
of the pervasive but heterogeneous matrix that constitutes cultures. 
It would seem that many _geogl.'aphers have failed to appreciate that 
cultures also are idiosyncratic or particularistic, that the impact of 
culture on the landscape includes factors other than profit and loss, 
or distance decay, and that culture, by definition, is cumulative, 
historical and dialectical. 
The evaluation of these concepts was the main factor of a 
geographical deconcentration from the traditional approaches, merely 
expressed at the level of locality and its replacement by a geographical 
space, sufficiently broad to include socio-economic perspectives and a 
chain of interrelations in an existing milieu of information and 
innovation. 
To return to the point of what must be assumed about iemographic 
considerations of space, the situation may seem-to be so restrictive 
as to be severely "unrealistic". Meaning.ful evaluation in such studies 
has been hampered because existing research has been deficient in two 
important areas of population research. First, knowledge is lacking 
(or not considered when it is present) on the nature of the relation-
ships which exist between the differential characteristics of a 
population. Secondly, there is a paucity of "independent measures" 
by which to evaluate systemic determinations of populations concerning 
the institutional and symbolic content of their operational space. 
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There is a number of different ways in which spatial knowledge 
is organized and used. Depending on technology, organization and 
subsistence modes, space provides a ·set of. natural resources, perceived 
differently by bunter-gatherers, by agricultural communities or by 
industrialized societies, and therefore affecting their value and 
potential exploitation. The "object" population is then explained by 
the processes that shape, distribute and relate "ecological units'' with 
its immediate (created) environment. The principal ecological processes 
are: centralization or the functional specialization of an activity or 
network of activities in the same space, with its articulation over 
the whole regional territory; centralization, with its corollary. 
decentralization, underlies the processes of mobility of a group's 
structure and, consequently, the functions of circulgtion, in the 
broad sense; segrega~ion refers to the process by which the social 
content nf space becomes homogeneous within a unit, sometimes strongly 
differentiated in relation to external units, in general according to 
distance; invasion-succession explains the movement by which a new 
population, or activity, takes place in a previously occupied space, 
having been either rejected by its previous sites, or integrated into 
it, or taking it over in a dominant role. 9 
There is nothing new in the above specifications let alone that 
they still cover a broad field of conflicting discussions, where the 
problematic is concentrated mainly at the environmental level, 
incorporating abstract inferences on populations, without differentiat-
ing between human and other species most of the time. It is true 
nevertheless that some ecologists insist that the whole of the 
organization of space should be treated on the basis of interaction 
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between members of the human species, the technology created by it_, )<..__ 
and the natural environment. This may have placed them in an extremely 
strong position, insofar as, in actual fact, these are the given 
elements of the problem. But because they did not try to theorize 
these relations and presented them quite simply as factors in the 
universal process of the struggle for life, thetl"covered" biologism 
. lent itself easily to the socio-political critique, 
particularly at a time when a reorientation of values was becoming 
necessary. 
Complex delimitations within space may attain different "forms", 
with space variously controlled by several hierarchical institutions 
(from kings and secular nobility, to chartered cities, companies or 
individual landholders), and according to different privileges 
(religious, military or juridicial control). Particularly, but not 
specifically, in the case of sedentary societies, space, as an aggregate 
of human constructs and natural economic potentials, may become an 
object of military and political organization. The overall effect 
of a sufficiently complex overlay of socio-political controls is a 
spatial ''system" determined lass by available resources and their 
proximity and more by spatial fragmentation as imposed by socio-
political boundaries and the resultant economic privileges. And this 
leads to a relocation of population and spatial patterning which has 
1 1 h . f 10 nothing to do with "purely" eco ogica or demograp lC actors. 
These different perspectives on the nature of demographical space 
suggest that another approach is needed, which would have considerable 
methodological and empirical utility. Demographers tend to think of 
populations as being represented on a permanent medium, using absolute 
·., 
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parametere>~nd do not consider the possibilities of the differentiation 
and composition of social space using the internal and external 
factors that establish, eaoh time, their structure. 
The methodology of a discipline is not determined by the practice 
of that discipline in isolation from the reality. A combination of 
regional symbolics and local symbolics together with a "territorial 
obsession" ca11 lead to serious misinterpretations, which cannot and 
should not be ignored any longer. Philosophers of science have 
frequently been involved in direct debate with the practitioners of 
some disciplines as to the nature and form of explanation they pursue. 
To put it another way: what is the relationship between the methodo-
logical arguments as developed in demography and the methodological 
argument regarding knowledge in general? How far do the views of the 
methodologists of demography tally w~th the views of the philosophers 
of science and, if there_are differences, what rational basis can be 
provided for such differences? 11 It has been suggested on occasion, 
that the work of philosophers bears little relationship to the 
/ conduct of empirical work, which is a very dangerous aspect of solving 
·, 
, 
.. 
.>·. 
the problem of a discipline. In the west. particularly, there seems 
to be a tendency to "avoid" or "ignore" such a direct debate and a 
gap has thus developed between the methodologists and the philosophers 
of science. Surprisingly enough., even within archaeology, demography 
:'.;· and anthropology the arguments have not been about explanatory forms 
~::~ 
·iy but about objectives. Wbere and when explanatory forms have been 
-~ .. · 
~--': considered there has usually been scant reference to the enormous 
... ' 
--~~ ~. 
·~, literature on explanation in general, much less to the dialectics of 
,.~., explanation. This is scarcely mentioned, even in those sections where 
~·:: . 
·.- .: 
224 
the concern is obviously with diaiectical forms rather than 
descriptive objectives. 
In fact, although more recent!~ P spatial concepts have been 
incorporated into cross-cultural studies it seems that a spatial 
theory under the above-mentioned componen~ rhas not been justified ~~ , .... 
or accepted; and most of the attempts made to apply this approach 
to prehistoric settlement patterns have remained at the level of a 
12 functional-ecological appropriation of space with no deeper insight. 
This situation allowed the treatment of population demography as 
something "maintained" under the permanent order of topological 
relations and justified the existence of possible positions as 
independent of the existence of actual facts. In any event, not all 
contexts calling for the postulation of environmental influence would 
be contexts calling for the postulation of demographic effects. 
Something fundamental emerges from this: the social signification of 
the different forms and types of space, the significative segmentation 
of space, the spatio-demographic units, do not have meaning outside 
the organization of the social structure; therefore in terms of the 
mode of production and the social formations. That is to say, each 
mode of production and each stage in the mode of production implies 
another diversification of space, not only in theoretical terms; but 
also in terms of the real relations established between people. 
In fact space is something "material 11 enough, an indispensable 
element in all human activity. And yet this very obviousness, para-
doxically, deprived it of any demographic autonomy and prevented it 
from being used directly as a category in the analysis of demographic 
relations. A "demography of space" can only be the analysis of social 
225 
practices, given in a certain space, and therefore in an historical 
conjucture. In considering further that pr.o posit ion we should 
note that we do not begin from an abstract conception of space. As 
spatial locations exist through time we can understand that some 
spatial regions become for some time unoccupied. We can remove an 
"object" from some location, thus leaving unoccupied a location to 
which the "object" can be returned later. We cannot remove an event, 
leaving a temporal "hole" to which the "object" can be returned later. 
The process in question is that a location occupied at 8 time X may 
be un~ccupied at a time x1 ; the precise analogue of this is to be 
characterized as bringing it about that at one location a period of 
time is occupied (i.e. something is there occurring) and at another 
location that period of time is unoccupied (i.e. nothing is. there 
occurring). 
- 13 While there is a long history of beliefs about the "acausality" 
of space, it seems that there is no reason to accept the position that 
a spatial location itself of some occurrence can be a causal factor in 
bringing that occurrence about. The problem may seem 8 conceptual one 
but the "case" is real: a region exists -4.f and only if some object has 
at some time some property, that is if some region of space is 
definable in 8 certain way (i.e., as containing a population) and later 
that same region of space is not so definable. A change is thus con-
stituted by an alteration in the properties of a persisting object or 
by an alteration of the properties of a region of space. As any 
change in an object involves change in a part of space, it might seem 
possible to characterize all changes in objects in terms of changes in 
spatial regions. However 1 in a senae 1 the notion of change in a region 
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presupposes the notion of change in objects. For we can only talk 
about changes in spatial regions if we can re-identify them through 
time and the criteria of justification depends upon the identity of 
some objects through time; namely, the objects which pr~vide the 
frame of reference in relation to which one identifies regions of 
space. Thus to have a notion of change in spatial regions it is 
necessary first to have a notion of change in objects, and in order 
to give a not ion of the "demographic space", it is necessary to delimit 
what is to count as constituting a change. For instance, very 
different implications follow the case that the political situation 
in a certain area in undergoing a change - from being stable to being 
unstable, means more often than not - relocation of resources, flexi-
bility in the boundaries of spatial locations, population movement 
etc.; _that is change in the perception of the structure of space, if 
not of the regional space itself. 
It is commonly held that the properties of space 9an be discovered 
by an apriori reflection. Treating the space-system ·from this 
position, means to imply that apace is distinct from the history system. 
With this line of thought, space is presented as having a standard 
topology, and as if that topology is established in1ependently of the 
particular features of the given world. Space, (i.e. region. area, 
etc.,) becomes a sort of container into which different populations 
are placed and its properties are not a function of its contents. 
This picture of space, and, accordingly, the spatio-demographic 
system as a container whose properties can be investigated without 
reference to its contents, is related to a network of abstract 
systematization - neither in virtue of facts about the hi.dory system 
_, 
;· 
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nor in virtue of facts about the system of temporal items. 
3 .2 "Settlements" in Time and Space 
Every ~orm of matter has a history, or rather, it is its history. 
This proposition does not solve the problem of the knowledge of a given 
reality; on the contrary it poses the problem. For, to read this 
history, to discover the laws of its structuring and transformation, 
one must break down, by theoretical analysis, what is given in a 
practical form. It is in this sense that an approach to the history 
of the process of settlement pa~erns seem to be the most comprehensive 
to the question, for it brings to the core of the problematic of the 
development of societies and shows, at the same time, an ideologically 
defined conceptual perspective. 
Settlement patterns themselves, which tend- towards gre~t complexity, 
seem "independent" of site, o nee we no longer conceive of "settlement" 
as a juxtaposition of more or less understood sites, but as a field of 
"action" and a number of possible structures, combined and translated 
into a particular organization of a settlement. The same areas may 
have isolated hamlets, farms or villag~s while even mountains~ which 
are forceful and rigorous sites, exhibit a variety of habitats based 
on cultural ground~· In fact, almost universally, the same site through 
history will have had "different" forms of settlements. 
That point requires a further explanation. At first, when we 
speak about "settlement" we mean a community's arrangement at a certain 
time and into a certain area. Secondly, settlement presupposes 
location. That definition - settlement in tera:s of location- while 
at the same time defining settlement by appealing to the principle of 
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"identity" of the community14 - may appear as creating a circular 
argument. In reality this is not the case. Location as a concept 
is likely to possess an interesting dichotomyz 15 indigenous morpho-
metric postulates on the one hand contrast with derivative process 
postulates on the other. The emphasis may be placed on what Brynnes 
termed "connexit~" in landscape or in geographic area.16 The inter-
relationships of a whole multitude of factors within an area create 
a "unique" personality for a given settlement and provide criteria 
for distinguishing regional units. This can be interpreted as a 
matter of linking the population theory governing processes to theories 
about spatial structure and form. This link demands a space-time 
transformation which is difficult to provide in most cases. The step 
from the system of things (which does not contain space-time objects 
but only extended objects with spatial and temporal relations between 
them) to the physical coordinate system is again a matter of decision. 
The choice of certain features, although itselr not theoretical, is 
suggested by theoretical knowledge, either logical or factual. Internal 
questions are here, in general, empirical questions to be answered by 
empirical investigation. On the other hand the external questions of 
the reality of physical space and physical time are ambiguous. For 
assertions about that reality, only provide a framework within which 
to organize assertions about things in time and space. Such assertions 
are not thought of as being ~rue or false in virtue of some independently 
existing system. They result from the intersection of pervasive time-
geographic realities with historical properties and attributes 
"affecting" directly large segments of population and contributing on 
the life content of human individuals. 
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Every task or activity that a human individual conceivably can 
undertake is time_f'demanding. Existence through time-space at daily "'"" 
...... 
and lifelong scales, means that he cannot participate simultaneously 
in activities that are spatially separated from each other. Hence, 
every commitment to a task or activity diminishes both the finite 
daily (or lifelong) time resources of the individual and of the 
population as a whole within an area. In other words, whether viewing 
one human or an areally aggregated segment of society as a whole, only 
so many tasks and activities may be packed into a single day. Movement 
between any pair of points in space can only be accomplished ttrough 
the sacrifice of time. Therefore a person ~can only take part in two <"'\ 
successive activities, if they are so located in space that the 
distance separating them can be traversed-~with the transportation )\ 
,. 
mode at his command. Space, moreover, has a "limited" packing 
capacity, or ability to accommodate events, no two physical objects 
being able to occupy the same (exactly) space at the same time. Any 
set of activities whose occurrence requires the use of uniquely 
designed physically fixed structures or objects must be placed 
spatially apart from one another, regardless of their timing. (this 
does not mean that two such activities cannot be physically adjacent 
to each other) Thus, even when time perceptions, conceptions and 
definitions are not sidereally based, or even when "real" measured 
time is distorted or totally ignored, time-geographic realities are 
operative. As a consequence of being loCked into a new or modified 
role associated with a technological or institutional development a 
community may have the length of his "life path" reduced by conditions 
associated with that role. 17 For there is nothing that time-
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geographically can affect a human individual without affecting 
society as a whole. And because time-space is not a medium through 
which events pass but 1e .. : created from the events themselves 1 it is 
"bound" into an historical dyn~mic of differential antithetical and 
oontra~untal forces; these forces and the connection of seemingly 
unrelated events and activities, identify, influence and transform 
the structure and organization of location and accordingly of 
settlements. 
Virtually all models of settlement location and structure have 
one.thing in common; they assume a measurable degree of order in 
spatial behaviour. (See Fig. 3, 4, 5) This seems to be founded on 
the following general premises which form the basis of, or are implied, 
-~ 
in, most models: 
The spatial distribution of human activity reflects an ordered 
adjustment to the factor of distance: Distance was one of the funds-
mental spatial concepts identified by J.D. Nystuen (in Berry and 
Marble 1968) and the importance of distance decay was enshrined in 
w. Tobler's (1970) first law of geography: everything is related to 
everything else, but near things are more related than distant things. 
The empiricai effect of this is not bard to see; within geography 
with the emergence of the search for general theorems of spatial 
~~~· organization and underlying many of the classical models of spatial 
structure (as the central place models of Cbristaller and L~sch and 
the diffusion models of Hagerstrand) are assumptions about spatial 
interaction which, in the typical gravity model form, postulate a 
definite inverse distance effect which is capable of a series of 
mathematical expressions. These various transformations have such a 
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powerful effect on the lapse rate that G. Olsson (1980) argued that 
the identification of a distance decay ''may reveal as much about 
the language I am talking in as it does about the phenomena I am 
talking about." But in any event distance is evidently not independent 
of the system within which interaction takes place, and in some 
locational models this is partially recognized through a parallel 
discussion of the accessibility of points arrayed on a movement 
surface (or network) around some hypothetical centre (e.g. the von 
ThUnen model of agricultural land use or the density gradients of 
conventional urban land-use models) Because of these connections 
Bunge (1966) represented interaction and geometry (returning thus to 
an Euclidean notion of space/settlement) as "the inseparable duals 
of geographic theory" and Watson (1955) even goes so far as to state 
that geography itself is a "discipline of distance". This is not bard 
to see, for if all things were concentrated at a given place at a 
given time, there would be no patterns, no spatial variation or areal 
differentiation. It is clear that the matter does not end here, 
because such interdependence poses important interpretative 
difficulties. The search for "order" in spatial behaviour must be 
treated with greater flexibility and different distance measures can 
be applied and justified by the fact that different things are more 
or less relevant in different or similar types of settlements. For 
example, travel time, transport, or road distances, weight according 
to different kinds of parameters (among which the socio-economic is 
highly responsible) and non-linear distance measures must be taken 
into consideration, in determining the relations between settlements 
or sectors of settlement. Hence, while distance-decay curves can be 
235 
"identified" empirically, it is by no means clear how far their form 
depends on the models used to replicate them or to what extent their 
implication can be given substantive meaning. 
Locational decisions are taken, in general, so as to minimize 
the frictional effects of distance: this concept, generally known 
as the least-cost Weberian model (Fig. 6) or the l~w·of·~inimum effort 
(L~sch 1954) makes the assumption that events reach their scope by 
the shortest route or otherwise, people move to choices and solutions 
which minimize "costs" and maximize "profits". (The theory has its 
archaeological extensions - the catchment area and territory approach 
which will be discussed in section 3.3) The theory has been 
criticized as too "noisy" in terms of its abstraction from real 
conditions: the location "optima" are not always so obvious and 
"cost" is culturally conditioned and affected by the socio-political 
organization of a society. 
All locations are endowed with a degree of accessibility but some 
locations are more accessible than others. But accessibility is not I 
easily definable; in a technical sense it is a relative quality 
accruing to a piece of land by virtue of its relationship to a system 
of transport and communication.(today and in the past) In an 
operational sense, it is the variable quality of centrality or 
nearness to other functions and locations. Clearly the notion is 
closely related to socio-political factors, although, in most of the 
studies, it has been viewed as related to the movement-minimization 
concept and especially measured by the costs involved in overcoming 
distance. 
There is a tendency for human activities to agglomerate to take 
?I~ ).6 
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advantage of scale economies: That is, the savings in costs of 
operation made possible by concentrating activities at common 
locations, which in turn form settlements viewed as a reflection of 
scale economies. This is a standardization which implies many 
problems, mainly because generalizations about patterns and processes 
at that level may not hold at another and strictly because the impact 
of other control mechanisms and relationships are ignored. Any 
significant modification, would necessarily involve a transforQation 
of social relations. Despite this dialectical relationship, which may 
be established only within definite social relations of production. 
geographers - and social scientists in general - have interpreted 
"settlement" through an asocial methodology which has relied upon 
environmental and economic determinism. Although a socio-cultural 
"view" may be "generally accepted'' it is rarely incorpors ted within 
the settlement studies. 
The organization of human activity is essentially hierarchical 
in character: The hierarchy of locations, based on the same general 
principles we discussed above, is frequently stated as being "true" 
for both spatial and non-spatial aspects of human activity. But if 
for example it may be true of political organization (although it 
may not be explicitly expressed spatially) it does not follow 
necessarily that it may hold for the agglomeration or dispersal of 
settlements. The "advantage" lies within the theory: more accessible 
locations appear to be the sites of larger agglomerations - which 
means the application of a "uniform" basis of explanation across tbe 
entire spatial domain - without any serious consideration of 
differential condi tiona responsible for the "behaviour'' of the system· 
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Human occupation is nodal in character: this notion underlies 
the concept of the nodal or functional region. The nodes about which 
human activity is organized are agglomerations of varying size and 
correspond to "stable" systems~ hierarchically arranged, of different 
sized focal regions. Philbrick (1957) had argued that the areal 
structure of the occupance of the earth's surface is composed of a 
number of hierarchically "nested" orders of spatial functional 
organization. In this way, "least-cost" accessibility, agglomerations 
and hierarchies are linked together to form a system of human pattern 
in space where the most important elements of their existence are 
best understood with an automated, quantitative approach, while 
making no allowance for explanations including reference to the 
changing historical context (economic, social and political) of the 
settlements appearance and development. 
Inevitably there has been an increasing amount of empirical 
statistical research and more mathematically oriented interest among 
researchers, which appears to be the result of the existence of 
accessible information for testing or elaborating this interest. The 
sp~ead of settlement and technological innovations. however, have not 
taken place in a vacuum, but within the constraints not merely of the 
physical environment but also of institutional policies by which the 
patterns of land settlemant were controlled. 
In most cases, the settlement patterns of today depend in part 
upon the patterns created in the past. However, this is not the 
reason for a methodological enclosu~e. If the form of settlement is 
similar to the end result of a linear, cluster, uniform or random 
process patter{f(Fig. 7)"1 this does not necessarily mean that )< 
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the process which produced the observed pattern was the sa~e. The 
problem here is that no matter whether one is arguing in favour of 
a "unique" arrange~ent or whethe_r one is arguing for "regionalization" 
by way of cla~sification and grouping procedure~. it is necessary to 
identify an ''ind.i vidual" ( ha~let, village, town etc.). The short 
answer to this is the t broadly two types of "individual" ~ay be 
identified - the first by way of its space-ti~e co-ordinates and the 
second by way of its properties. 
It follows that transformation beco~es important and the relation-
ship between the two types becomes of like importance. The pre-
suppositions involved aie far less binding than a mona~ic diversion; 
in particular there is no need to make assumptions about the order of 
interrelationships among the variables used, which ~eans that a 
particular class of elements so identifien will share ~any features 
in co~mon, but no element in the class needs to possess all the 
features used to identify that class or structure. (Fig. 8) 
Analysis of existing settlement patterns has developed along 
model-building and quantitative lines, and these approaches have been 
used for urban as well as rural settlements and had a decisive impact 
18 
on the formulation of archaeological settle~ent patterns. This 
being so, the fact that re~ains at the centre of the problematic is 
the observation that there is no law of nature which establishes a 
relationship in human affairs between quantifiability on the one hand, 
and importance on the other. Thus, in an atte~pt to understand the 
"evolution" and/or "preserve tion" of settlements through time, 
important aspects are ignored simply because they are difficult or 
impossible to measure quantitatively. To assign e~pirical content to 
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FIG 3.8 A the union of two sets ( ::::>:ade:l a:r·ea) 
B tte intersection of t 1HO sets (shaded area) 
,... 
tr:e complerner:t oi' set A (sr:a:le::l. area) ,, 
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an "abstract" calculus is not merely to determine the values of 
variables measured over the concrete entities, because the aspects 
of concrete reality to be taken into consideration in locational 
theories largely go beyond those susceptible to measurement whether 
the term is taken in its strict mathematical sense or in s broader 
sense which refers to mathematical entities and "models". The 
relevant phenomena of-human settlements inevitably involve a constant 
interplay between_variables of different kinds; and as such require 
historical comprehension to show how changing societal conditions 
have been associated with changing relationships with the local eco-
systems and with changes in the "quality" of life of the communities. 
This evaluation encourages a sense of perspective with respect to the 
rate of change, ani a balanced evaluation as to what th~ 
conditiops and propertie§ ·:of a given set are. 
These changes clearly involve a process of differentiation in 
building types and spaces. In general terms we are dealing with an 
aspect of history of the built environment - if we take history to 
mean concern with evidence of the past. The listing and classification 
of house types and forms have not given much insight into the 
processes of determinants of the creation of ·form. Tb~e have been 
some attempts to take a deeper and more theoretical look at the forces 
that create house form, but most have been implicit rather than 
explicit. All these attempts have suffered from two faults. First, 
they have tended to be largely physical determinist in nature. 
Second, no matter which specific-form determinant has been stressed, 
the theories have inclined toward a rather excessively simplistic 
if:; 
'<.1 ~~1 attempt to attribute forffi to a single cause. These theories do not l,• :\9 ~~~ ~~l 
; ·!'~." 
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recognize the fact that building form manifests the complex inter-
action of many factors, and that selection of a single factor, and 
changes in the types of factors selectei at different periods, are 
in themselves social phenomena. 
Buildings can be studied in different ways. One can look at 
them chronologically, tracing the development over time of 
techniques, forms. materials and ideas or thoughts. Each one may bB 
a valid viewpoint but is plainly not absolute. Their predictive 
capacity depends on analogy by association.i.e. on repeated juxta-
position and coincidences of various aspects of community life. In 
fact buildings are basically nonchronological in nature. 19 For 
example primitive and vernacular buildings have coexisted in the same 
area at one time or another with both "high" civilizations and modern 
technology. The geogrqphic distribution of these buildings depends 
on their co~responding cultures. Almost all primitive and peasant 
societies display a typical "lack" of differentiation in the use of 
space and labour. This applies to work in general, which is 
"unspecialized'' in a way, and hence applies to the way in which space 
is used. As spaces become more separated and differentiated the 
number of types of spaces increases. For instance, from man and 
animals being housed in the same room, we find them under one roof 
but in separate spaces, then separated but close, and finally widely 
separated. This multiple use of space affects the form of the house 
and settlement. A deterministic point of view neglects the idea of 
the house; just because man can do something does not mean that he 
will. Primitive and vernaculsr building provides examples in which 
knowledge of technology does not mean that it will be used. There 
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are situations where socio-economic values and needs take precedence 
over technological advances. This is an interesting point since the 
tendency is to equate technological advances with progress without 
thinking of the social consequences of adopting such advances. 
Materials, construction and technology are best treated as modifying 
factors, rather than form determinants, because they decide neither 
what is to be built nor the form - this is decided on other grounds. 
They make possible the enclosure of a space organization decided upon 
for other reasons, and possibly modify that organization. They 
facilitate and make possible or impossible certain deci~ions, but 
never decide or determine form. 
Another important consideration is why so many forms of the 
house have been developed within the limited number of climatic zones. 
Even the variation among micro-climatic types is relatively smaller 
than that found in areas of similar climate. In cases wher·e climate 
is non critical, we find a great variety of house types and in severe 
climates, the forms of dwellings may be very different - and these 
forms cannot be explained in terms of climate alone. 20 There are 
cases in which the way of life may lead to almost anticlimatic solutions! 
with the dwelling form related to economic activity rather than 
climate. Typically primitive and vernacular buildings respond to 
climate very well. But this correspondence does not mean climatic 
variations are the determining factor for house form and settlements 
organization. 
A third consideration of course is the impact of site as an 
essential variable. Similar site conditions can result in very 
different house forms and similar forms can be built on very different 
--~ 
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sites. The fact that sites are often chosen on the basis of non-
utilitarian or purely physical grounds has to be considered. 
The choice of what is regarded as a good site brings with it 
physical effects and some consequent adjustments. Given solutions -
to adaptations do not always occur simply because they are possible. 
The physical setting provides the possibilities among which choices 
are made through the taboos, customs and traditional ways of the 
culture. Even when the physical possibilities of a site are numerous, 
the actual choices may be ''limited" by the socio-c.ultural matrixJ 
this "limitation" may be the most typical aspect of the dwelling-s and 
settlement patterns. Given a certain climate, the availability of 
certain materials and a certain level of technology, what finally 
decides the form of a dwelling and arranges spaces and tteir relation-
ships is the ideas that people have on their everyday life. Buildings 
-
and settlements are the visible expression of the relative importance 
attached to different aspects of life and the varying ways of perceiv-
ing reality. The question. in effect, is concerned with how changes in 
a society relate to changes in the environment, as shown by physical 
form, and to what extent subsistence act~vities do or do not modify 
this reality. (This particular aspect will be discussed in detail 
in chapter four) 
Attaching such importance to the culturally linked aspects of 
built form tends perhaps to lead to a position of complete relativism. 
As soon as a given culture or way of life has changed, its form would 
become meaningless. Yet we know that many artifacts retain validity 
when the culture which created them has long disappeared, and that 
housing and settlement forlils Rre- still viable, even thoi}_g}i~ the 
---=-~~ 
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"meaning" attached to the forme may have changed very greatly. It 
seems that it does exist an element of "constancy'' within different-
iation, which needs to be considered. The logical disjunction is 
that t~e-mechanisms of interaction between material/social variables 
that we try to identify are coincident with the topic being studied: 
namely the way in which communities were organized to operate as 
integrated systems succeeding or failing in their attempts to cope 
with circumstances. On the other band, it does not necessarily follow 
that because we can deal with present day communities using particular 
classifications _anr'l categories - _ those labels will inevitably be 
appropriate to the treatment and organization of long-term date. 
The assumption behind a belief in the appropriate quality of 
contemporary labels appears to be that present moments represent a 
complete data supply that degenerates as it_ persists through time. 
-
But while there is no dispute t~at some specific elements of data are 
eliminated or raised, the process is not simply one of cumulative 
damage. The past is the only source of date on long term time trends. 
The premise that cocm::unity bel:.aviour is more ttsn a eum of the 
beheviou:- e.nd attitudes of the component.s members seems to adequately 
describe human groups and their settlements. furtbermore, the nature 
of social cause end effect operates differently at different scales 
of space end time. The critical issue is ttat past data in which 
documentary or direct verbal evidence of social patterns is not 
available are neither good or bad: it is questions that are 
appropriate or inappropriate. 
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3.3 Palaeodemography an1 its Regional Dimensions 
In theory, for settlement patterns analysis it wou11 seem that 
a region coulrl be_treated much as if it were a site. That is, it can 
be delineated on the ground, separated into units on the basis of 
different attributes and combination of attributes and systematically 
sampled. In practice, though, a region is so much lerger and more 
complex a unit than the individual settlement that it must be treated 
somewhat differently. 
A region in cultural ecology mey be defined as a natural space within 
which exists a variety of resources that complement each other to 
enable population to be self-contained at the subsistence level. 
There are, however, several ways in which population is organized in 
time for the exploitation of these resources depending upon the 
t h 1 . 1 . t d . t t. 1"-t 21 ec no og1ca equ1pmen an econom1c po en la 1 y. A single social 
~: group organizing itself at a seasonal settlement complex is one; 
several groups organizing themselves at several seasonal settlement 
complexes is another; several groups each settled in its own area and 
constituting symbiotic relationships is a third; a combine tion of 
symbiosis and seasonality is a fourth. 
Regional settlement patterns may be one of the most important 
elements to unders~an1ing the ecosystem of a region as well as its 
cultural history. 
Uost settlement patterns studies have had two major objectives, 
the definition of ecological processes and the reconstruction of 
changes in ~nstitutions through time. They vary in the way in which 
the researcter views the interaction of tt.ese two processes. The 
derlved demog:;:_;~phic data bas been used to m.sasure the ''success'' of 
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the populations in adapting to their environment and as a measure 
of social evolution. The implication of this latter is ttat there 
- . 1 t i "' . b t th . f . t . . d 22 1s a re a onsulp e ween e s1ze o commun1 1es, o~gan1ze 
societies and social structure-. Usually· inferences about the population 
of prehistoric sites or regions based on measures of utilized space 
are found in a simple equation: Population is some function of 
utilized space: paf(s). Two of the terms in the equation- population 
and function - are relatively non-problematic. The third term -
utilized space - embodies a substantial number of problema. The 
initial consideration is, to be explicit about th-e boundaries of the 
regions under investigation and this is depending on how the region 
is defined. The major contradiction of any regional structure is the 
region itself. First, it is not apparent how things like population 
activities can be defined.ueefully except by reference to "real" 
pe tterns and in tensi ties of land utilization and settlements "pressing" 
against certain ecological limits. Secondly, ~e may say! for this 
purpose, that a settlement as ''an archaeologically discernible site'' 
is a unit of speca characterized during some one culturally definable 
period of time by the presence of two or more dwellings•or structures 
(community or component). It is somewhat narrow however in that it 
requires recognition of two or more dwelling structures. For many 
components or communities we do not have these data. One of the great 
difficulties is in fact the question of what is an archaeologically 
discernible site, which represents a cultural unit during a definable 
period of time end also represents a functioning cultural group. 
(Fig. 9 ) 
The proolem ie a per~:eanent one for eny demograp:tice-1/arctaeo.l.o-
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gical research; it would be naive to assume, however, that an 
archaeological site must be, or is, defined only by its dwelling 
structures of any form and size, because in this way any other source 
of information is excluded. Material remains of any sort comprise 
the archaeological data, with differing composition and structure, 
corresponding to certain levels of development of a community or group, 
and to changes with increasing or decreasing population, due to 
different and contradictory reasons, even within the same habitat. 
The demographic processes which link settlements of a given society 
and the socio-cultural mechanisms which integrate adjacent settlement 
populations have to be taken into account if the behaviour of a pre-
historic population at a given settlement is to be fully explicated. 
The natural environment in which a given Palaeolithic settlement is 
located and the articulation of its prehistoric occupants with each 
other and with their habitat can account only for a part of the settle-
went's form. At least as important are variables which cannot be 
inferred from a settlement's archaeological and palaeoenvironmental 
remains, because they relate to its articulation with a supra-nite 
entity. The site's social surrounding. 
Thus the problem, amongst others, is to delineate the spatial 
dimension of a site, which is determined broadly by three criteria: 
physical contiguity, functional congruence and temporal contemporaneity. 
Time, it seems, takes precedence over space in this delineation, and 
in the concept of archaeological time the concept of "stationary" state 
is crucia1. 23 Continuous space, in most archaeological situations, 
'? . 
is not the main problem, referring of course to spaceshorizontal ~ 
dimension not to its vertical dimension. which is temporal rather than 
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spatial. The main concern appears then to be·:the time relationship ·"·· 
between each pair of arctaeological objects in terms of their inter-
action in the context of human behaviour, and this is crucial for 
~ ·~ 
estimations d·t~' population in palaeodemography in any sort of context. \. 
7 
As the major development within palaeodemographic studies has been 
the derivation of demographic information for larger geographic units 
and estimation of population size, distribution and density through 
the various time phases the third point is to discuss the regional 
concept in relation to a number of different meanings. How do we 
define the region and especially regional patterns in palaeodemography? 
In some ways, regional analysis may be regarded as a particular 
type of cognitive description; one that involves a space-time language 
rather than a property language. Regional analysis thus provides a 
framework within which may be examined shapes and forms in space. In 
general the assumptions are geometric ones and this amounts to 
identifying a co-ordinate system suitable for discussing the particular 
problem for shape and pattern of town locations, the structure of 
networks of settlement systems, spatial relationships of villages or 
communities and so on. The analysis is explanation in the sense that 
given two sides and one angle of a triangle in Euclidean space it is 
possible to predict the length of the third side and the other two 
angles. In archaeological, geographic and ethnographical contexts, 
it is possible to predict the occurrence of settlement given a number 
(say two) of initial settlements and the geometric laws of central-
place theory. 24 The implications from this approach is a tendency to 
assume a priori a set of regional entities which exist and hence 
constitute ''real" units. Much of the search for regional divisions 
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may thus be regarded as an attempt to identify geographic units. 
Given a relative view of space, however, the idea of such aggregates 
bas to be profoundly modified.- A regional unit is not just a node in 
a network of-descriptive value, but a node in many overlapping networks 
formulated according to varying criteria. Given a relative view of 
space, the problem then is to identify the co-oriinate syatem which 
is most appropriate for a given purpose. It is usually held that this 
is an empirical problem and that its solution depends on the kind of 
activity being studied. But activity involves discussing properties 
and therefore the choice is dependent upon the phenomena being studied. 
The same kind of problem emerges even under the assumption of an 
absolute space. It is a problem of significance. Again it becomes 
clear that objects and events have so~e place in regional thinking, 
for without reference to particular types of pheno~ena it is impossible 
to determine an appropriate co-ordinate system, to judge whether or not 
a system of regional division is appropriate or not and even, toosome 
extent, to judge whether the objects and events examined in terms of 
spatial location are reason_ably selected or not. 
It is also natural that as operatiopal methods change, and new 
developments take place, there will be a change in their meaning. 
Kuhn (1962) gives many examples of this in scienca in general, while 
terms such as environment and region in geography have shown an 
amazing variation in the way they are used and interpreted. There is 
therefore a need for flexibility and mobility in the process of 
assigning meaning. But thi~ need is not necessarily incompatible with 
the importance of understanding the causal connections that bind 
diverse phenomena togeth~r w1th regional complexes. 
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The term region has taken on various connotations during its 
long use in geography; classically through chorology or an analysis 
of areal differentiation "in wr.ich the purpose of the study is to 
clarify a specific situation in a particular locality" (Paterson 
1974). The region has sometimes been accorded the status of a 
theoretical entity, rather like an atom or a neutron which could not 
be precisely observed but whose existence could be inferred from its 
effects. The areal differentiation of the earth's surface could thus 
be "explained" with reference to this theoretical object which 
governed human spatial organization. (Harvey 1973) Later writers 
denied such a mystical interpretation of the term region and came to 
regard it as an essential mental construct for the organization of 
geographic data. 25 26 Others have since indicated that the concept 
performs the same function as the concept of a class in any science 
and that therefore regionalization is nothing more than a special form 
of classification. But this l):otion can be confusing: once spatial "~ 
phenomena are classified into regions it is not useful to explain 
the existence of such classes by reference to the regional concept 
itself. 
J 
The question of scale is linked rather broadly to the problem 
f l . f'. t. 27 o c ass1 1ca 10n. In a special way, it relates to the problem 
faced by a human geographer or archaeologist who wishes to delimit 
a segment of space. for purposes of studying a particular culture there. 
This is a case of dichotomous division creating a two-region system -
within and without the culture space. The delimiting criteria which 
initially fit the scale may determine also whether viable sub-regions 
can be established within the cultural region. At the initial level 
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of the dichotomous division, location or site is determined by the 
delimiting criteria. Areas and points within areas are in or out 
of the culture space, on the boundary or within a boundary zone. 
(Fig. 10) For sub-regions developed within the culture space, 
locations and sites become a variable which need further attention. 
It is not a variable in the sense that positions change, but in the 
fact that different spatial sub-orders will suggest different inter-
relationships over space. The particular "selection" of sub-regional 
criteria thus may determine whether the interactions involved in 
creating the cultural complex (and accordingly population units) 28 
will be identified or made sufficiently apparent to become the subject 
of a valid conjecture. 
We have already noted the notion of landscape in geography, that 
is a complex of physical and human characteristics which give 
"individuality" to a terri tory. In an archaeological context the 
site comprises the ''same" elemer.ts and is the result of a "humanized 
nature". Even if one was able to reconstruct what was the "natural" 
site and define the physical environment, the relationships oetween 
natural and humanized site are far from simple. Two similar and even 
adjoining natural units can develop to two different sites, concerning 
their internal and external characteristics, as for example, agrarian, 
demographic or industrial complexes. Several sites can succeed one 
another over time within the same territory, and human impact can 
completely alter the character of natural environment. The site, 
therefore reflects a "momentary" state of interrelstionships, an 
"unstable" equilibrium between natural conditions, human technology, 
economic systems and de~ographic social structures. 
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In addition each site incorporates a variety of inherited 
arrangements from the past. Even if spatial organization tends to 
confer a relative permanence to a site, this1although visibly real, ~ 
cannot be explained without referring to factors as diverse as under-
ground hydrology, land tenure, birth rates, productivity or religious 
practice. The very obvious implication of this is the general nature 
of archaeological ~~rk directed toward interpretations. No hypotheses 
are worth testing if they are not responsible to archaeological reality, 
for that reality is never responsible to any laws or law-like state-
ments unless they are derived from it or can be "demonstrated" by it. 
Explanations in archaeology are hypotheses for the determination of 
the interrelationships between variables to account for the occurrence 
and the form of each, and the explanations also have many levels. At 
the highest level, explanations seek to disclose the interrelationships 
of a universal scope and to determine the primacy of one set of 
interrelationships as against another set, but such explanations are 
not always possible or even relevant in archaeology. Thus, searching 
for and con~irming covering laws is only one of several related 
aspects of palaeodemographical research. Already discussed is the 
need to integrate such laws into a theory covering explanation - not 
only of a higher but of a lower order as well, that is establishing 
analysis at the point where empirical data is unsufficient. Since 
the perception of underlying articulations ultimately depend upon 
parameters quite dissimilar, assumptions for a specific system"' require X 
/ 
confir~ation at all levels. 
Data usually only represent a (nonrandom) portion of the time 
period and the site or sites under investigation, and are the result 
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of a concrete behaviour through which input stimuli are transformed 
into a socially definei idiom. The equilibrium population of a group 
represents thus the working out of these factors - given as well the 
specific antecedent conditions for that group and the particular 
technological and subsistence strategies. The properties of these 
factors and their effect on population size per se, are largely 
determined by the meaning ascribed to physical phenomena (i.e. the 
way nature and resource exploitation are perceived) through not only 
socially but economically structured categories. 
A theoretical substratum has more than just illustrative value. 
Expl~natory arguments in palaeodemography are primarily attempts to 
account for the specific observations that are made about data 
(settlements, or artifacts) in an archaeological context. As such, 
they ate indicative expressions of human systems, the explanation of 
which depends upon the und.erstanding of the processes operating in 
such systems. 
It is on that level that the relationship between population size 
and area of habitation is of substantial concern to prehistorians. 
The area of a site is one of the few "measurements" available to 
account for the population size of extinct communities. That the 
site area tends to increase with increase in population size is a 
preliminary approximation. The precise relationship between the two, 
however, is not so obvious. Empirical observation has indicated that 
in some societies there are 10m2 of habitation area per individual_,· >. 
(Naroll 1962) • Wiessner (1974) has pointed o'ut that Naroll's "law" >. 
relating habitation area to population size is not truly a universal 
law, but at best an average over several disparate sets of phenomena. 
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The question then arises of how to deal with such data in trying to 
relate the values of one variable to those of another. Minimally 
the relationship between area and population size depends on a) the 
spatial structuring of residence units in a community; b) the area 
-
allocated to each unit; and c) the number of individuals in a unit. 
The variability in tr.ese factors cross-culturally implies that there 
can be no single, universal relationship between these two variables. 
Rather, there will be a relationship "specific" to each form of 
spatial arrangement, with parametric values in the relationship, 
changing according to the area of residence unit and the mean number 
of individuals in a unit. The reference points and interactions 
established also vary from society to society and even within societies. 
Population density for example is a relative matter; there can be 
high density in areas of low population; while formally density is 
a ratio expressing the relationship between people and space, as 
Birdsell (1968) says, there is an economi0 as well as a spatial 
dimension when we consider population density and/or population pressure. 
Obviously, when seen in this light the problem is even more com-
plicated for palaeodemography than is usually thought. It is 
difficult enough to establish things like population size and density 
(absolute or relative) in time and space. When these have to be 
correlated with the carrying capacity and its fluctuations the problem 
is even more complicated. Any population uses different sorts of land 
in different ways and wi tr. different intensity. A community may use 
the resources of bush, forest, lagoon and/or sea. Tiow much should 
be counted in a calculation of population size? ani what is to be 
counted? Are the few acres under coconut palm to be counted in within 
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the hundreds of square miles of fish rich ocean? Likewise in 
calculating population-density, expected forest averages for exampl«;l '·_ X 
cannot be simply added to the intensely exploited farm acreage, nor 
can it be omitted. The situation is certainly too complex to be 
expressed by a single number. Rather it can be represented by the 
relation ship between area and population that is between subsistence 
and society. 29 Given our present level of chronological control it is 
more feasible to estimate regional population size for a certain 
cultu~al phase by ascertaining the total number of sites representative 
of each settlement type containing maximum local aggregate populations, 
the sum of which comprise all the maximum subsistence settlement unit 
populations in the area. This data would provide population estimates 
for the area during the time span of the associated "cultural" phase, 
also requires a much enlarged scale of field research for demographic 
studies, once certain assumptions are made about the nature of 
"culture". The basic premise is ,'that for a given "cultural phase" 
no single typical household or settlement also exists - but rather a 
complex regional population structure that relates closely to the 
settlement system. The substantive problem revolves around the fact 
that the palaeodemographer is dealing with the results of human 
decisions which are partially dependent upon perception of time-space 
concepts operating through social conventions. To define and explain 
not only the appearance but also the level of these interaction 
spheres is a requirement which needs to establish an "adequate" 
regional information field as a subject of investigation. 
It is evident from the preceding discussion that regional 
definition stays closer to human reality by analyzing tte organization 
of activities rather than by uniformity in the physical landscape. In 
that sense no precise dimensional criteria are necessary, because too 
! 
I 
1 
~ 
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many variables condition the size of the 7.ones of inference. Of 
course knowledge of the spatial combinations ~hich form the lan~scape 
is indispensable for evaluating the potentiaLof a territory, measuring 
-
its value and understanding the risks of disturbing t!le delic_ate 
equilibrium between the natural milieu ani human groups. Conversely, 
even a highly individualized landscape cannot be separated from 
neighbouring landscapes with which it has complementary relationships. 
A region, on the other hand, is endowed with a certain self-sufficiency, 
not in the sense of economic independence, but in the sense that most 
of the functions and services of primary importance are represented 
there in such a way thet the region is capable of satisfying most of 
the needs of its inhabitants. In these terms, the regional articulation 
of a territory is related to the nature of regional functions that is 
-
with economic and social development, which obviously varies con-
siderably accoriing to its stage of development, so that the dimensions 
of the regions vary, in space and time, with the degree of technology, 
population densities, levels of living (specialization of production, 
family and kinship organization) an1 inter-intra site communication. 
In spite of the inherent difficult~es. the flexibility of such 
an approach towards the regional concept. allows for estimations in 
palaeodemography which otherwise would not be taken into consideration! 
that is a series of deter~inants whose character is not dependent only 
by geographic position and/or location but by the intrinsic conditions 
of the area in question. Again, even in situations where evidence is 
not available by special units such as buil1ings or cemeteries, it 
becomes possible to evaluate the palaeodemographical pattern from 
fectorf'.\ "~mtsj_de" U"H~ B}HH:ial J.or;ation as such~. thus retaining much 
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of the local orientation without falling into a functional bias. 
The data on changing pattern of adjustment and composition, documents 
the response of individuals to shifting environmental and demographic 
constraints and the historical material shows the impact of the 
cumulative consequence of these decisions on the environment and 
wider economical/political systems. The integration of local 
populations at a regional level . offers the possibility to relate )( 
historically characteristic patterns of internal differentiation or 
similarity without rejecting their local elements. There is thus•.;: a ,,, 
corresponding de-emphasis on concepts such as carrying capacity or 
homeostasis used for estimations on population, an:i a shifting towards 
the importance of extralocal ties and of the access of extralocal 
resources,that is decisions on social, productive activities distribut-
ing or integrating populations to their region as a whole. 
In palaeodemography where the problem of relating groups and 
communities with their "site" are obvious, a regional approach allo""s 
for the correlation of "continuous" parameters, even under uncomplete 
situations, and permits identifications concerning bot~ the operation 
of the whole system of communities and the processes of their socio-
economic evolution. The preceding considerations suggest that it is 
possible to apply systematic explanatory procedures to palaeolithic 
societies; the large number of settlements occupied in tbe course of 
a given state of a society, as well as the large number of artifacts 
accumulated in areas outside the settlements, enable us to derive 
information concerning their structure, in terms of those factors 
which are significant to their regional-historical articulation as 
defined by their mode of production and the forces relating to them. 
3.4 The Dialectics of Region 
It may be said that p~laeogeography30 has been more interested 
-
in the form of_things than in their formation. The spatial different-
iation of settlement and the formation of regional systems of 
settlement are affected to a certain degree by demographic factors. 
Palaeogeography is concerned with regional differences in the 
reproduction of population, its structure, and its relationships with 
the spatial regularities and peculiarities of settlement, as well as 
of the way these factor~ manifest themselves regionally and of their· 
impact on the formation, composition ani redistribution of population 
among and within various interregional and regional systems. Despite 
that, its domain has been one not of social dynamics, through ~hich 
~ forms are created and changed, but of things already crystallized -
'i 
~~1 ~ an inverted image which prevents the apprehending of reality unless 
history is made to intervene. Forms do not have a life·on their own; 
the most essential point o~ anaaysis then, requires the interpretation 
of human space as an historical f'9ct, as the basis for understanding 
spatial reality, or for transforming that reality into on~ usefu~ for 
any social organism. Eistory after all, is not written outside of 
space, and an a-spatial society does not exist.31 
Thisis ~cause region itself is social, incorporates a definite object: 
the spatial aspect of the development of social production. Spatial 
reality is a dimension which is permanently engaged in its own re-
adjustment under the influence qf eocial and economic reality, but 
which at the same time exerts its own i~fluence over that reality. 
The notion of socio-economic formation thus, is more than an econocic 
and its cultural, political and ideological activities is complex 
and the issue is not one of determining whether, for example, culture 
affects, influencesor interactswith the economic basis, but ratter 
of determining the precise way in which they are related. When Marx 
wrote '' •• a definite amount of space is always required at any given 
level of productivity" (Capital vol. 3) he meant to discuss the 
conc~ete ways in v1hich societies produce spatial organization and 
j 
builp geographical landscapes that reflect their own requirements. 
This is a dialectical relation to the mode in which natural objects 
are transformed into use values for human use; it is here that the 
relationship between the natural an~ social aspects of life becomes 
more explicit. Any geographical landscape or set of geographical 
relations in a region is treated as the result of some process of past 
historical development. That process is a social process of production 
and so the "region" is seen to depend first and forer;;ost on the kind 
of society established ttere. Different societies characterized by 
different modes of production produce different "regions''. 33 Modes 
of production become concrete on a historically determined territorial 
base. From this point of view, regional forms would constitute a 
language of the modes of production. That is wh~L in.their geographical ) 
"' determination they are selective, reinforcing the specificity of 
particular places. ~ode of production. social formation. region -
these three categories are interdependent. The fundamental basis of 
explanation is production, i.e. man's labour which transforms, according 
to historically determined laws, the region with which the group is 
confronted. One might even ask, whetter it io possible to speak of 
socio-economic formation without including the notion of region. It 
is actually a category of socio~economic and spatial formation rather 
than a simple socio-economic formation as it is usually conceived. 
Accepting this would make it possible to avoid the error of the 
dualistic interpretation of man-nature relations. Nature and space 
become synonymous as soon as nature is considered as a transformed or 
socialized nature, a second nature as Uarx called it. 
The social formation includes a structure of production and a 
technical structure. The concern in fact is with a technical-
productive structure expressed "geographically" by a specific dis-
tribution of the activity of production. If the concept of social 
formation must "contain" the complex of different technical and 
organizational forms of the productive process which correspond to 
tte various existing relations of production, it cannot be conceived 
of without reference to the idea of region. The localization of people, 
activities, things in space, may be explained as much by external needs, 
those of the "pure" mode of production. as by internal needs, 
represented essentially by the structure of all demands, that is the 
social formation itself. (Santos 1975) 
Thus the dialectical relations between region and social formation 
are existing on the same "level'' but are of a different order altogether, 
since they are formed in a particular region, not in region in general 
like the modes of production. This requirement of concreteness (Sereni 
1971) does not at all mean that isolated elements can be perceived as 
things-in-themselves. The concept-- 7 is inseparable from the concrete }_ 
represented by a historically determined society. To define it is to 
produce a synthetical definition of the exact nature of the specific 
diversity and unity of the economic and social relations which 
characterize a society in a definite epoch. (Godeliar 1978) Taken 
individually, each regional form is representative of a mode of 
production and the history-4f the social formation is the history of 
the superimposition of forrus created by the succession of the modes 
of production, of their entanglement with its "regional territory". 
A mode of production. organizes the process of production into a 
particular form in order to have an effect on nature and obtain from 
it the necessary elements for the satisfaction of society. is needs.- This 
society and its nature - that is,the portion of nature from whic~ it 
extracts its production--are in a sense "indivisible" and constitute 
at once a concrete totality and an abstract totality. Thus any 
discussion of human agency in transforming the environment must 
reject all form of determinism in the sense of utilitarian explanations 
of social activity. The modification in the role of form-content 
or of the function conferred on the form by the content - are sub-
ordinated to, even determined by, the mode of production as it is 
realized in and through the social formation. Thus the movement of 
space suppresses, in a practical and not only in a philosophical way, 
all possibility of opposition between history and function. The lags 
in evolution on the part of particular variables are opposed to the 
simultaneity of their functioning within the total movement of s~ciety; 
whence the unity of synchronic and diachronic processes.(Santos 1975) 
The time lag with which a mode of production impos&sdifferent vectors 
on each portion of region is responsible for the different "lifetimes" 
of its multiple elements or variables. Diachronism is at the root of 
regional evolution, but the fact that the variables act synchronically-
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- assures the continuity of the region. The total reality which 
is the set of conditions characterizing a given society has a 
particular meaning for each place, but this meaning can be grasped 
only at the level of totality. In fact the redistribution of roles 
achieved at each new moment of the mode of production and of the 
social formation depends on the quantitative and qualitative dis-
tribution of the infrastructures and on the attributes of the region. 
Cosgrove (1983), following Polanyi (1958) ani Sahlins (1976~has 
suggested three broad modes of life wherein the dominant site of 
production is differently located. 1) In primitive societies, that 
is those which Polanyi characterized as having reciprocity as the 
dominant mode of economic integration, the primary location of 
"symbolic" production is in the social constitution of kinship. This 
is then mapped across other institutions. including the economy as 
producer of goods and the region. It determines the possibilities 
and limitations of the forces of production made available to achieve 
culturally determined ends o 2) Archaic formations are dominated by a ~ 
mode wherein "symbolic" production is primary located in the politico-
religious sector, and thence mapped across all others. This gives 
the foundation for structuring regions and/or landscapes centralized 
around a sacred centre in what Polanyi refers to as redistributive 
societies.3JFinally, capitalist society elevates economy, to a position ,>c 
of dominance so that it "throws a classificatory grid across the 
entire cultural superstructure, ordering the distinctiveness of other 
sectors by distinctions of its own" (Sahlins 1976). These three modes 
of "symbolic" product. ion provide only a crude outline ann typology • 
They resemble Polanyi's three forms of economic integration: 
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reciprocity, redi stri but ion and market economy. But unlike PolanyL 
who inverted the base-superstructure model for pre-capitalist 
formations, arguing that in them economy was "embedded" in society, 
these three categories maintain cultural encompassment throughout, 
varying only in the location of the key site of "symbolic" production 
derived trom Marx (1964). Thus modes of production are not definitions 
of specific societies. Regional or landscape studies which employ 
them are best developed under the concept of the socio-economic 
formation which expresses the unity of the diverse economic, social. 
political and cultural spheres of life and places that totality within 
the concrete conditions of a specific historical and geographical 
context. The term is used by Marx in a double sense: at first it 
covers society throughout its existence and then it applies to a 
definite historical stage in the development of society. 34 It is in 
this second sense that the term went into the theory of dialectical 
materialism. It is in this sense also that its application for the 
delimitation of regional systems through time.' can provide a deeper ~ 
r--
critical insight into the conditions with which regions are produced, 
shaped and reproduced. And it is from this standpoint that Marx's 
method generates quite different perspectives and conclusions from 
those generated by simple logical empiricism. Logical empiricism 
has the capacity to inform as to what is, given an existing set of 
categories. Dialectical materialism on the other hand is not just 
a convenient method that we may fit to observations, as one may choose 
between a linear or non-linear model. The basis of dialectics, in the 
manner that ~~a~used it, is "constructivist" in that it sees change 
as an internally generated necessity that affects categories of thought 
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and material reality alike. 
There is another important point with regard to the above 
remarks. Because dialectical use of "language" is relational rather 
than absolute a thing cannot be understood or even talked about 
independently of the relations it has with other things. For example 
natural resources can be defined only in relationship to the mode of 
production which seeks to make use of them and which simultaneously 
"produces" them through a certain human activity. There is, therefore, 
no such thing as a resource in abstract or a resource which exists as 
a nthing in itself 11 • To establish the distinctions between areas, 
to delimit the diffusion of phenomena upon a territorial unit, is still 
not regionalization; it remains a geographic differentiation upon 
physical characteristics and reflecting physical properties. It is 
an attempt to find some tangible objects on which to 11 hang" regional 
processes. Physical-geographic regionalization proper is based on 
natural regularities, and the natural regions that are delimited on 
the basis of a set of criteria usually vary in their natural conditions. 
Such regions are "constructed" on the basis of natural processes that 
flow "regardless" of the will of man or of the purpose of their 
utilization by man. But in general, "real" regions will not coincide 
with physical-geographic region~as a region is really a totality 
comprising parts of internal reciprocal relations, integrated in a 
"behavioural" system. of several characteristics that are relevant 
for particular purposes. In that sense, what is truly material for_ 
a region is the conception of its reality as a totality of inter-
related parts and the conception of these parts as expandable 
relations such that each one in its fullness can represent the totality. 
ThesG in turn yare expressed by one form of appropriation of the 
',-
nature and natural resources, or another qhich gives to each region 
a distinctiveness "outside"· its purely geographical regulari ties1 
what is meant by that 9 is that a "similar'' regional complex can be 
found under "di asimilar" geographical units and out side any national 
boundaries 9 so that the distinctiveness of the region becomes a 
proper,ty ~pen~ing ·on. and related to its socio,....economic setting-rather· than to 
its particular physical one. 
Despite all the complexities the results of human activities in 
any hLstorical epoch -must be considered in any "regi.onalization"; -
aside from the actual kinds of human activity. physical-geographic 
regionalization should also consider the extent to which these 
activities tend to modify the natural system in area and in degree 
affecting several components of the environment. the-entire environ-
ment or a single component of the environment. This is precisely why 
a regional unit cannot be established by means of its own initial 
existence 9 although this very existence is of course a prerequisite 
for its establishment. 
In dialectical .terms,· a region js not a "static'' approximation 
of territorial conditions but a constant and dynamic articulation 
within a network of productive rela tiona which "shape" its existence 
and "define" its boundaries. It is interesting to note in this context 
that dialectical reasoning includes conventional reasoning but not 
vice versa 9 just as human action includes regional forms but not vice 
versa. The indication is, therefore, that conventional modes of 
categorization And descriptions of spatial f0rms project only surface 
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necessary role in the actual operation of the region. First, it is 
a way of analyzing the function and distribution of forms in space; 
secondly it is a way of explaining historically these forms i~ time. 
The two kinds of specification are complementary. Neither is sufficient 
in itself. The unifying theme of the entire analysis is at the end, 
the evolutionary (or devolutionary) transformation of a regional unit. 
not related to some single factor but to a system whose origin, 
existence and development include~ internal dynamic properties and 
tendencies manifested in the actual distribution of socio-economic 
forms. 
3·5 Summary 
To speak of spatial demography seems! perforce, to speak of two ~ 
distinct elements - distinct as regards their origin and context; yet 
these elements are closely linked by the dialectics of their 
historical status. On the one hand are the people, their productive 
and social activities; on the other hand is a given space within which 
people move. The crucial point then is that we must define, at any 
level of analysis, how, and according to what strategyla given space 
has been produced, and to "delimit" its contents- that is of the 
people using that space, people who perhaps are opposed to the physical 
form of purpose of that space. At the outset, it is necessary to move 
through spatial description into an analysis of the social. processes 
which originate spatial appearance. While social processes (especially 
under the capitalist mode of production) have an inherent ~ndency 
towards various kinds of uneven development (thus in terms of spatial 
arrangement, producing centre-periphery forms at every scale), it is 
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obvious that natural environments also impan their particularity 
.to such developing processes. F.nvironmentally - em betided processe~. 
geographical instances of specificity, move through time under dynamics 
whic_h reflect and contain their particular geographical circumstances. 
This whole geographical aspect of social process was recognized by 
Marx in the most basic of his ~ritings on historical materialism. 
Thus, for example, in t})e "Grundrisse", Marx'states that property 
relations in the original, primitive communal mode would take different 
forms depending, in part, on environmental conditions, but that this 
does not prevent the same economic b&sis - the same from the stand-
point of the main conditions - due to different circumstances, relations 
and historical influences from showing infinite variations and 
,,g.:t"_a~tlons in appearance, which can be ascertained only bY: an analysis 
·of the given circumstances. 
Thus, region develops under the stimulus of a sequence of changing 
material events. Such events are perceived and experience1, assigned 
a place in a pre-existing but changing order, and "appropriated" or 
incorporated to become part of a population's spatio-demographic 
relations. As these relations are funda~entally _ the collective 
production and reproduction of the material basis of human life, 
societies are basically characterized by the social relations of 
production. What Y.arxism asks of social processes are two particularly 
related questions: one concerns the relations between processes and 
their natural conditions of existence; the other, the reiations across 
space between processes, or specificities of processes, within 
different geographical environments. Hence, while regions provide a 
d:~+.9rmi?Ji.ng cont~-xt for th~ df\V01oprnent of popuJ. a to\. on a~- th.e dete:rm.i.n-
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istic relationship between the two is a dialectical one. This allows 
populations, communities or groups to achieve a dynamic on their own 
in which change may take both quantitative and qualitative forms. 
The expression of these forms incorporates apparently differential 
categories: population concentration, dispersal and movement, resource 
utilization, instruments of labour, territorial organization etc., 
which, despite their very different programm~sfor explanation stemming 
from their contrary dispositions of the problems, all have a common 
underlying factor: all are the results of human, collective behaviour, 
and their spatial relations are determined mainly by the movement of 
their originating and receiving social processes. Therefore there 
exists a need, for examining not only these differential categories 
as independent variables, but also choice at the organizational level. 
Attachment to or alienation from place or locale is an integral part 
of the process of social structuration. Furthermore the role of the 
region and of regionalization coulu be interpreted as that of mediat-
ing between site and space, in a way somewhat analogous to the group's 
mediation between the individual and society. The significance of 
place to specific groups, bands or communities in history' ~thereby 
/-
······( 
becomes a critically important palaeodemographic concern, embracing 
not only biological reproduction but also production and reproduction 
of the means of subsistence, that is its economic structure. 
The transformation of a social formation from one dominant mode 
of production to another is thus the result of both.. Athe ~ndigenous, y 
I' 
"autonomous" movement of that process, and change in the "net" of 
spatial relations with other processes. A new mode of production 
appears in its classical, pure form only in articulation with the prior ';';(.... 
I 
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mode in its region of origin. Elsewhere the social formation is the 
product of the articulation of a certain pre-existent mode of 
production and the received form of a diffusing newly dominant mode. 
In that sense, production as a whole incorporates a definite object, 
subjects involved in labour activity, instruments and a consciously 
set objective. Social relations of production are, together with 
nature and the forces of production, fundamental conditions of 
populgtion activity. Little, if any. attention has been given to the 
extent to which such spatially defined entities have any palaeo-
demographic significance. The more recent interest in Marxism is helping 
to rectify this state of affairs and to examine the dialectic of the 
whole through the particular dialectics of its geographical instances 
and their spatial relations. 
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not a classification of entities that exist in nature, there is 
still a tendency to forget that ''lines on a map are rarely real 
and that any given classification is but one way of looking at 
the world." Although the belief that there can be a ''correct" 
classification has had unfortunate consequences in biology, 
geography, archaeology (and especially in Palaeolithic archaeology 
where community, band, society, population, group were "locked up" 
into a series of static types (techno-cultures, techno-complexes, 
tool types and the rest) the misinterpretation of the word 
"natural" has led to particular difficulties in the study of 
regions. (In Eng lard for example the term "natural" was 
introduced by Herbertson (1913 ).7 who clearly confined its use to X 
regions based solely on features of the physical environment' and X 
tl:is remains the general "trend" till today in most of the 
studies). Given the belief tl:at there can be one "correct" 
classification, it is not difficult to envisage a situation 
where the construction of classifications becomes an end in 
itself, simply by arranging objects in clas~es with no deeper 
understan~ing of their association, relationships and changing 
structures. 
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B.J.L. Berry 1958; B.J.L. Berry- A.M. Baker 1968; B.J.L. 
Berry- D.E. Marble 1968; English-1layfield 1972; D.B. Grigg 
1967; D. Harvey 1973 (a);' R.R. Sokmal- P.P..A. Sneath 1963; 
A • Tar ski 19 6 5 • 
28. In part, the problem depends upon whether the population is 
conceived of as being made up of aggregate elements or of 
individual elements, and in part it depends upon whether locations 
or events are being referred to. Duncan et al(1961) have 
examined in detail some of the consequences of specifying 
populations in different ways. To the statistician the population 
merely consists of abstract units. But to the palaeodemographer 
or geographer the population comprises a class of "objects", 
events or numbers that are of direct interest. For example, it 
is not possible to give an account of the South African population 
on tr,e scale of locational/regional "frequency" without taking 
into consideration and evaluating the internal characteristics 
of.the formation of that "pattern". 
29. From a systemic point of view, one excavated site represents a 
single excavation of one settlement ''type", and does not reflect 
the whole settlement system. To reconstruct a settlement system, 
it is necessary to work within a regional "universe". The 
problem is to identify the region and its exploitative maintenance 
activities which are differentially distributed within the 
geographic area, encompassed by a culture; therefore no site can 
be expected to reflect more than a fraction of these activities. 
If the aim is to describe prehistoric population patterns the 
frame of reference must be regional and not be confined within 
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the boundaries of a single site. 
30. By palaeogeography we refer to that area of investigation 
concerned witt the linkages between the population in a region 
and its settlement patterns and between regional population 
structures and systems of settlement. 
31. M. Santos 1977; D. Slater 1977. 
Vle emphasized in that study the "concreteness" of the region 
as far as it concerns the transformation or events within them. 
A formalistic approach would (in contrast to a dialectical one) 
be the study of regional forms separated from the society which 
animated them; society creates infrastructures and activities 
whose locations do not necessarily follow the laws of a formalistic 
"space" analysis. 
32. We have already indicated that Marxism is often accused of economic 
determinism - economic factors determining everything. Marx, 
however uses economy in the classical Greek sense (~conomy); 
that is, the social relations to nature, rather than economic 
in its modern sense, and even then he does not argue that every-
thing is so determined. (Marx: Grundrisse, Capital, Marx-Engels: 
Pre-capitalist socio-economic formations, Engels: Anti-Dtihring. 
3 3. Under capi tali sm1 for example, market processes operating in the >-c, 
sphere of exchange and class relations-usually between capital ~ 
and labour - prevailing in the work place "congeal" in such a 
way as to make the "law of value" the dominant regulator of the 
production of space and the relation to nature. 
> , . 
34. Preface to .l·. ~~ontri but ion to the Critique of Political Economy. ..lc-
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CHAPTER 4 
Demography and Economy 
4.1 Economic Formations: What is the Question? 
Probably the major question of historical demography is the 
nature of population changes concurrent with economic expansion 
and growth. Usually this question centers on the timing of 
agricultural and/or the industrial revolution in a region. Although 
there are other questions addressed, the nature of demographic 
transition, pervades the majority of research, with a stereotype 
insistence on the three notions whicc constitute its stages of 
1 developmentJ that is, a) high fertility and high mortality 
b) low mortality and high fertility and c) a return to equilibrium 
as a result of low fertility and low mortality. We have already 
discussed, that while many of the features of demographic transition 
have occurred historically, the s~ages are not always present or in 
the same sequence' different areas experienced different transitions 
and neither .. developed" "developing" or "underdeveloped" societies 
exemplify the model consistently. Moreover the model remains 
"confined" to an epistemological conception which usee only the 
"external" characteristics of a population as a whole. That is the 
most general and "static" aspects, -which means that it is difficult 
to use it for a more specific or diachronic analysisJ the model 
remains unrealistic and the population configuration an abstraction 
so far as it does not relate to a definite "stage" of developments 
production by social individuals. 
Attempts to reformulate the traditional view by posing questions 
on the directionality of influence between population and resources 
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or population growth and whether population expansion causes or 
results from economic change 2 remain one-dimensional and simply 
registering empirically the findings in the past, without equating 
historical inquiry with what was in the past, in relation to the 
condition of the present, and to what should be in the future. 
Anthropologically, such projected futures arft <>"'Clearly difficult to > 
define. They should be debated, compared and contrasted. But this 
does not change the determining point: relations between experience 
and reality are dialectical and are continuous. 
The immediacy of these relations becomes crucial at the level 
of identification of productive activities and economic integration. 
To operationalize these categories, a frequent strategy is to select 
one or a few resources which are critical in a given situation and 
to study their effects on a population; that is. a homeostatic 
approach, considering the presence of necessary resources and the 
nature of the distribution of these resources within a given range 
of habitat as "the regulating mechanism" of the population unit(s) 
to persist successfully. While many categories have been suggested. 
these are usually operating within the limits and possibilities set 
by the nature and location of such resources, 3 that is, generally 
concerned with their diversity, density and predictability in space 
and their frequency, duration and intensity over time. However the 
importance of natural resources is clearly affected by cultural 
variability and by differential control of and access by socio-
economic groups. :?oli tical control for examplt>. can create false '1=-
shortages or induce change where no apparent shortage exists. Trade 
on the other hand opens up the possibility of breaking through any 
constraints imposed by natural resource deficiencies ani links growth 
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to population, technology and/or capital accumulation; such a 
relationship is not dependent upon the occurrence or non-occurrence 
of these resources, but on the level of conditions of production 
and therefore of the reproduction of social relations as well. 
In this sense, the ecosystem does not contain the economy any more 
than the economy contains the ecosystem. "Economy is a culturally 
mediate1 field of a human population's activity in which its members 
interact with their physical and social environment in the 
calculated attempt to acquire, directly or indirectly, a living.•· 4 
"Directly or in-:lirectly", implies a contrast between subsistence/ 
acqui si ti ve ac ti vi ty involving production for consumption within a 
single unit (with an absence or minimum interunit exchange) and 
subsistence/ acqui si ti ve activity involving production both for 
consumption and for exchange within separate units (with regularined 
interunit exchange). Such a distinction is applicable to the study 
of economic activity at any level of socio-cultural integration, 
but it is especially relevant to the study of pre-industrial and/or 
"primitive'' societies. The phrase "acquire •• a living" implies 
thet the individual, as a member of a unit, comes into possession 
of m2 terial "wealth" to satisfy subsistence/acquisitive needs through 
mis own productive activities within the prerequisites of his 
society's needs. "Calculated attempt" means t!'lat economic activity 
entails either a rational comparison of alternative courses of 
action or a rational readjustment of given means to obtain certain 
minimal ends, and is purposeful - its intended purposes being 
appropriation, transformation, exch8nge and utilization to attain 
the immediate goals of subsistence or acquisition. Ration.2l· ·does , . 
not imply that individuals are mAking decisions in accordance with 
any universally operative maximization principle, but simply that 
they are pursuing ends coherent among themselves and are employing 
means appropriate to the ends pursued. (Fig. l) (Godelier 1972). 
Production for exchange, or t~e production of exchange values. 
is thus specific to certain modes of production. While the 
production of use values is common to all forms of human society. 
'production for exchange values is specific to· production under 
capitalism. (Fig. 2) l!arx,as we have seen;,:?(.Chapter l),)argued that 
each mode of production has its own laws of population; he did not 
mean (necessarily) rate of growth but population density and dis-
tribution generating dynamics of development that are influenced by 
factors internal and~external to the sociocultural system. In fact, 
at the heart of the matter there is a whole complex of important 
theoretical issues. 1.'.'hat emerge,' are t~e questions and the diverse ')1 
answers to the problems concerning the distinctive nature of economic 
formations in primitive societies, their differentiation from 
capitalist formations, t~e question of tbe very idea of "economy" 
in general, and t:he separation of the ''economic" from the "non-
economic'' in social life. This generalization reflects the content 
of Lenin's position: 5 in order to understand what is taking 
place it is necessary to know what questions are settled by the 
changes in strength. The question as to whether these changes are 
"purely" economic or non-economic (e.g. military) is a secondary one. 
which cannot in the least affect fundamental views on the latest 
epoch of capitalism". In essence, this statement helps us to 
qualify the problem; because the same concepts and theories used 
to analyse present capitalism are used to analyse any other economic 
formstion or social relation, societies at different stages of evolution 
Social 
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FIG. 4.1. A rough model of ''decision" 
(after R.T. Chorley, K. Roffie) 
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?IG. 4.2. The processes of exchange under simple commoclity production 
(SCP) ani capitalism (C) (after J. ~arrison 1978). 
Under the formes (SPC) artisans go to market with commo,:lities 
(c) they have produced. They sell these for money (~) which 
they then spend on other commodities (c). They begin ani end 
the process with commodities. The total prices of both sets 
of commorlities are the same but the goods are qualitatively 
different. The purpose of exchange is the acquisition of 
different use values. For workers unier capitalism, the 
process, though similar, does not begin with products they 
have maie because these always belong to the capitalist for 
~hom they work. ~orkers do not own means of production and 
so cannot work on their own account. Nevertheless. they do 
own a commoiity. They sell tteir labour po~er ani spend the 
wage on means of subsistence. •rne exchange values of tr.eir 
labour po~cr ani of the means of subsistence ere the same. 
Again, money is onl,y 11 meRns to an end. The point then is, 
under simple commoiity proiuction, the acquisition of different 
use values. ~he process is altogether different for t~e 
capitalist. It begins ani ends with money. There is no 
/continued ... 
> 
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FIG. 4.2 (continued) 
qualitative change only a quantitative one. He finishes 
with more money than he began (m• instead of m). The purpose 
is not the acquisition of different use values, but an 
increase i~ the amount of exchange value under his control. 
}.'eans an1 ends are reversed to him. 
The expl"anation of how the capitalist finishes up with more exchange 
value than he began with, lies in the fact that the exchanges 
he makes are separated ( ••• ) by the process of production (p). 
He spends his initial money capital on means and objects of 
labour (m+o) and labour power (lp). He then sets the labour 
power to work and, using his posit i~n of aut~ori ty and 
control i~ the labour process. forces workers to perform 
surplus labour. The commodities they produce embody more 
value than those he bought and therefore sell for ~ore money. 
The capitalist makes a profit. This profit hae not been mede 
in exchange - where everything has been bought and sold at 
value - but in production; where exploitation has taken place. 
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are treated as being basically 11entical; under such an apprehension 
of society. all notions ani concepts are universal. Any kind of 
assets (toolf!. land etc •• )., are "capital''; any transfer of goods is 
"exchange" if not trade, any ol:l-men benefiting from collective "!ork 
is converted into an entrepreneur an-i calculator of marginal returns 
and any kind of returns are interests whose rates are someti~es 
computed as being 100%; 6 labour-value becomes en operative concept 
only when labour is a commodity; in a non-market economy labour-
power and accordingly production and reproduction, although the 
potential basis of value, finds no way of actualization, and that 
is because under capitalism the existence of value reflects the 
impossibility of consciously adjusting production to demand under a 
regime of private property and competition. (Fig. 3) For Varxism, 
this principle. represents and determines the value of production 
for the furthering of hu~an existence generally, that is, real value 
from the standpoint of social repro1uct~on; no particular object 
can have any real value in itself, ar.d no relationship between an 
individual commodity (or array of commorii ties) and an individual 
"conaumer" coul1 be a means for determining intrinsic value. In 
considering "values" it must always be supposed that labour power 
is distributed in an optimal manner corresponding to tte technical 
standards of tre time. V.'e must note that thie labour power does not 
simply exist. Variations in labour power are determined by con-
sumption - in the broadest sense of tr.e term. An increase in tte 
conceptual (cognitive) power of individuals which is the basis for 
increases·in their pro1uctive potential, requires increases in the 
ebsolute level of cor.fiua.ption and tre amount of ''leieure··. Such 
FIG. 4.3. 
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A simplified dia~ram of the process of capitalist reproiuction. 
Let us assume a system in simple reproduction in ~hich all 
production takes one year, at the end of ~hich capitslist 
and workers meet in the market-place to buy and sell. 
Capitalists enter the market with commodities c• and ~ith 
Money M'. ~orkers, having consumed their wages during the 
previous period of pro-duction, enter the market with only 
their labour-power LP which t~ey hope to sell afresh so as 
to be able to con~ume once again. On the basis of their 
investment plans for the coming year, capitalist invest 
money-capital~ to purchase the elements for next year's 
production. Of this money, ~c represents constant-money-
capital advancei for means of production ~OP; it therefore 
buys back- a portion of the overall commodity proiuct c•. 
The remaining portion of capitalist investment expenditures 
consists of variable-capital NV, which is use1 to purchase 
labour-power LP for next year's production. The workers in 
turn spend this money on their means of subsistence A!OS 9 
thus buying back a second portion of the available coa:moiity-
product c•. Finally capitalists muet also buy a certain 
amount of goois for their own personal consumption. They 
therefore expend a~ amount of money-revenue m to buy back 
t~e remaining portion c of the total prn~uct C'. Fig •••• 
sumrJarizes money flows ).n t~e overall proc:ePs. It is evident 
fY'Oift t}:e abovr~ ·t.r.(1'i.: ·(.}.~ Ci}"J_;·,, .. ·. f CO~Ji-~al n: ... c, enCOllllJtiSSet.1 
.tr.f:!:·~urcl:ase of t~:e ·vast bulk of the porial-commo~ity 
/continue; 
•• 0 
FIG. 4·3 (continued) 
product C': directly through the exchange Mc-~OP ann 
indirectly, through the exchange U, LP-MOS. 
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It follows that any transfer of value arising from price-
value deviations of meanH of production Y.OP an~ workers' 
means of subsistence wns remain internal to the circuit 
of capital: what one capitalist loses as capitalist-seller 
of MOP and ~OS, another gains as capitalist-investor in VOP 
and LP. The remaining circulation to consider is that 
encompassed by the capitalist's own circuit of revenue m-c. 
Here too, what the sellers of commodity-capital lose in 
value through a price below direct price is gainen by the 
capitalist in the form of a lower price for their articles 
of consumption. 
(after A. Shaikh 1980) 
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production, in the sense of the total available productive labour-
time of all labour power. The process of social pro1uction implies 
the making of instruments-~f labour and t~eir use to make articles 
of consumption. That is why social production comprises two 
interrelated· spheres: the means of production an-i the means of 
consumption. Now at various stages of social development the 
differentiation between these two spheres of· production may be more 
or less pronounced, but they can always be brought out in social 
production depeniing on the time spent in the process of labour, on 
the natural form of the product, and of the specificities of its 
elements. The point of concern is to understand how social reproduction 
develops. As technological advances occur, production of the means 
of consumption can be increased only through an improvement in the 
-
techniques of production.? To ensure continuity, there must be 
constant reproduction of the means of labour. When ~arx in Capital 
repeatedly notes that the value of "things'' (or commodities), the 
value embodied in them, is determined by the quantity of necessary 
labour power socially required for their production. he is assuming 
that the value of labour power has been·measured. not upon a simple 
increase in population, •nhich anyway is not the measure of successful 
social reproduction. but .to a set of "nonlinear" determinate 
magnitudes of the entirety of labour power. In general these 
"countervailing" considerations.- represent a general necessity; 
increased material consumption and greater cognitive powers represent 
freedom. Labour power or, more generally, social-reproductiv~ power, 
represents for Uarx- and for all Varx's economics- the notion of 
-~·--~·-e· j ... ~~·:r:· 
f) 
c ...... ~ .. ·:~·2 I 
As to whether this mesne an absolute increase in the number of simple 
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iniivi1uals, two points must be further elucinated: the notion of 
the magnitudine of the human population is primarily a qualitative 
consideration, that is, the primary consirleration for any society 
is the tendency ratio, which expresses the social-reproductive powers_ 
of individuals and of their entire society for that specific mode of 
human existence. The second consideration is the quantity of 
individuals of that power, which corresponds to the power of th~ 
society as a whole. That which is common among social organisms which 
relate to e socioeconomic formation is understandably not exhausted by 
their socioeconomic structure. But what unifies all these social 
organisms, is finally the presence in the basis of the same system 
of relations of production. With respect to that, productive forces 
are all and any of the means of production (and reproduction) of real 
life. It may be seen as a particular ki~d of production (hunter-
gathere!', agricultural or industrial) but any such kind is already a 
certain mode of social co-operation and the application and develoP-
ment of a certain body of social ~nowledge. The relationship· between 
the productive forces and the relations of production expresses the 
process of development of all social formations. The relattons of 
. 
production depend on the productive forc~s ani are dete~mined by them, 
while for their own part exerting an influence on tte developme~t of 
the latter. This influence pertains at two interdependent levels: 
where they correspond to the productive forces, they promote thei= 
development, and where they run in contradiction with these f6rces, 
they become "antithetical" to- their development. That is why it is 
necessary for the relations of production to correspond to the nature 
an1 the level of development of the productive forces. ~ kind of 
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relations of production on the development of the productive forces 
and vice versa. However, in thie interaction of the two sides of 
production, each "relates" in a different way, with the productive 
forces being the driving force in this process. This correspondence 
expresses the dialectics of interaction between the productive forces 
and the relations of production, which take place on the basis of the 
development of t~e productive forces. The complexity of these processes 
explains why the system of concepts an::l. of values has no direct 
relationship with the process of production. Yarx envisages moments 
when the social system will accord with the technological system, 
but at other times it will enter into contradiction with it, leading 
to revolutionary changes. 9 
The concept of contradictions of a system was rarely used in 
anthropological literature. It has however been brought into 
prominence in the debate over modes of production. In tte main there 
have been two ways in which the concept has been used, one which is 
concerned with the internal workings of a system and the other which 
rejects tte idea of a bounded system and emphasises the importance of 
external factors. The work of Baliber for example ~relates to the 
former usage. Ee takes the Althusserian construct of mode of 
production with its economic, political and ideological instances, 
and its structure in dominance, with determination in the last instance 
by the economic, as the structure which has to be reprod~ced (Balibar 
1970). While this formulation allows for empirical variation in how 
each level is reproduced, the potential for change is not contained 
within an account of the structure of the mode of production. Thus 
it can lead to the position that all mo1es exist to reproduce them-
selves. Belibar escapes ttis difficulty by i::l.entifying a source of 
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contradiction which could ultimately lead to the non-reproduction of 
the mode of production and thus to its t!'ansformation. In his 
account, this contradiction is contained entirely within the economic 
instance - in the differential development of the forces an1 relations 
of production rather than in the structures of the mode of production 
as a whole, and thus, he determines contradiction at a different 
conceptual level to that of repro1uctton. The actual field in which 
the resolution of contradiction leadsto changes in the mode of 
production is that of social formation. While this concept is again 
st a different level of abstraction, it still refers to a kind of unity. 
The obvious source of difficulty thus, in attempting to under-
stand the contradictory movements 6f pre-capitalist socioeconomic 
formations, lies in the fact that the typical anthropologist/ 
archaeologist knows no standpoint of analysis other than contemporary 
economic theory, that is capitalist economy and capitalist ideological 
views. He refuses to admit the notion that the same material basis 
might also be developed differently as the material basis for another 
composition, a noncapitalist society. The notion of value remains a 
merely speculative construct, unless the determination of such a 
valuation has the content of an actual practice a practical form of 
realization. If a capitalist society is seen as a closed system-
an eternal arrangement of human affairs - the valuation attributed 
to objects (for example commoiities) by the capitalist superstructure, 
the capitalist market, must appear as the only realization of value. 
Thus, capitalist economy is imposed as a "logical" system. equal to, 
~ . l 10 if not altogether superior to, any laws or un1versa nature. The 
"superiority" of capitalism to previous forms of society - in terms 
of an evolutionary overview - is that tbe dialectical notion of 
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capitalist accumulation reflects the noetic principle in a certain 
way: the notion of the absolute increase of wealth by expan1ed 
forms of higher social proriuc ti vi ties, anri also tr.e s~lf -reflexive 
notion of wealt!1. as the- substance that- has tbe qua-!__ity of such 
positive self-reproduction. This is not something new. There is a 
long process of gestation from the twelfth through the seventeenth 
centuries of European mercantile capitalism, and until the emergence 
of bourgeois political economy in the last third of the nineteenth 
century, by which capitalism was determined to have such qualities. 11 
Taking into account the above qualifications, there is a fu~ther 
comment to make: the most general contradiction of capitalism is 
that it is inherently incapable of "perfection" by virtue of its non-
dialectical (that is alienated) form. The notion of indivi1ual 
~ capital in itself - the ideologieal basis for capitalist ideas of 
f~. ~i accumulation in general - is an empty construct which does not know 
,:~ 
J universality, is unable to distinguish between absolute and relative 
surplus value, or exch.snge and use value, and therefore cannot 
systematically distinguish between productive and non-productive 
activities for the particular case of capital investment. This is 
characterized by the fact that tl:e indivi_dual capitalists may each be 
pursuing what appears to each as the optimal course for increasing 
thEdr _absolute wealth, while in the aggregate they are reducing the 
absolute wealth of society as a whole, or generally destroying the 
material basis for maintaining present rates of capitalist production 
and accumulation. Capitalism, because of its particularist-interest 
nature, has no organic capacity to "learn'' new behaviours (or to 
"comprehend'' old onee) that mieht correct such errors (Uat~.us, .1975). 
-!__,~-
.......... ~ ..... :.! 
'H!:i.r.; /eaLu..:''" pj:uvides t'hs p1emi~e fo1· tr.e socr;rd tnajor ~~on'tt'adic~oiu·,i: 
il 
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when a general rise in productivity has 1evaluated existing capitals, 
the capitalist necessarily passes on this actual or implicit 
devaluation as a charge ag~inst both absolute and relative surplus 
value, either causing an apparent tendency for the general rate of 
profit to decline, or avoiding this by recourse to an inflationary 
expansion of the monetary system. Either course of responsive 
actions leads to the same ultimate crisis-result, a breaking of the 
development of the productive forces, ann a consequent slowing of the 
rate of expansion of absolute wealth-production (in current terms), 
while the rate of capitalist accumulation moves ahead towards the 
inevitably ensuing liquidity crisis an1 general depression. On both 
account~ the system is.incapable of expanding the mass of capital in 
ways amenable to the productive reproduction of the actual working 
population as a whole. The most devastating irony of this is the 
fact that the dynamic disfunctions_of the process outlined are 
determined by the effects of that very rising productivity of labour 
on which increases in capitalist absolute accumulation depends. The 
special result of this general contradiction is a third one. It is 
possible for capitalism to maintain the rate of profit and even to 
' increase the short-term rate of relative accumulation of wealth by 
primitive accumulation - by means of the one-time measure of looting 
nature, existing populations, and even other capi tali at sectors, thus 
depleting the future basis for even continuing such accumulation of 
new relative wealth. 
l!!e will see in the subsequent chapters<.; how this "paradigmatic" 
procedure is taken as one of the main criteria for the apelysis of 
other economic formations and employed to determine primitive socio-
"'"' c1r , .. ·~ tt· e 'D., l 0 fll"• 't·i ·;.l • .; r: ') 
- .. '·· ,., ._ .... ~ . (,.-. ~ ...... . .... . , 
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where the productivity of labour is measured in terms of its 
"profitability" and. related to ''investment" ani "market decision" 
(even in a "vulgar primitive" sense). Thus, political economy and 
accor1ingly economic enthropology, while an existent subject~becomei 
permeated wit~ metaphysics. Since the mind of alienated man refuses 
to recognize tte distinguishillg features of political economy, features 
'!!7'hich are precisely :iialectical in form, it must impute the notion of 
political economy to every imaginable society, from Robinson r.rusoe 
to civilizations millions of years hence. Its motive to see all 
human existenc~ as a vin1ication of the true religion of its present 
ideology and its way of interpreting the world, provides it with no 
contrary indications since th.at interpretation - reductionism, 
empiricism and related outlooks - is entirely consistent with its 
. . 13 
convictions. Unable either to identify the actual (dialectical) 
content of political economy or to recognize it as something which 
came into being, reductionism sees in it only an abstract metaphysical 
essence which can be readily imparted to any object at any time or 
place, provided that bourgeois ideology rests upon it. Thus, in 
general, political economy is the fals~ consciousness of its subject 
matter, an ideological disguise for the actual practice of political 
economy an:i relate:i subjects. r:apitalis:n' s human actievement in this 
sense is epitomized not only by the merciless 1estruction of ''the 
·idiocy of rural life" (K. Tj'i be 1978) or the distinctive inhumanity 
of feudal ani early capitalist eocieties but by the :iea~ end ·of the 
14 
ancient commune as well. 
In order _for the simplest form o: human eoc iety to .·ex4,-s~t in 
material con1ttions of life eni means of production necessary for 
continued existence, b~t must also produce a social eurplus. This 
~a a 
t: .·. 
social surplus provides tl:e means for continuation of society within 
a specific moje. an~ in most in~tances imme~iately creates those 
social formations ani inetitutions ~hich play a iecisive role in 
bringing that ~orm of society to an enct. The determination o~ the 
objectified·contradictions to which we referred earlier, ioes not 
lea1 to being out of an abstrP.ction; it usually -ievelops as a 
materialized form througt a realization of social surplus. This 
division between the labour required for simple reproduction and the 
labour corresponding to social surplus is the simplest end most funda-
mental division of social labour in every society. Provided that we 
recognize that the (socio.- economic) cateB'ories :iefine1 are thus 
deter~ine1 in aBah c~sa, ""t not na~essarily empirically identical 
with tl:eir determinate values in other instances, it is pos~ible to 
heve a generally correct notion of them ~or capitalist soc~ety and, 
implicitly, an insight into the means of adducing simila-r kinds of 
determination for different·societies- not simply parallel 
determinations. but determine tions a1 iuce<i from "empirical'' evidence 
by the .same general meth&d. Accordingly. abstraction contains an 
-empirical content. This content cannot be presume:l to eY.ist indepen-
ner.tly of t11e tteory even ii' tr.e -:-elationships upo!'l ·•·hicr·: it i!: based 
cen be presumed to exist eni appear inie?en~ent of the indiviiual. 
The simplest fact iE open to vsrying i~terpretations e6cording to the 
theory w~ich is interpretei and incorporated. T~e empirical content 
of a theory, tten cannot be conEiiere~.~either to be a neutral starting 
point o.r· to be tr.e closing mowel'lt cf verification} or bot1:. It too 
will h~v~ a relatio~ship to tte abstraction ~ittin the theory 3nd 
although it c~n be :-lrF..•1.rn fr')nJ 1i!'ferer.t sourcee, it cen ~:f.ve its 
1 :, 
~ave to be con~i1erei et different lev~ls. ~ It coul1 ~e Rreuei th~t 
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contemporary ~epitalism ie still best un~erstnoi if tte m~rket 
ruechanism '"Orked to create ru2.1 employment equilibrium a~ suggested 
by the theory of competitive ~quilibrium; ~het~er ttis is correct 
or not, tte point is ttat contewporary capitAlism is explained as if 
16 it coul:l be i·ier.ti!'iej wit!: an earlier stage of development. That 
this is possible follows from the existence of different societies, 
of relations which appear to be tte same. This involves tte use of 
general concepts that are applicable to all societies such es labour, 
production, technology or consumption, but the question is 1:6w this 
is to be 1one. An answer is suggested by raising two solutions at two 
polar extremes. The first is to employ general concepts only. Then 
tr.e result will be to create an a!'laly!"is characterizing every spciety 
and. because it has no specificity, it ~ill explain none. It ~ouli be 
as if natural laws could e:>plain sociel la,..·s. At tbe other extreme, 
the e~pirical material inc0rporeted could be so ~etailei that tte 
analysis woul1 be specific to a fleeting moment of time alone. Thus 
it is necessary to demonstrate that the theory reproduces in thought 
relationships ~hich conform to tho perio1 of history to ~tict they ere 
. 
applie1. J,~oney i.s mor.e.r, :·;ut is money un-.'l.er feu:ialisrn i:lentical to 
money under cepitalism? Ttis is not the same thing as saying ttat the 
concepts have no relation to reality. The model of perfect competition 
is clearly inspire1 by the wish to examine the properties of an economy 
witt many pro1ucers an~ 6onsumers and the mor~ or less free flow of 
reEOources between sector~ by tte mecbenisms of exchange. t'odel here 
i£ the operative worrl, ~ince it takes a system of thouJ~t an·i ~n:poses 
it upon tte relations to be ~tu~ied. wittout justifyin; the 
1-; 
to those beinc ~::1:a:nined. ' ~t ir. i!': tl-.is ···r.~:. this ~·,...~·rr:~::. econ0mic 
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theory was iffiposei as a a:etho1 for analysis of priffiitive economics 
end it is for t~is reason ttnt it is impossible to see one's way to 
tte formulation or attea:ptei solution nf these problems, without 
taking into accour.t :t!:et "cor.tempo:-ery economic tr.eorJ·" •!:hose applies-
bility to primitive societi~s is in dispute. 
T!:e domi~P.nt tre~.i is of courRe cer.terei arourd ~·erginalisrn. 
rethoiolo5ically. the ffiejor c!:eracteristic of marginalism Ar.1 of t:r.e 
schools of thought ttet comprise much of moiern eccnnmirs besiies is 
its attempt to free itself from t!:e necessity of ar. abstraction that 
assigns a different status to differer.t concepts ~ithin the t:r.eory. 
Central to this erdeavour is tl:e di-vif'ion of the eccnomy from the rest 
of t!:e society so tr.!'lt economy can be sturlied in isCilation froa: social 
relations in general, just as economics becomes a separate discipline 
from otter social sciences- ~;istory 8~1. prilosophy. ''.1iat modern 
economics has done is to avoid tte question of the relationship bet~een 
economy ar.d society. 
:'.'hat marginalist tr.eorJ' !'las do!'!e is to introduce ir.to economic 
t!".eory a basic, funiame!'!tal catesory: tr.at of t::e scarcity of means, 
. . ""' . 1 t'+' ( . 1 'l't .:1 ... using the not1on o. merg1na quan 1.1es ,marglna ut1 1 y, prO=tuc.s, 
. 
income ete.,) ?.i~to~ically t!:e ~ta~ting·point o~ rnsr[in&lism ~as tte 
contention t~~t soois (objects, services) are never sufficient for tt..e 
full satisfaction of-human neeis. In tt.eir vie"' ttis scarcity 
necessitates the existence of economic theory. 3oois that are 
available in ur.lirnite1 quantity are nnt subject to economic ccn-
f:ideratior.s. 0nls ~vlen wear.s are insufficient, does the ·need ali.ise for 
tteir ec0nom;y, ani hence for e~onornics, ,..Ucr. c0n£1~ts nf tr.e allocation 
of ~carce me&ns a~onc alternative h~~&n neeis. :t is unierstnni that 
::uc}. :J! .. .l .. P.CJ:.tj_~n cc.:n i:n~"e ruo~t r1i·~!:~t~·~e fo~ ... U!S. c:: i: ~.e :.~~· t!·1 2 very 
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essence of xan to strive to attain tte greatest satisfaction of tis 
needs, co~patible with given circumstance~. Fence he is fa~e1 ~ith 
t're task of calc~lating just which particular allocation mill cain 
him "maximize tion ,. • t~ovin;:. from-con !:umpt inn to prc"i uc t ion. me !"8'inRl ism 
speaks of the scarcity of t~e reso~rces. Th~ main problem acRin, is 
the question of tr.e allocation of scarce resour~es amongst alternative 
18 
ends. As men alwa~s strives to use all the resources available to 
him witt the greatest effectiveness, so as to attain maximal returns 
in given circumstances, careful calculation is essential. Given thct 
picture, man appears as a being wto oy his very nature rationally 
calculates "maximization". And .the economic theory which thus 
conveys the essence of ma~ ~is the theory of rational choice, and 
of tte particular allocation of means amongst alternative ends. 
1'hu s Samuel son wrote: 19 "><'conornic s is the stu1y of ho•!'l ::1en 
and society choose, with or without the use of money, to employ 
scarce productive resources to pro1uce various comrnoiities over time 
and. ·1istribute them for consumption. r.o'l!.• and in the future. among 
various _;-eoJ:le ar:i group.s in society.·· (Fig. 4) Tl:is is "obvious" 
for the marginalist aspect of reality reflects a relation of man to 
nature, but ~nder a distinctive form of production. capitalisx. the 
principles of ~~ict are universal an1 can explain any economic 
.e~,·stem. In ttis manner, facts ,,_.::!ic'r. contra positi·dsm can only be 
interpreted within a theoretical-historical framework, enter merely 
f::)r the purposes of a "verification" and lose even their empirical 
content,or at least they create a iistorted connectio~ between facts 
a~d explan~tion. Thi~ i~ certainly true for the principle of 
"sce::-city•·, ex~ressing not the relation o~· man to nsture but a 
ever-present divergence between hu~an needs and their satisfaction 
may seem, it is r.ard to un.ierstan;l how given limited means "unlimited" 
needs emere-ed ar.i moreover wr.a t kin:l of general rieployment of limited 
means is incorporated. asj after all, me~erial goods are basically 
''inherently'' specific: they can only be used to satisfy well-
defined neens (food can only satisfy hunger, clothing to wear, and so 
20 
on). 
Everything seems to be explained if we enter into the sphere 
of the capitalist market, which supplies a vast quantity of diverse 
products and thereby also forms a vast quantity of diverse needs. 
Capitalist society ~s a mode of production in which the reproduction 
of the structure of society and society itself requires the 
circulation of tr.e products of labour as commonities (needs) that 
not only aie exctangeable but must be exchanged. Thus the welfare 
of individuals is brought into a social equivalence through an 
exchange that equates merginal utilities to each other. That social 
equivalence is established from the individual propensities and there 
is no reaction from it back upon them. Changes in the marginal 
propensities of any individual are exogenous and can have the effect 
of transforming every equivalence th&t has been established, even in 
perverse directions, without any other individual propensity at all, 
merely reflecting a predetermined correspondence. 
What all these these theories fail to realise is simply that 
the "factors" they ere dealing_ tt:ith are socio-economical as well as 
ecological and that any kind of palaeoeconomic approach must ~ake 
into consideration bott dimensions, viewing tre basic necessities 
of existence in terms of their ''appropriation'' as a whole. To avoid 
e.. 
;:f,F-
and resources is to reject the entire evolutionary process, its 
corresponiing transformations, qualitative and quantitative, with 
tte social historical origins of proiuction ani the ecological 
components of their reproduction. 
4.2 Fconomics an1 Demo~raphy 
If we compare tte basic forms of society there con be no doubt 
that bet•.veen economy en.i population there does exist a definite 
relationship which combines the features ani properties of all tteee 
forms with a special tendency for "assimilation'', at a specific moment 
of their development, of the diverse. multiple an~ distinct processes 
which concern the conditions of their production and reproduction -
thst is of their proper appearance, evolution ani existence. 
In ttis sense, it is clear that there can be no theory of 
f~i demography "in general" since demography (defined in t!Je double 
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aspect suggested above) has a history wtose determination is clearly 
situated outside demographic evaluations alone, although it involves 
them. To ttink the concept of demography is to think the concept of 
.the unity of its conditions: the: economic processes involvEd in the 
1ynamics of its modification. In this case the ''unity" of tte notion 
of production an.:t repror\uction is ttc;t any society must prorluce ani 
reproiuce certain elements of value in order for the society to 
continue. Although tt.e meanings of production an:l reproduction have 
areas of overlap two distinctions must be emphasised. By 
pr orl. u c t ion i s unierstood tte basic "economic" attention an·i ::~caning 
given to acts o: forminG. creating sometr.ing new,- wit1': the trans-
on nAtural m~lterinls in order tl" ma\e usc-
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tJ-.e elaboration, renewal P.n·i continuation of "entities" previously 
reproduced within each specific mo1e of proiuction, interrelated 
.,.,ith factors "external'' ·to it ani influence.; or even-totally trans-
formed by them. Jerno-graphic structures are incluie1 "!i thin all 
these elements. Social relations. kinship relations. religious ani 
other practices penetrate the dynamics of human populationJ biolo8ical 
reprod~ction, and reflect their uneveness ani fluctuations - based, 
at iifferent levels of complexity. on the relations and forces of 
production specifin and Jisti~ctive to each economic formation. 
The concern tten is which way ttese processes and elements are 
regenerated through time and under what conditions. ~hat mAkes these 
elements important is that t~e decay, loss or the increase of any of 
them is not left to chance or nature. The physical processes of 
fertility/mortality and gr~~th are culturally and economically 
elaoorated. to the degree tr.~t consBeracle amounts of energy, time 
eni attention are ex~ended ~n efforts to avert I and:or transform t~e 
effects of deterioration ani to facilitate and foster tte effects 
of ,?opulation p!':tte:r-ns as well P.S the production ()f material resources. 
~hatever t~e ctilturel ~snifestati~ns Qf t~ese productive/reproductive 
activities. mey be, tte process ia not aut~matic or tah!tual. ~ven 
in these societies where large sectors ere organizei iifferently. 
with varying degrees of el~boration to the running 1o~n ani the 
building up of eacl: kind of valt,;ed elements. the disproportion tr.at 
exists in ~erms of population interrelationships an~/or articulation 
within the wholo - therefore inequalit~ i~ these relationships - may 
cause a s~.steui to lie :;;iri.:1P.ll;;,' integreted in these processes or 
~opposed to .it: 
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throughout its effectivity. The fact th3t each of these specifio 
responses is relatively ''autonomous" does not rnA'>:e so m11ny 1omeins 
··:-=1 
::':\ independent of tl":e whole. In 11the!" wnrJs the relati-y_e "autonomy" 
and iniepende~ce is b~sej o~ a certAin type of ar!iculation in the 
whole ani therefore a certain type of integration and ~ependence 
wit!"l respect to tte uase of tte w::ole, that is,its econo~ic mode 
of existence. Of special interest here will be the interplay between 
human life cycles ani tte life trajectories of material and immaterial 
resources - concerning the processes of production/reproduction which 
take place in the face of contradictory motion of loss and-decay. 
From this perspective all human societies are necessarily in~olved 
in three interrelated productions: the pro1uction of the means of 
pro:J.uction, ti':e pro-1uction of the means of subsistence ani the 
_production of labour-po~er on a-daily ani a generational basis. 
These three pro1uctions ~ay be organized in a variety of ways. In 
each case t!"le problem is to identi~y their composition in and 
derivation from particular modes of production and into specific 
social for~ations. ~oreover. whereas a mode of pro:J.uction is defined 
as a particular set of proJuctive forces in combination ~ith and in -
latent or m.<lnifest - contradiction to, a specific "ensemble" of 
relatio:1s of pro~~.lction, the point is that this forces/relatior.s 
combination must be conceptualized for all three production~. Con-
cerning the first two productions the point may be non-contrAversial, 
but it is not for tte third. Yet, it can be expectei thet if one 
takes labour-power ae a productive force in all modes of production, 
the question of the specific relations wit~in wtict it i~ produce~ 
eni re?ro1ucei must be Riireseej •. And if one rejects all neturalistic 
socio-economic relations which re~ulate fertility - tr.e infrastructure 
of the eenerational reproiuction of labour-power. Although the 
importance of ie~ani for labour in 1etermining populRtion growth 
ani distribution is generAlly now recognize1, t~e tendency of 
ieruographers is to ignore changes in the demani for labou~ ~hen con-
:=i:iering population probler:.s. All the conventional moie1s21 
postulate a direct connection bet~een population changes an1 changes 
in factor supplies and/or final deman:is. I,:ost of these models are 
reflective of t!':.e original !.~al thu sian iieas ani emergej (As has been 
said earlier) under the i~pact of classical ani neo-classical economic 
theories. On t~e other hand, because means of subsistence an1 demand 
for labour must be distinguished srd in neo-classical thou6l:t tl:is 
distinction was not made cleai (when ani if recognized) the analysis 
of population ,:rro•Nth was con:i•;cted within the framework of a -~'natural" 
ratter than an institutional context~ i.e.! in ter~s of the ratio 
of numbers to ;>hysical resources - ,...,:-,ich lea:!> ultimately to t'he 
different ecological models a~i to most widely accepted (although 
'\- \ . . + d l 22 not wit~out controversy) cerry1ng-capec1.y mo e • 
There are two variables to the problem: first, in all societies 
consideration must be given to the overall rel3tion between the 
''schedule'' of labour-po, .. r_er' s cor.sumption in pro:bctiO!! ani its 
demograp~ic replacement (both for the stort ann lon]-run phenomena) 
through the meiiu~ of its s~all domestic groups (as well). The way 
, \ in ,.,hich this relation is rer,ulate1 lo::.- upset; gives an impo::.-tent 
insight into the 1ynamics of the society as a whole; moreover it 
offers important iegrees of free~om for furt~er explanations~ rle-
emphasizing t}e consequences of climAte. natural fertility etc., 
.. the· podtion of women in any soci.etJ is closely bouni up with t~e 
gender construct -of wife/rnotl:erhooi ani women's subordination. in 
a variety of forms. At s generR1 level this c0ncern raises the 
-issue of gender iifference in itself: why it is c~lturally elaborated 
and developei snd h0w does a particular society deal socially ~it~ 
this fact? Since this is not ~nly a social question by definition 
but correspon·i s to the different categories of material product ion 
an1 reproduction, it requires an historically specifilc explanation 
of the ways in which worue~ and men are bound in social r~lationsl:ips. 
Women ani men are empirically definei beings; similarly many of the 
explanatory terms used. in this type of discussion, (such as marriage, 
family, etc.) are empirical categories in which are contained a 
variety of different relationships. For ¥arx,. (and we quote this 
example only to bring the issue into better relief), ''individuals 
producing in society - hence socially determined, indiviiual production 
-r· .. 
\ ' - is, of course the point of departure." In Gruni.risse ":e find 
dozens of such statements, while earlier in The German Iieology 
Yarx defines that in research (althoug~ not in the presentation of 
results) it is iniividuals ~ho are the point of departure, aiding 
:·~·.,· that he means iniiviiuels 'Nho live a!"li act in so0iety. F.e says so 
~"'-::.. 
because they ere concrete reality. eni he does not hesitate to accept 
(as any empiricist would do) the concrete as the point of ieparture 
in research. ~arx. ~hen discussing the methoi of political economy. 
consi1ers population (classes etc.) as the real starting-point; he 
is not afraid of adopting such realities. he is afraid of trans-
forrJins t~.e.se concretes into abstractions if their complt:!x nature 
iE not reco1fnise'9~ 3 if t!",e methoiolo~7icc.ll_y sicni.fic3nt truth wbich 
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i 
~;;i,~~ 
~ 
,L~<-7.,_:··· 
":_"":~ .... -=r.~~-.:~ 
:~~' ~.." .... 'f'"-i 
~J~:!~~ -~~:!tv; ~~ 
310 
many determine tions, an·i hence unity o!' the :iiverse". is not recoC]nised. 
('lrundrisse) 
'.'.'hat ~:arx explains re:erring tn t:-:e category "popuhtion" is 
that it -become-s an abstraction if :1e :io not take into consideration 
the fact that population (ani not the concept of population as 
24 
structuralists state ) consists of ''real components", human beings 
with all their abilities, attitudes, classes, labour etc.. In the 
rarxist theory what is ter~el the base ~includes tte forces and 
relations of pro1uction, ani human beines are not just the active 
force o~ proiuction relations, but also an element of the forces o~ 
production, which includes raw materials, instruments of production 
anj the appropriate abilities to use them. 
Now co~si:iering a thiri variable related to the first two 
discussed above, tl:at is populetion size ani growth, we l:ave to pose 
tl:e question: w~,at t!:en constitutes t!:e socio-economic relatio_!!s of 
labour-power's reproduction·: Pere we have to identify the question 
of the family. Jefinitions o: the family, reflecting ambiguities 
in colloquial usage. have oscillatei between reference to kinship 
(relations by blood ani marriage) an1 co-habiting kin (related persons 
living together under t!:e same ''roof"). T!:e problem, ·~:as one of 
multiple ani shiftinc referents with household ani family often being 
used interchangeably. As a result of a certain critique, it is now 
common to upholj a household-fami1~ distinction, which settles one 
part of the p!"oblelL b'.lt ~.leaves e.nother one, ttat is, family still 
covers both tte ~in co-residence eroup and more broai kinship fili?.tion. 25 
A further distinction proposed is between household, family ~ni kinshi;, 
wtere tte intermejiete term - the family - iR esei~ned the restricted 
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various phases of the do~estic cycle. It is recognized that house-
holi, fe~ily, kin relations may organize more thar. the third 
pro~uction o~ lgbour-power:outlined above.· In many modes, they are 
integral to the proiu~tion of the means of production an~ subsistence 
as well. In many cases they organize tte primary production of 
labour-power, though they may not do so exclusively, as under 
capitalism, wl:e:re ot!-ter systems of organization play the major role. 
Snier capitel~t private ownership tr.e means of production 
assume the for;n of capital, a means of exploiting hirei labour. As 
a consequence a population's performance cranges. Given the -problems 
surrounding "natural loss·· an:i tl:e equally perverse changes caused 
by human intervention. t!le process o:' production constitutes an 
intrinsic attempt to identify tre ~ifferent reproductive factors in 
a certain socio-economic environment·. Human action a::ay t.a;.;-e place 
within a frame'•Jork <Jf social structures but these structuras are 
the~selves created by human action within and on the social world. 
In prehistoric societies the means of production were objects of 
social ownership ~n1 tl:ey served to produce items for auto~consumption; 
ttese means, cannot oe the source of surflus-value, since they do not 
produce any new value, but merely transfer their own value to the 
newl~ created product. Therefore ttey cannot be exploitative. 
In the course of proiuction the value of the means of production 
consuwe:i is transferred by concrete labour to t!'le pro1uct ma:ie, while 
abstract labour is the source or value of commoiities. T~e 1ominAnt 
relations of proiuction determine (each time) tte sociel character 
of..:liir.ing ·l"!bour <>:~l its :livision into necessary J.aunur ard surplus 
.L<:i;our. !:istorically, tl-:e ·ii·;isiO!'l of labour c.n·l res;;er.tivel;y of 
-~-·!!;,.-; 
tte ~/rc--i\~;;·i~~~-~~11~f~~1:::-t'C·--l i:ntn t'.\'0 r~:~rt..s ... necessnr~,· .:=:!:1 su:.--;]lus- becHme 
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possible wten the level of labour pro~uctivity mgde it possible to 
proiuce more material benefits than the a~ount really neerte~ for 
•'' I 
~-·· 
.. -.·:..: :n!-!intaini'1f? the existence of a populP.tion (P.ni its units). The 
quantity n~ labour com~8nie1 i~ nnt tn be ~eterminei hy the ratio 
.~.~.'.: 
n:f absolute ecolo~ical coniitions. but by the way tr.ese coniitions 
_, 
·. ~ ! 
26 Rre exploit. To ~aintain t~at ttere is one Ani un~hangeable 
amount of "pressure" that alY•a_ys enters as a component part of 
demographic identification is not to explain why we shouli believe 
thi So !f human population dynamics were to be determine-1 by an 
absolute ratio of envirnn~e~tal con1itions purely in terms of trcphic 
energetics, then it would no longe:r be properly calle:i human. 
The evidence does not support. t::e theory of a ''cCimmon" pattern 
of demographic evolution. Yet, population gro•Nth is usually analyze:i 
as e biological Fh~nomenon derivi~g rather from natu~al o1jectives 
than fro~ the characteristics of particular productive rel8tions, 
~hich demand jifferent degree of cooperation bet~een pr0ducers or 
between producers an~ orea~ic resources. It is under this principle 
of biolog-ical/ ecolot--:ical 1eri ve tion that economic ''mo hili ty'', 'coth 
on the mic::-o-mecro level has been "'blocke-1 out" from iemographic 
research eri explansti~n. lea1in? to a blin1 empiricism cnncerning 
populc.tions' stetic, dynamic an'l even structure~ n-:- 1istritutione:l 
variables. Such f. point beco~es particul~rly cleer in s0cieties 
where subsistence is obtaine1 througt direct appropriation of nature~ 
as for hunter-z,atherers. The purpose is to establish a !'lessonal rota 
witt hunters moving from one site to tte next performinB subsistence 
activities at each one. Ani tte result i~ the interr~tion of 
prir..itive cO;HmunitieF- i!'ltc Ont; SJ'sterr. o:f "tribal activitj'' wit!: a 
r"' 
- ---·-- _____ 4 ___ - ----------~~--··--------------.. -----
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The concept appears to ~ave gainei mur:h of its popul~rity over the 
l~st years as e result of ilirisell's ~tuiy of tte relatinn~hip 
.... ;.(,.: 
bet"teen rainfall ani Australh1n abnri£inal population ·iensity ani 
·-':_ .. 
-.·-·.:.• 
~-·~~i: nn earlier COaJmer.t§.ry b:>· Ba:::-tholou;e·:.: an .. l liir:l.sell •uh-ich are,"'Ue:i for 
-~=-:..~~..£~ 
tte importance of searching for limiting factors in accounting !or 
:=/G population 1ensities: it is generally agreei that under 
or1inary circumstances in prehistory it is dlfficult to use erchaeo-
losicel evidence to pre·iic't ?Opul?.tion numllers or densities among 
hu!!ting an::l gathering peoples. "'stim~·tes can be marie for the number 
of people occupying well-ex~avete~ sites unjer certain conditions, 
but it is more difficult to ~roject such iata into ~eneralize~ 
estimetes for regional populations. Therefore, if it can be s~own 
that simple equetion can be developei to space numerically stable 
~nits of ?Opulationn in bouniei societies on their lnni. it shou~d 
be possible, ::;iven pelaeoclimstogical --lata. to :ii~tribute hunters 
bott numerically, ani as densities. over prehistoric • • II .. erralns •.• 
The simplest predictive equation covering this rel&tionship is 
an exponential one in ~hict tte tribal area is equal to t~e medium 
annuel rair.fall raise1 to "! negative po•·•er ani multiplied by a 
constant. Tte question arises as to whether suet techniques f0r 
pretistoric populations censusin~ cen b~ eveluatative of their 
demographic reality. The n~arly identical arrangemerts of these 
determinations are not independent nor iP their rcl?tionstip random. 
They focus on perpetuating i1eas of a mechanistic interpretation of 
~ociety, c~anginE as a result of a siffiple corresponierce - furthermore 
empr.asizint: equilitriu::• rat~.er t~P.r. cr!?.n,:;e. nirnsell arsues: ·· •• rt 
does not st?.er,,;_ rash ur.ier tr:ol:'e c:rcu:ll~.tl'!nce~ to 'h'):ne tl.ct t}:e 
'";'..;;;'=:..;.!.;.:.;~[~~~ 
r:"e:'fic:-leni--o·:.· c•.)~·~·el.:;·~ior. ~1et···een t 1·a ;::7'E'-' "'' t:-ih>:Jl ·ln:I!Pi!'! ar:l 
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the complex of environmental factors may rise as high as 0.98. 
It stouli be anticipAtert that tte seme level of environmental 
• ·< 
1 etermin i £m p~o tJa bly o pcrA't ei among ['er.eral i zed hun-ters and gatherers 
...... 
: '; - ~. 
elsewrere on t!:e earth totl: in t+e present day an:1 in prer,istory."-. 
";r:-
,";'" -···· 
·~·:\: 'I'!>e 3bove r:~oiel, alon:;~iie tte carrying capacity, population pressure 
.. :) 
.... · .... 
~~~ ani different kinds of calorific estimates Models, apart from 
the feet that tl:ey tef'rl. to monopolize a particular humP.n popul~tions 
brancl:, preventing treir er:try into the ''facts" of an economic 
activity, by controllins relev~nt areas of practice an~ restricting 
treir inte~vention into the process of prbdu~tio~1 reproduction, 
ten:l to. preserve e rouch equality bet,.•een groups, destroyinf in- this--w~y 
the__specific. character-of their ,iistribt:tionel variation erd. exploitation 
~7 
. .::' 
strateg1es. Perhaps group movements may follow typical annual 
pa tt€rr. s and 
_, - ~ reflect seasonal shifts from one resource to another, 
out t:hey do net constitute a real cb1r.e;'e of t'he populations' size o:-
structure per se. Such e p::-ocess wouH net ordinarily be started in 
tl':e absence of some inter-reeule ting ··sectors" imposing pro'luctivi ty 
quotas for foodstuffs that will be con~ume1 an1_where ~he compensation 
Ji ven does not closely respOn·:l to the e:!:Ount proiuced. To f!Uru up, 
tte "meaning of economy mgy b~ foun1 in a system of repeated 
~r.~lo.;ief" (as for enJ:n?le the moiel 'Ve hve in Fig. 5) but w·hicl: 
conflict witt or overri1e bRsic a1~ptational directives. Tr.e 
literature concerned offers a 'Vell-documented list of peoples living 
in identical environ~e~ts ani yet practising different econ~mic or 
settle~ent strate~ies (?ig. 6),1ike for exa~ple. the ~huti pygmies, 
the Yenomamo ... 01 ~nuth AmericR or the Ti'Vi of North AustrAlia . In 
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conditions for ~is own existence. 
Using the outlines of a mo,iel of reproductio,n rather than the 
limited features inherent in models basei on norms of adaptation 
the ecological perspective remains integrated with a societal 
perspective in ~tich the restraints ani potentialities nf each 
reproductive level in the system a;ay be charte·~ an . .-1 measured against 
each other; in this way a transactional orientation becomes 
incorporated into the demographical fraa;ework so that population and 
environment are not perceived as dualities or as opposition. Life 
cycles of individuals in this bio-social dimension, in articulation 
witt the life trajectories of objects of exchange, distribution, 
consumption, in their natural an1 symbolic rates of productivity and 
dissipation establish the temporal dimension around which a 
particular socio-demographic system is structurei. ~ithin and against 
the restraints of these dimensions populations' international strategies "/ 
are developing, so that demographic phases operate within social 
relations, economic determinants and ecolo~ical boundaries in the 
context of the demands ani the possibilities for their produ~tive/ 
reproductive concern. 
4.3 Problems of ~conomic Relations in Euntin~-Gatterin~ Societies 
In depicting an economic' system trat is expaniing continuously 
over time, it is essential to recognize the need to distinguish between 
the factors responsible for the existence of production/reproduction 
in general, ani those responsible for the cyclical or differential 
movements arouni that tren1 line - even if at least one of the 
factors involvei (like kinship structure, natural co~iitions, techno-
logical level etc. ) is - or appears to remain - the same. 
FIG. 4·5· 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
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' 
A mo~el for t~e ievelopment of reeionRl centres. ~hich 
they mAy else ect as redistributional centres to 
surrounding areas (adapted from ~oiier-nrton 1975) 
r"IG. t;.6. Settle~e~t patterns associatei w th an increasing 
ocalizei reEource (iarted areas 
Source: P. ~aggett 1968) 
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A number o~ points which arise from this account neei clarification. 
First amons ttese is the concept of kinship. Both the complex of 
symbol ani the complexities :or kin~hip were use~ as • convenHmt 
scte~a of interpret~tion in orier to avoii tte real questions, b~iriging 
together unier one heaiing systems whose positions ani functions are not 
the sa~e in every socioeconomic formation; it is of course, one of the 
functions within the system of a group1 not. the predominanf one. Some of 
t~eee systems organifte ~ocial life as a whole, while others affect only 
eo~~ sectors, ani these again ~iffer -idely. Particularly for hunter-
gatherer societies in ~tich a complex kinship system exists alongside 
a sexual division of labour, or for hunter-gat'herer societies· ""'here no 
kinship system exists. but an extremely stable division of labour1does. 
Even if kinship is considere~ (as often happens) the basis of social 
organization in. so-called "tr.adi t ional •· .or "primitive" or "band,. 
societies, we hav~ to pose the problem of the way in wtich e relatively 
autonomous position is determined by the relations of production and 
reproduction quite independent of all genetic hypothese~.- To give 
kinship structure a decisive value for the understanding of. primitive 
society, kinship must be understooi as more than a simple co~bination 
of genetic relationships an~ attitu1es, it must be consi1ere1 in a 
formal as muct as in a functional aspect; at this point the unity of 
the entity "kinship" can no lonser be thought of as given an1 has to be 
·proved. ''!hat follo•ns from this in ''practice'' is the eEtablishing of 
the actual relstinnships -hie~ exist bet~een the spheres of kinship 
an:1 the economy. 
~hen kinship relations can operate as relationE of prniuction 
.t~ey do so not from outei1e pro1uction as 1eterroinantE of the for~ of 
;=;' -~),l 
,,(t• 
~'>i;-~. 
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,.t .' tJ~ of labour, the meAns of proiuction an l proriucts. ''.'e have alreariy 
~~~j seen tb~t in·iiviiuels an-i groups making up a given !~Ociety always 
:r~~~ ~~ obtain accese to the resources nf nPture ani appropriate them within 
-~~/-! 
' . 
·_') Clni tr.rough a social forn: of use of a territory. '-rhid: form le~itimizes 
'·: -:.; 
this access and this appropriation. In all societies the forms of 
"ownership" of its terri tory tRke the form 0f snciP.l relations. in 
whatever form they may happen to take. ani they function as systems 
of proiuction. as social relations of production. 
.... ..2 1 . 28 '- '- 1 b 1 ;JO•..~.e 1er argues t~:at t.,e a our process takes p ace at tr:e 
level of the bend,which is the unit of production en1 consumption. 
But this feet does not explain why it shoul1 be that the bani has no 
exclusive rights to the territory which it appropriates. On the 
contrary it is the relationship(s) between ban1s, functioning in the 
form of kinship relations,which "determine'' the formal appropriation 
of tte collectively-owned means of proiuction; these relations 
tl':erefore ·constitute the basic fr~:-ee•.•rork for proble::~!:' concerni!"!g 
,(. 
access to resources bot~ at the centre end at the periphery ere 
settled (as for exemple conflict ani alliances) since they 1etermine, 
before the immeii2te process of ~roiuction. the essenti~l pre-~oniition 
"() 
for proiuction i.e. access tn territnry:L> 
Looking at t~e Australian a~origines' use of t~eir resources 
~nd lan1 through a perio~ of ti~e. we fini that it ~as legitimate for 
any indiviiual belonei~g to one of the descent groups forming his 
tribe (half. sectio~ or sub-!.':ection) to hunt over all the territory 
oelongin:; to ~is kinsl:ip grou~. In case of need. he •yes aleo permitted 
to hunt on the bni of ._ .. .ulS allies, 
tr .. ·~ 
tribal territo:::-;,· .... ere attactei to "kinship" groups. 
r.wnership of noture took the for:.1 o!' an attribute of !-:.insl:ip 
relatior.s beca'Jse t\ese !'uncti~nej ~s r~ social fra:;,e··:ork. (or even base 
according to otters) for projuction. Thin;~ are in fact much more 
corn~lex and this cowplexity steds li~~t on the controversy concerning 
tte above notion. RaJcliffe-~rown cl3i~ei that each patriclnn had an 
exclusive ri~tt over its territory and th~t each local _ban~ was a 
patrilineal ~roup jointl~ exploitinc tte territory of its ancestors. 
But accu~ulated work since has shown tl:at local Australian bands 
were m~de up of members of several patriclans, exploiting several 
territori,es,-their_ own a!"'~ those of certain of their allies. '!ihat 
seems to have ha~?enei was thet each kinship grou~ functioned as the 
unit of abstract appropriation of territory. but did not function as 
a iirect unit of concrete appropriation. The units of direct 
production sni consu~ption ~ere t~e l~cal ~ends. consisting of a 
restricted number of families ani in1iviiuels. Several kinship groups 
came together for the purpose of exploitlr.g tl:e resources of several 
territories. Jescent relations thus :nay !:ave senre;t as a basis for 
. ' 
abetract and ju:::-idical appropriation of resources, ~hereas relations 
of ?lliance m~~ have servej as a basi~ !or concrete appropriation sn1 
!'or everyiay cooperation. ?!:t:P. both aspects of kinship relation~"!. 
served as a social frame~·;ork for ;-roiuction. Again this is a point--. 
df importance, for ~e are denling here with kinship relations whic~. 
in ell sooieties, ere relatinns regulating mnrrisae, descent. place 
of re~iience, 9n1 ie~ngraphic structure. In this respect, if there 
ie any iistinction het~een i~frastructure ani superstructure. economics 
·-~ . 
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ani kinship. 30 In these Australian societies we find kinship systems 
functio~ing both as infra-and superstructure. The majority of 
.:5{ a:1tl:ropolo[~i~ts, 1N~e!'1 f9ce:i by a cultifunctional institution, w!lether 
es in the case of -ustralian section sv~tems or of 
w ) 
PCephalous segments~y societies like the Wuer or the Tiv, infer that 
it i~ because 0f its multifunctional character that this institution 
-dominates the structure of the whole society ani the logic of its 
reproduction. For some it is kinship, for others politics or religion) 
' .... hich is the ':ieterminant instance of the ·•,orking of the "•hole of the 
society ani the cause of its inter~P-1 logic. At this level. all these 
theoretical opinions find the~selves in opposition to Varx's position 
that it is the economic infrastructure of e society mhi~h in the last 
analysis determines tte inner lo~ic of its working ani of the evolution 
of the various types of society. ~e have seen what ~arx meant by 
economic infrastructure; on this definition there is no the~reticsl 
reason for prejudging the nature of the social relations that in any 
particular society will assure the programming and control, nor for 
prejudging the nu:nber of functions a social structure· can assume. 
Once again we should note that with the development of exchange and 
the rise of market econdmy, kinship as tte m~in expression of pri~itive 
social organization., loses its "actuality"; it is transfo::-r.:ed here 
into an ideolog:,' whose "raison ::i' etre"' is not so much to express the 
growth and ~rganization of the society as to justify ani support a 
dominAtion imposei from nutsi::ie. ~e couli relate this i~eology_to 
the "ne'.v•· rules of kinship "'tich ~evelop in "the aristocrati.c lineaf.es 
an~ which are 1iffere~t because they obey politi~al rRt~er ~~en 
econo~ic conztraints. 31 Whe~ kinstip reaches ~ religi0~s iimensi~n. 
-- .. ~ ... - -~ 
: .1.-·:· i£1~-:y f'S i ri ·=.::-!"i ·Jt~:.:~ }·: f:.· ~. ::..~ s r~g .t~ !: tr: bE: Ct) n ~..: ·l ·l e:!"' e-1 ?. :.) t t e basic 
322 
for dominAtion ani exploitation. The situation is invertei: people 
instea1 of being kin ani interiepen,ients because of tl':e relations 
of production they are in, are i~teJratei into such rel~tions because 
of an allege1 · i:leol_ozical-kin relation. ?.ence the e:npbasi s on "blood" 
relationships in some cases, or on religion in others. The change 
can be relate:! to the new relations of pro:iuctinn arising from the 
transformation of the product into a merchandise. V:hile the pro:iuct, 
in the self-sustaining economy, is not an object of appropriatior. 
(it cannot be alienated but only advanced) it becomes property once 
it is traded. This reorganization of "economic space" imposed a new 
way of exploiting nature, people's labour force, their demographic 
mobility and structure (cutting off whole tribes from their traditional 
environments) and changing "by force" the local character· of forms of 
social organization and production. 
nr all aspects of Aboriginal society economic pursuits and 
the socio-economic units involved are t~e most di~ficult to leal· 
with. In part this is due to the early, shattering effects of the 
colonial experience on Aboriginal life; 32 even when tte cultures 
. .,ere not t-otally ·iisrupted, economic ani population factors deriving 
from t.:!".e impact of colonialism heve contin'!.lously brouJht ao~ut 
demoeraphic nisplacement and a marked decline in traditional mo:les 
of economic life. 
In most instances peoples with a gatherer-hunter heritage have 
not lived solely as gatherer-hunters for a long time. Around the 
world, the colonial expsn sian of ::.:U :-ope an nations he s resu 1 ted. in 
profoun:i transform3tions in gatl:erfne-hunting societies. F.uropean 
colonialism was not, l:o·~rever, tr:e only so'Jrce of such 
. 33 
trensfnrru~tion. 
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more has been one of transfor~ation from gathering-hunting to 
agricultural society. In most cases the aioption of agriculture 
~pread peacefully from areas where the exigencies of geography ani 
human society first tr.<-"lde serientism prefe-rable to mobility,3 4 an:i 
domestication based on accumulated k~owle1ge of plant and animal 
life, a viable adjunct to gathering end hunting. In some cases, 
however, foraging peoplewer~·harrassei by agricultural peoples. In 
other cases foraging people entered into long-term exchange relations 
with settled neighbours. A major problem is posed by the fact that 
the lives of recent foraging peoples ere inseparable from their 
relations witb systems of predatory expansion. In oraer to resolve 
debates concerning their past end present social forms, it is 
necessary first to locate a people being studie1 in its full historical 
ani socio-economic context, a"d second to azree on ~~at constitutes 
essential data for settling a debste1 issue, before assuming t~~t a 
particular socio-cultural pattern directly reflects t~e necessities 
and constraints of g9thering-hunting economy in a specific ecological 
setting. ~ven very early reports on a culture cannot be taken at 
face value but have to he appraised; tte very feet tr.at •uitten 
. 
records of a gathering-hunting people are available ~eens that the 
people have already beco~e involvei in so~e way with economic and/or 
political relations with a market society. Furthermore, such records 
are coloured by the prejudices of the particular people who wrote 
them, or distorted by t!:e fact that the representstives o!' different 
groups best known, to some explorer, missionary or trader were 
usually those who ha1 broken with their ~in~olk ani attache~ them-· 
selves to tt.e outsiders. 
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relation to the problem o~ :l iscrepancy between ''ideology'' and actual 
behaviour is basically e confusion between ''natives' "and· ilnthro-
~ologists' cate~ories n~i concepts. The core of the confusion is 
no-t so much the interpretation of -empirical :iata_as ~uch, or the 
iisagreement about the definition of the concepts, as a failure to 
realize ttat a concept which hai been defined in a specific way to 
cope ~itt problems derived from a certain theoretical freme~ork is 
not suitable for coping with problems formulated outsi:ie this frame-
work. In other words. the core of the confusion i~ the failure to 
realize that a concept which might have its origin in a certain 
ethnography is not elevated to the status of an analytical concept 
because of its capacity to provir:ie a kin·1 of "metalanguage" by which 
a range o~ ethnographic data can be adequately described, but because 
it enables the analyst to organize his ethnographic data in such a way 
that he can accommodate thew within his theoretical model. In 
deciding on whether the natives conceptualize their groups in terms 
of relations of descent -or kinship tte "natives'' own categories and 
the ''anthropologist's" analytical ca tee;or ies might quite simply not 
heve been clearly distinguished. The problem could tave been formulated 
in this way only because o~ the failure to realize ttet a concept of 
descent as a principle o~ recruitment into any definition o! descent 
groups has not some universal heuristic value but is defined in ttis 
way in tte interest of protecting a typology of a certain system and 
of the c:10del of a segment as a ph;ysicall:,' iistinct entity. 35 
Describing the composition of local groups in terms of his o~n 
AnP.l,ytical ca te;?ories is thou~tt to enable t~1e antr.ropolo,:cist to 
establif:J-. "'~:at tt:ese ,:rroups represer.t in tl:e ··•nrli of t~e nbjective 
·- -
-~ .. ~ 
fact -(~l_~;·j~i~·f-f~~:::;or!trr.:.d.J:~t.jne··.l~':i :~~ ·s:!:atever t~ c noti"..es· :night 
~-·. ' 
r;· ... ·~J 
' ··:; ~·· ~ 
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SUbjectiVely take them for), thus ultimAtely nistinguishine categories 
which have ontolo~ical status only within the reality which he has 
himself definei. 
If this much is concedei, it is clesr-trat y~e iispute over 
the meanings of kinship ter~s has been misconceivei from the outset. 
The real problem is not what kinship terms mean but the nature of the 
relations among the genealogical desi~nata anJ significate of certain 
words an:i between those anj any otter designata those words may have. 
Some have persiste:i in describing tl':e words in question as kinship 
terms, even thougt they maintain that these words do not designate 
kin categories. There are many reasons to suppose that this 
assumption is false, certainly about kinship terms, which may 
designate genealogically defined categories (thus the description 
of them as kinship terms) and/or other kind of categories (~ocial, 
economic, political) (see for example reeiham's early studies 
&' • t · 11 · t ¥' • 1 1 · f' · t · 3 6) Th o.~.. prescr~p ~ve a -~ence sys en;s o~ soc~a c e::;s~~~ca.~on. us 
-tat began as an argument about the ethnograp~ic facts be6affie also a 
largely unackno·.rledg-e:! ::l.ispute abou:. t:!'!e meanings of ·uords 1..:se:i oy 
ant!-.ropologists to describe such ·facts.- It is r.ot necessary atthis 
point to in~uire i~to the exact mea~ing.of t~e assertion ttat 
iesignetion of indivi~ual relationships is secondary to ~esienation 
of group relationships. Once it is ackno~le1eed that certain -ords 
~ay be used to designate genealogically defi~ed categories, -it is 
difficult to see what leeitirnete objection there can be to describing 
them as kinship terudi! ani using the:n as a f:yster.-~ of kin classification. 
_, 
out to describe t~·:em in this w'P.-y is not neceesarilJ- to imply trat 
their cenealocicel or ki~stip ~esi:n~te are their only iesi~nats 
.-. 
-, 
" > 
. ~ 
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are functional ani not mutu~11y exclusive •it~ ~egari to the forms 
··•tiel: serve to defir.e t~em. Alternatively tl--ey may refer to the 
transmission of richts ani duties from one generation to another 
-
under a s,yster:. ":r.ose structure ma~· be 'iescribable_in qu8si-gen_eA1ogieal 
terms but which is not necesserily connected to biolorical facts; 
these are relevant insofar as t~e people concernei posit such facts. 
Social units exhibit varying degrees of formal an1 informal organization 
and pertain to vario~s activities and interests. Referring to the 
transmission of rig~ts and duties,i.e. to political/jural constitutions 
and/or to soc~o-cconomic ani demosraphic structures as for example 
allocation of labour a!"i resource~, or site-settlement patterns, 
kinship categories of ~enea lo,;icel ''typoloey". leave unan s"~:Vered the 
most fundamer. tal que stinn: by u•ha t cri te!'ia are the e bove ''rights 
and duties'' distrituted, allocate·'\ o::- transmitted. 1Nherever the 
question has been given t!:e attention it deserves, it has invariably 
turned out ttat kinsl:ip ter~s ~ay refer to relstions of genealogical 
connection. or to socio-econowic relations or to bott at once. 
Tl:is requires thet we assume tb_t kinship terms are "tools" 
defined by their plece i~ the syste~ of tools;· they al~ays do much 
more than label indiviit.:als an:i nJO!:t car.· be used '?;,' e skilful speaker 
of a langua£e to refer t0 en al~ost u~liruited nt.:mber of people given 
tl:e right situation. The operational potential of kinsl:ip ter~s 
derives frow the fact tl:nt they have a "morel" meanine originating 
in the cenerel belief system of the culture iniependent of tactical 
use, ani tactical use itself cover~ much more than the ienotation of 
lr ' '1-- 1 38 
.. lns--lp ro es. The term ~OrAl is usei here in tte way Firth uses 
-· :. tr:~: r:uc•. ':' r: i £ rr, e c; r. !: __;,;;; . .::-:... ;:::~:.: 
--·~:··-
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that as ~ v~lue ju1eement kinstip ter~s may contain elements o~ great 
significance w~ich have nothing to ~o with wtat is norrually denoted 
of HS kinship ani neei tn be iefinei in a rnuct ~i1er framework. 
~~ere iE no reason to ioubt t~Rt certain rig~t ard iuty ~tatuses 
~not always clearly Epecifiei in the ethnography) are ascribed to 
certain cateeories of 1 • :t:ln, at least Rt the level of the primary 
senses of' tr.e ter~ts. ":hAt t'!o.en is the problem? The problem is the 
negative stence or' P.e thenrist to iistinguieh bet'."leen kin classes 
and non-kin but kin-like clas;es. both of ,.,hich me>y be iesignated 
by the same ter~s. or in other woris bet~een simple exte~sion within 
t~e 1omain of kin clas~ification ani metaphoric extension. As is 
known, like many before ani after him. !falinowski coneiierei that 
whe~ a kinship term can apply to both ~lose relatives and re~ote 
relatives (or even non-relatives) the meaning o~ the term primarily 
·refers tb the close relatives and is only usei for other indiviiuals 
11' t . ,. 39 o~, ex en s10n • This notion is overtly psychological end has been 
critically 1iscussei ani criticised by Fortes (1957). An interesting 
state~ent on ralinowski's theory ca~e in an article by Leach which 
uses ~alinowski' s own :11aterial to demonstrate that "kins!'Jip terms 
;;re cate?ory woris'' (Leach 1958) , ~e argues th11t in the same way 
a£ it wowli be .. ~i:!iculo\.:s to S9;!' thl'lt tl:e word table meRns ··my 
table", it if:' unju stifie'i to argue tree t the ter:n ··x" u !.'ei for ~y 
"'father an-: otr:er in·:l.iviiuals'' me<Jns prima~ily ''my father". The 
term refers equally tn all t~e people so aiiressei unless there 
/;\) 
is clear evi1ence otterreise. ' Leach ie probAbly rig~t in pointing 
0ut tLe ethn!')~e!1tric r~.aracter o:· the ?:P.lino· ... sldan theC"Irj. but in 
aJvocati~z the unit~ry mesnin~ of cate~ory he see~s t0 forget the 
----::-=_ ... ~ 
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situation. Lounsbury (1965)> ansutering Leact., notes the primary 
meaning of kinstip terms as trRt of reference to all the closer 
eer.eaolo.;ical ki~srten. but this is seen RS consisting of several 
compone!'1tS Of rr.eer.in;;,some Of ''-'hict ('a!'1 be altererl to operate 
various extensions. It seews though that he. as many others. is 
seeing the process nf extension as an Ruto~Atic process. the result 
of impersonal rulee rather than human choices. The useful point 
of his position, . is that for once the ~otion of the inevitable 
\ 
primecy o;.' -lenotation of roles is remove.i from the un1erstan1ing o:' 
kinship terws without necessarily being replacei by monocemic 
"categories'' of people. 41 42 From Radcliffe-Brown end later Steward 
the idea of patrilineal, patrilocal and exogamous band or horde 
beca:11e t!:e fra:Dework for describing the structure a rd. composition or 
local organization of tr.e Australian abor~ginal populations. In the 
1960's t:egs-itt 43 ~nd Eiatt 44 ~eculated t::at the horde (as defined. 
by Raicliffe-Brown) probably never existei in terms of the formal 
properties which he attributed to it. Furtrermore, they statei thRt 
even if we hai complete 1ata, the composition of hor~es ~as so 
variable t~~t any claims for the specific existence of a parti~ular 
kind of social organization. let alone tr.e U!'!iversP.lity 0f suet 
social ore;ani za tion. must l:le carefully con sideren. I'eggi tt and 
Hiatt beld thet communities ranging from 200 to 3n~ in~iviiuals 
mi~ht have been the besis of local organization from ~hich smell 
task groupf" a;ove1 over t}:e terrain. In response to these suggestions 
45 Stenner· establishe1 tte concepts of estate and range. ~states 
pertain to sacred localities whic}. are the ancestral ho~e of clans 
n~~ totemic unite. Such localities are secrei ~n~ i~ theory are 
. t,6 
·- -~ CL2lw ttrou~t iesce~~ - - .. --~· 
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and who are members of particulAr clars an-:l totemic unit~. T~e 
range 1s composed of the areas ~~ich members of ~ifferent totemic 
or clan groups cou11 enter an-:l cross for purpose of economic 
exploitation. Unier normal circu~stances the iniiviiuals of a 
particular estate formed a core group basei on membership in t~e 
Eame descent group. The ranee was coruposei of the specific resources 
around t~e estate which these iescent groups normally exploited. The 
border areas of ~ifferent ranges intersectei, a~i it can be 
demonstrate1 that such bouniaries were not riaid over time. Thus, 
ba~ds from different iescent groups would mutually exploit adjacent 
P.rees as long as they evoiied sacre:i ani ancestral sites. Inter-
spersed between ra~ges ani estates were areas which different local 
groups exploited ~ithout reference to iiffere~tial rights. Thus. 
t~e ideological basis o! land ani spatial mobility meant t~at the 
very source of existence. be it spiritual or emotional. ~as nearly 
always e:xpreRf.'eri through ties to t~e soil. It is quite possible 
ttat variance in structure and composition of local groups was 
fundamental due to regional ~ni microenvironmental iifferences. 
Since household structure ani composition ani rules of residence are 
known to be the most aJaptive ~spects o! social organization as it 
relates to economic imperatives, the stability or instability of 
group structure must be seen to derive from economic forces expressed 
t~rough totemic and religious philosophies a~1 manifestei in myths, 
ri tuale etc •• 
It coul-i therefore be art;uei tht kinship distinctions as suet. 
tave no relevance in aboriginal cultu~e ari only iiviie the 
continuity nf culturel forms into arbitrAry ~nt mcanin~less categories 
r 0 '0 h 0 ~0 to t f 47 o~ meanlr{! 'Nl1lC, 1~ 11~ 1nc rom use. In this respect it only 
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requires pointine out that by :Hstinguishing between meaning and use 
we· leave the probl_em out of any co~text. No use of a term need 
be more or les~ proble~atical since, Given tr.e concept, the use is 
see~always ass particular Atte~pt to use a tool for tr~nsforming 
t1 social l'lituation or ''manipulating" a ne''' socit'll situetion by usin~ 
a term wr.ich r.es been ~iven meanine in a previous context. 48 In 
this perspective. kinship as a ''concept" i~ an aspect of a culture's 
socioeconomic scheme an1 it mey be better regar1e1 as epiphenomenal 
to the "behavioral'' PE tterr.s t~an as an epiphenomenon of any 
kinship terminology. 
Because tl:e terrain for most aboriginal cultures as expressed 
through locality, residence ani livelihooi is not only a territorial 
phenomenon, but also a "spirituel" force '"hich relates to the whole 
question of exi!'ltence an-i being, the q::estion of economy, social 
relations and conditions of pro:iuction e~i repro-iuction sr.o_ul:i be 
under~tood in terms of.' certain ''tendencies" which craracterize 
''primitive" societies in general; although not without contradictions, 
ttese are indicative of how ttese societies maintain tteir co~erence 
wf:ile at the sa::.e time promoting or,:ranizationel variability in the 
quest for 1 t . ' l 49 popu e 10n surVIVe • 
For example ritu~ls, culturally enimate1 through exioms ani 
~rrangemente of symbolic iiscretinn ~r.ich provide emotional sustenance 
to members of every aborig-inal society, t'hey function to "re~lete'' 
economic o~jectives ani to ~ certain extent iemocrephic ones (for 
instance marriage, alliAnce relet ions). Rituals mey serve as ?. 
toun:lary-n;aintaining :7Ject?.nisc-.... ":i.ch in turn may c0ntri·::-ute or 
preserve t~e iie~tit~ of R tribe ~r sub-crnup. ?hey ~~y also 
~ ...... : 
co. 1 ~ t )_ t t.: t G -::.. rf i r:1 :;or ·tar: t s u ~ .. v i v ~l l n. e c ::?. r: i srL i r, t!. E : • t ~~ e;; r. ~: ;_ l: r. e.:.. 
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!"Urplus bet•"een sub-groups of a population an·i preserve an important 
property of primitive groups-es-alitarianism. inv,.,lvin~ sharing and 
iistribution of fooi R~l other items- incluiing tonls- hoth on 
intra--g:-oup c=.rd inter_-group bas~s. At this point, ~e wouli note 
t~at being basei on consi1erations of neei and alloming fnr goois 
to flo•v, wee han i sws like the above f'unct ion to equalize consumption 
in the face o~ possible 1ifferences in production. The rationality 
of these functions lies at the very core of the ~ociety. that is at 
their economic base; because A system of kinship is a particular 
group of these relationships, within which descent ani marriage-
connections ere socially reguleted, selected· ard "retained", the 
real kinship is· not a biological fact bu~ a social one. 50 Accordingly 
the correspondence between projuctive forces and production relations 
is at t!:e same time correspon1ence between economy and kinship. The 
interesting aspect tere is not the correspondence bet~een a certain 
form of economy and a certain form of kinship, but t!:e fact tl,at 
tlese S)Stems teke on a muct larger number of functions ani t~is way 
perhaps account for thei~ wore complex internal structu~e. Here is 
the problam of the range of demographic transformations which may. 
II 
in a technical sense, take the ''saffie form unier kinship or non-
kinship con·titions, but do change under the constraints imposej or 
the possibilities of~er b~ economic coniitions. 
~e m~y define a demographic system. in a general way, as con-
Eisting of the relations between people in respect of tte resources 
and products of tte environment; in attendine to demographic factors 
l:cwever, we must avoid treatine; observe:.! ·te::nographic -;:r:·6cesees as 
exo~enous, biolOJicelly ~iven conetrsints whict ieterffii~e tte 
:0 "!O 
unit A 
1? ~ 
unit B 
0 .. [!] 
., 
I 
I 
FIG. 4·7· ~wo jifferent views of inter-system relations. 
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?IG. 4.8. Jiagrems to show the kinls of relations t~et may exist 
between the elements wittin a system (aiapted from Klein 
end Veloch 1967) 
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oo woul1 be to con~use social replacement with biological replacement 
and to overlook tte strategies ttAt people employ to exercise control 
cueto~s. In tte~e terms tedhn0logy - alon~si1e organization !ln~ 
iieology- m~y oe seen to medi!lte re!Atinns both bet••!eenmen in 
society. ?.!11 bet···een :nen ~r.d components of the natural environment. 
The actual use of technology represents an. aspect of tte functioning 
of the socio-economic s;;·stem. with the physical or organic con-
.sequences of that use emboiied in the state of the ecosystem. 
Pressing a mec~anical analogy, ~e could perhaps view the act of 
hunting in ter~s of the transmission of informntion, by •hich the 
state of one system effects changes in the state of another linked 
system~5l (Fig. 7 end 8) Thus the thrust of the spear establishes 
the conditions !or a trophic exchange of materials ani energy from 
the ani~al to the humans; these actions are wilful, and involve the 
expenditure of ~abour in order to obtain from nature the means of 
subsistence. This is economic pro~uction. From an ecosistemic 
perspective, on the other hand, ·the hum9r. group ~ppears as an 
uniifferentiate1 ~opulation eggregate,-ie?endent for its gro~t~ ani 
repro1~ction on an input of ~~terials ani energy from its environment. 
The suspfcion of sup·erficiality aroused by ttis kin:i of argument 
jerive~ from a failure to con~ider alternative possibilities open 
to a society. The environment can only be iefinei relative to the 
·subject wtose environ~ent it is, be it a single individual. a local 
or a refiOnel population; it does not therefore exist as 2 system 
but rat:-1er as a set of possibilities. T!:e environment .ioes not 
itself specifi t~e ~enner or intensit~ of its exploitation, but it 
•,;! ~;.~~ .... ~~~-~. 
-.... 
335 
the socially iefine1 objectives of the subject population. 
If we consider the case of social aiaptation to the environment, a 
particular environ~ent mey facilitate sn~e kin1s of institutio~or 
I 
renierothers .nore difficult An1 still others im-possible but there 
ruust be few if any environments ·.vhich 1emand. one an1 only one 
a1aptation in the form of a particular social or tecHnological 
institution. Thus the socially 1irecte1 ~cts of economic proiuction, 
1istribution ani consumption serve to effect a transduction from the 
social system to the ecosystem; this being so, we fin1 population 
holding a simil~H system of kinship catee1'ories to those of others 
when their mode of proiuction seems to imply the very opposite 
premises, or differential kinship unier the same mode of production. 
Since there are tr.erefore in practice always several alternative 
possibilities open to a society in its orgenisational ani technological 
response to a particuls:~r environrne!"!t, to s'ly th'?. t tr.e possibility 
actually follo~ed is adaptive is n0t to say that no other fnrms of 
adaptation ~ere possible~ 
It is of course true that ~here some natural resources are 
beyond tte technological capacities of a people to exploit them. they 
are to thAt extent non-existent a~i in conse~uence a culture of 
hunters and gatherers will re;uire a greeter la~i area to support 
itself tl:an a cornmun i ty of edvance:l. agricul tu:-ali st s; again in 
cases where people have religious, legal an1 sentimental attachments 
to particul9r pieces of ground they may be reluctant to move from 
them even when they Bre aware of areas more pro1uctive. For demo-
grRptic 1eter~in~nts to be 1efinei, we must consider both ~~terial 
F:nd non-mr!teri~l ele.ments. In consiG.ering de-fining f.>opu,lation · 
-·· 
-· :::",:~~-~"':'~~re, for example, we rnu 1:' t spec if j. t t e !"! n tu r e nf t te 
pressure. ?..,pul!!tion pressure is not necessarily synonymous with 
the ecological concept of carrying CP.paci ty - es we ~ave rernar~e·l 
given area will-f'ustsin. ropuletion pressure .refers to tr.e pressure 
of a "strain" (i.e. excessive need or 1ernan1) on one or more existing 
resources) which can occur well below carrying capacity. Resources 
can be relatively elastic or inelastic on the basis of.their 
"renewability" but the correl<~tive nature of their exploitation 
depends upon tte development of tbe proiuctive forces and social 
division of labour in the process of pro1uction. 
~ith very few conceivable exceptions no economy. nor any society. 
tas existed in total isolation from others. The un~illingness to 
take this fact into account, or at least to ?ive it its iue weight. 
is a mejo~ failing of rece~t arcnaeolo;ical hypotheses on economic/ 
.:iemographic change. Ani wr,en contact bet• ... een societies ha·s not been 
. 52 dlsregarded, hypot1:eses of change have been constructei in which a 
single entity, or a group of entities conceived as a single unit, 
an1 modelled as undergoing change in apparent isolation with all the 
wechanisms involve1 integretej into the changing sistem. (Fig. 9) 
~.;ost explanations fail to transcend a purely empirical level, which 
reflects a widely held positivistic belief th~t t~ere exists a 
testaole one-to-one relations~ip between empirical observations and 
the properties of prehistoric societies. However, a mode of production 
or a iemogr~phic realit;r · is not constitute.i by the "structure" of 
the empirical eviier.ce alone. It cannot simply be reconstructe1 
t::rough it. ..,. +\-, 1 nus, ... e a!'1alytical ani empirico;l gulf bet .. •een separate 
levels of information t~s to be crnssei by an explRn~tnry bri~ge 
-·----........ __ 
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,, h. t. t .. " t '1.. • 53 . l sop ,1s 1ca e·, ec~•nlques, ln or·i.er to ea-1 us towari.s Rn unner-
staniing of tte reality - a system of social ~eproiuction that 
explC~ins wt.<Jt '!:appene·i beb•een trese levels. 3ecau~e local 
proiuction is rarely autonomous (even in tribal societies) ani it 
is normally linkei to a ~ider system of renroiuction in various ways -
excha~ee. traie, etc.- to ~etermine the relationship between local 
and supralocal levels of organization ani pro"l.uction. it is necessary 
to rielineate tr.e ''limits" of tr.e culturRl S.)·stems ;·•ithin which these 
:"JrOces::oes 'vere opere1ting. '''hen only C">nsi1erin[; a local area. there 
is always a risk of overstressing tr.e i~portance of the local level, 
and ignoring its place within a wider erea. Varx made t~e important 
point ttet tte distinct social end political forme e~d iieology of 
each society within a mode of proiuction were closely related to the 
ways people or~anizei their work ani to the ways t~e ownership of the 
means of production was allocated. - that is tte spatial and structural 
distribution determining the limits and the potential of 1evelopment 
within e larger system. Ir. applying a Yarxist approach to t~e 
foraging mode of proiuction, it is best to see which ~epects of the 
cultural en'l soci<::l superstr'..;ctu::-·e cnrrespor.::l more closelJ, to the 
base, becAuse ttese are li}.:-ely to s;ive an insi;;:::t t0 tte un·:l.erl,ying 
['-:'inciplee. "xpc:rdin3' reprn·iuction, flCcumule.tion, s":aring are s<J;ne 
examples of S'.lCh pr.ectir.es. The first refers to gro•,.tt ,.,hich is 
internall,)' derived, e.g. through intensifierl subsistence production 
or settlement expansion. l'he secon·l is a more general phenomenon) 
a surplus ieriver1 over Bn'l a'o0ve tLe costs of repr0duction; it may 
he derived from and corresponi wit~ expendei reproiuction, or it ~3y 
be clerive:1 through otr.er n:e<lns, C'.S lone di.str,nce trcde, wa::- etc., 
s~~rinc on the otter he.ni. 
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FIG. 4.9. A simple ii5grem tn sho~ entities eni change into e 
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.L. •• .i • r external factors 
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is a practice ~hich deeply pervadez the behaviour ani values of 
foragers .. ,.i thin the "family" ani bet,.reen ''families" ?.ni. it is 
exten:i.e:i. to t!":e bountaries .of t~e socio-economic universe. just 
as tte principle_s of profit ani rl:ltionality are central to the 
capit~list ethic, so i~ sf:<~rin.:;>: ce!1tral to the ~oniuct of social 
life in foraeing societies. Sahlin~ (1965) e~i otters, found the 
principle of generaliae1 reciprocit~ to be P univers~l among hunting 
a~ ·i gat "heri ng societies. Therefore, •vl:en we i iscuss s~a ring end 
other central features of the above peoples, we ?re not simply 
looking ?.t a cultural practice, cut at tf:e expression o:' a co1:1mon, 
univers~l coniition in the foraring moie of proiuction, ~~ich canbe 
(an·1 has·:. been) altere."! by tre ir.-.pact of ?.n external power mith effects 
on t1:e '!emo,:.;!'Aphic ··performa~ce·· of tt-··e po:;JUlRtinn(s). ·rte fact t~Hlt 
cornmuncl shAring of foo.-f resources h?.E' been iire~tly nbser·"·ei in 
~t1 
recent-years amonf iozens of fora:ing groups)- is a finiins that 
should not be unierestimatei. Its ~riversclity among fo~~~~~s lends 
2t:rong support to tte ma:rxist theorj-· trct e stage of ··_pria;i tive 
communism'' prevaile:i before tre :rise of tte state ard tte nreaku;-: of 
society into classes ~?ngel s , ...... , \ .J.0C4}• Sharinr foci is acco~pinied bt 
~:roiuction ani iistri~utior ~s nBrts of tre eco~ocic a~i ie~ogrephic 
reproiuctio~ of any society. 
·rn tte followinJ section me stall ieal ~ore specificclly ~ith 
t]--e iifferent appro11cr.eg compr-ised under"palseoeconomy·- ?.rd iiscuss 
to ~hat extent e ~R~xi~t fr?~e~ork of historicAl materi~lism can 
·t-...... ' 
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"?a laeo econom4:" an-:! rarxi sm 
·:"If tr.e m~ny econor.1ic nreuments tr.nt heve been usecl to justify 
the existence of peleeoec~no~ic interpretetinns, t~e strongest are 
tr.o.se of maxic:ization Rn·l r.;~r~·Jn~l vnlue.> bot":·. funiame~tal tfetermin~nts 
of the neo-classical moiels. Although nnt expres~e1 iirectly - as 
palaeoec(lnnmists never aieq'.Jetel;y ie:'ine vrhgt they meant by "economy'' 
this trend in their approach is emerging from two ~asic sectors 
~Of classification: ·fir~tlv,. COncentration o"n t}oe bef:aviour an.J St,tbjective 
r.;otives of t!:e "econou;ic man" 55 in a regulated pursuit o:' his 
interests, al":P.,ys trying to maximize l':is ''income" (or usefulness) 
and minimize his outlays (or effort); ani secondly a rnarke1 inclusion 
of mArginal "values'' :,utili.ty, pro1uctivitj, st:arc:..ty of the environ-
wer:t etc.). Thus equir-ped, tr.e palaeoeconOr.iist car. afford to ignore 
t:r.e ch~racter of feneral, o~jec~ive economic categories connected 
tr:e 'iifferen t 
-r 
attitudes employed towaris regional s~ifts of tte projuctive factnrs. 70 
Pccoriingly, a boiy of formal ralaeoecono~ic analysis was developed 
priffiarily concerned wit~ e einJle set nf questions: wh~t are t~e 
''forces'' •.•!hic!l cieterr!!i!"'e eCO!"'or;.ic or8aniz:1tion i!': ?.. pri!:ii tive eociety? 
t~.e er:swe~ usually ieE""er.err=tes i!"'t:: iilEasu:ri!"'g tr:e effects of t!:e 
human Agency. Ir. t~:is wsy. "•it~:out P. clee.:: set nf ohje~t:ives, H.e 
deliu;itation of economic spece heco~es 2 purely polPrized proce~ure. 
·.·Jith narro·••, ref:trictei r.~oumption~ for the "investmer.t" 0f the 
~ocir.l potential enerGY· 
. r:- ~-C'l ~-· 
~. • ........ ;;c_ii"'T 4 ... 
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~VRilabL.ity, foni ;::rocureaJt;~t Ar.·l group values- ieepite that. tl'.e 
centra:i. ~eanin.::~ o:· !'eCHr.: publicfltinr.~' prove:; U.:1t t:-e relevar.'t 
"e;o,iel~" re:.wine·l. static ::n• ur.:;t . .ie to proviie a ··cnrnplete" inter-
?retation of t~e economic processes in the past - regariless 0f the 
enorru"us number or' sites excr:vate·L tl·,e :iata collecte.i ard the 
powerful techniques ewrlojei to enelyze tte~. 
It ic e point of concern that tr:E integration of tr.e social 
with the economic is not so co~wnn in the PrctBeolo:icEl inter-
preta tion s; ani wten it is con~iiered, auttcrs maintAin ttat both 
ecologi~l a!'!d socicd e.p:;roacl:es are V<:li-:1 so lon:; as tr.ey re:nain 
,. . 4 t ... l . 'h .:;. • "l 57 con~lr.e'- o ".:e1r proper sp •. eres 0.1. 1r.~ uence. The problem wit~ 
this sor~ of casual erupiricism is ttat netting can be seii - or 
about al.terr.ative responses ani ieuH~ri!:- r-,f a society/ 
' . d I 
oan ,: ;rou .?, Rt any lcv~l nf investigation. An example-of such ~n 
justification of t~e ~~laeneconomi~ wniel. •. I tterefnre propose 
to approact the pi0blem fro~ an altern~tive perspective. namely tte 
point cf vie~ of tte null hy?nthe~i~ ~ti~t specifies t~Rt subeistenc• 
ch~nges &re tte result of environmentol ch~rses unless ~roved ot~errise. 
In adopting t~is view it is important to emptasize tt~t envir0n~ental 
cb:.r.f'e we..)' h,ove ootr; iirect anJ ir:lirect effects on sc;bsister.ce 
economy. 'I'he dircct effects will oe ttosf; \••!!icf: involve er:viron-
~entally in1ice~ c~on~es in t~e type of relative proportions of t~e 
iniirect effects stern from ctances in ~ore 
subtle ~n-1 elusive pro;>erties c:~ tr.e environment suer: as tt.e 
eccnomic. Thi~ epproach also leais to the emphAsiP 0n c~iorific 
e s tim a t e !-' C\ r. •l 1 i ~ t s of a t: i ru a 1 ~ n i t> l.q n t spec i e s ex p l o i t e i e t a 
particular series o~ site~ which - as we hPve ~een - it: themselves 
tell us-very little about t~c specific conter.t of tl':ese activities. 
Eere is or.e of t~e ce~trel problems in the stuiy of p~imitive 
econou;ic s: w~:3t is the ~if'ferer.ce bet·.,een iiet e!'d economy ani if 
inferer.ce fro~ observstionel premises to theoretic!l conclusions can 
rely purely on ar.JlyPis of tle iiet eviience ~~er. in a~iition that 
eviience is only pArtial? If •.•1e consiri.er ''palaeoecnnot:.~ic' explP.n"ltinns 
t~ey operate arout:i t~o ty~es of empiricAl re~lities: faur.al reru<lins 
,., . - 5t 
ar.i trar:shumance .ab1ts. 4lthough there is n~t any sort of fsctual 
interconnection bet·oreer. ttese t·•'o varia'.:lles - tr:e first is iata-base·!, 
t~e seconi is an ethnographic reconstruction r.ct necess!rily valii 
is. directed to s:tow t'r:e sea::.onal 'Jse nf site::=. partly from t':,e 
-" . o ... 00!':€ sco.wp.i.es. '!'hese faur.istic re~eins ir. fact io not 
represent tte e~vironment in t~e mature sense: t~eee Ere bones 
wtict are concrete exa~ples, together ~it~ pl~~t re~einz, artifacts 
;rocesses wtich can be com~re~eniei as· socin-ecan~~ic activity. 
•rhese objects ar.::l. struciureE t~c:t ?.re p:-ciucei_ ·persist t!:rough 
a certain perioj nf time ani so~etimes are Eubseq~ently reproiucei. 
undereoing in bott ceses continuous rnoiific3tion. ~tict eventually 
ere quAlitatively !lterei. ?Sss e~~y, or ~estroyei. q1 of theEe 
elements an·l processe~ ":<!ve their own times r;rd t1:e:ic O"•n rates of 
... 
"· 
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co-cxi~tence a~i interpenetr~tio~ ~ith ttes~ otter elements qn1 
?9 processes. Tteir temporalities ~ri rAtes of c~~n~e can he ~erceivei 
trib~tinr ~ri co~Pumptinn. frnm t~e useful objects creete1, exc~Rngei 
And consumed, ~ri fiom t~e proce~se~ of co~~titDtinn ~ni 1evelopment 
of cultural fnrm~tions eri culturRl object~. T~e com~ler interaction 
of t~ese objects ani ~ctivities ani t~eir r~tes of change form the 
real historical process, ani prn~i1e the b~Fis fnr the construction 
of appropriate regionaliz?.tions. T~e exter:siven~ss ~r t~ese objects 
an1 prOCesses ?.!1-t t!-.e extersiveneSE of their effects netermine tl~e 
?.ppropriate scales for th€ir an?.lysis._ ':'!"!e irr:plicAtions of this 
argument is not only ttat all :nateriel ani im:n~teri?.l objects and 
events bave spatial ani temporal iimensions but ~lso thet these 
1imersions cannot be sep~ratei from tteir ot~er properties becF.use 
they are essential coniitions for tte existence of 2~y object or 
event ar:·i because tl:ej· affect, qu::llify, or :noiify m?.n~: of their 
properties, ~itt tte result t~!t the separate aspects of en ~bject 
!'-tudiei by disciplines :1istinguisre'i in tris wey cannot be recombine'i 
a-dd.itive_ly. It t~e!'efore follows H:at Rr aiequRte c~nceptio!l of ?.ny 
object or eve~t must be b~sei upnr. c- ur..ifiei t'r.eoretir.al fr-:'!rne~·ork. 
~ri t~At it is no more pn~sible fnr tte SjstemRtic scierces to 
abstrRct from t~e spatial ~ni te~poral a~pects nf pter.n~ena than 
it is for tte "chorolo.:_!ical'" sciences to abstract fr0:11 t~e phenomena 
The reason for this is obvious. In t!: e e:<trert:e c?. se. each 
tools, sett.ier.n~ntr:, or even r:opul:otinnsi ·•rou~d :;e .:l.efine 1 ?.: 
~..:.. e?. ~· : ... :: .. i r: t:.: ~ c ,q se ·lj t1 
-' ~ ... 
~ .... 
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single structure can be locatei in more thRn one region. The 
iniiviiual struc~ure becn~es t~e explAnatory level of the whole 
structure ant t~e 1ifferent aspects of t~e ter~itorial ani regional 
ore;ani:>~ation "?.re:· iientic;:ll ·~::>· iefinition. It follnws iirectly 
that tec~nnlogy or better t~c te~hnique~ em~loyei for tte m?.nuf~cture 
(')f stone-tools fnr example, must be equal to the level o: tte 
exploitation ratea of a ~iven nrea or to tte population rates and 
indices. It thus appears as if tte relative importance of a distinct 
local ''vsriaule" fiiOptei fnr analysis, prnvi.ies t!ce oest possible 
explanation for the overall growth in the region w~ich anyway is 
so mucl: i_eperd.ent from the local environmental con;ritions ttat it 
do~s not seem to exist any freei0m of ctoice in aiopting a certain 
technique or the possibilities to give to that technique a certain 
flexi hili ty. ~er~;thil"!,S ·.••ill ieper·~ u;·on tt_e efficiency of aiaptive 
p.~tterns ·xitr.in determinei site-catchment locatiO:'JS· From the 
-;receiing it follows t~et tr:e logical par?.llels 0~ tl~eories of primitive 
0 
economics are t:pse wherein both ir.~ut an1 out:;JUt can be stated in 
ter~s of environmental/econ~~ic concepts (prefer!bly 1uantifie1) 
while social ini cultural variables are con~iierei as tte parameters 
within which t~e_equetions ere operative. 
:·";'nviron:nental constraints clearly !':P.ve a c;reat impc:ct on 
hunter-gatherer aiaptations ani exert consi1erable influence on 
their for[li of social organization." "Since hunter-gatherers exploit, 
but do not drastically alter, tteir environment, this subsistence 
mo1e plAces gene::-;,1 constraints on social p<~tterning" (Yellen an:\ 
:::erpeniin~ 1972). '!'he m?.in o'ojection tr1 tr.ese 1efir.itior.s is t!':at 
. · ... -. ·. 
- .......... ., ..... ;· 
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within ~e~graph~ tte conce~t of evolution led to a concern ~ith 
hictorical :levelopment ani to 6"8!1eralizntions about the history of 
ceographic?.l f'or:ns ( lJu t n·ct to s con~ ern ·.vi th the processes unier-
-lying t:-,is r~storicel move:r.entY) •.•,ithin p<llAe_oeconomic approsches 
tte conception is altogether basei - althou~h with iifferences of 
interpretation - upon a merkei for~ of humen social ani cultural 
ievelopment unjer the continuous oper~tion of predetermine1 biological 
.l • 1 .l • t . 60 ' ' 1 f h en~ enVlrOnme~ta con11 10ns. ~notner exemp eo sue an association 
"'e fin'l in '}emble 1S 1 1"'~' ,.,.,- '"'1·.,. \ 'Jf'-'1 8.;co.Lj- .,, ,, ~he change in resources 
and their utilization in the mesolithic is most satisfactorily 
explainei by clim~tic factors altering resource scheiuling and ~ence 
f0rcing a ~e-appraisal of the overall exploitation strategy. ?or 
t~e earlier periods, ~here t~e res~urces che~ge QUantitatively ratter 
tten qualitatively. there is eviience for climatic ~hanfe ani t~is 
must be taken into account before pronouncing on the aiaptive be~aviour 
circu~stances of groups utilizinz the area have been examinei we can 
evaluate tte long term aiaptation of ttese hunte~-gat~erers to t~eir 
e!"lvironrnent." •• ·· 'rtis cor:stanc;; in eiaptive behaviour is inf.i.uence.j 
by tte strong ;hyFical constraints of tte area ~hich promote a 
pre1ictable spati&l ani iernorraphic solution to tte proble8S of 
efficient resource extr2ction'· "It can be seen 1'rom tf,e above, t::ct 
patterne1 spatial behaviour is a feature of hunter-gatherer 
orcanization. The otservation thpt it is closely coniitioned by 
the structure of the environment ?roviie us with en opportunity to 
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ani settlement s~~tem: "The 1iecussion of territory. a E:p<>ce usei 
habitually b:,· s group of' ten employs tr.e term hoa;e .bl!se which h~s 
recently be en i e fine i a E f-ollo,·s. 3y l:n:r.e hr;se, '"€ a;ean 9 ~?.oitatinn 
~ite or aren, u~ to a mile 0r ~I) in exter.t (nr possibly mnre) '"Jit"~in 
~tich camps ~ere oc~u;iei each yenr for perinis nf time th~t in 
total generally exceeiei t~e time spent at any ot~er sin~le site 
~here there was ac~ess to a hinter-lani proiuctive o( aJiitional 
resources for maintainin.:?' tr.e home base's ropul?.tion. procurable 
from satellite C3tlips ''1hen e::q:e~Uent" (Ho5ers ani Blac~ 1':76) • .t.lthouc;h 
this passage refers to a specific ethnographic exsm~le ••• it is 
!?Ufficiently general in its i:nplications to act as :?. .lescription of 
the major settlement type that is com:non to ell hunter-gatherers. 
The other element of the settle~e~t system t~at is generally recognized 
is t':':.e s.atellite camp occupiej by s:r:?.ller ie::nographic units and for 
shorter periods of time. The establishment of satellite camps reflect 
an efficient balancing of energy ani tte total settlerue~t pattern 
with its large ~~i s~all foci ~ust be viewei as part of the strategy 
ttRt is desi~~ei to actieve the ~oal of ~ptimisi~g yielis w~ile 
mini:ni ~ing effort'' 
very oonr.ept a!1·-l iefini ti:">n o.:· t1tea:!,"ies r!~i s'..l':J-tl;eori =s are tbem-
~elves ~unctions of a ?BrticulRr iieology 3ni eristecnlagy. From 
tt~ point of vie~ a~ tte iiscussinn presentei here. the separate 
exi!"te!!Ce nf an entit~ c;!lle·l p<:ln.eoeconomic tr.ecr~· (elaborated most 
' ··~ 
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( .. ·het!:er i;.r.is ... ~e expressei ineconomics,generaphy. ["enlnf:!y or 
biolocyj tave ~:-oceelel as t~•~ugr_ t~.e 0bject l"lf stuly .. ,::~san 
abstract e!'ltit;,·- or.e "titr:·out e['fective ~tr.uctur,_l relatinn_sl':ips to 
tl:e rest of ::r.e soc i o- econ 0:.ii c ... 61 :;;;- s .em. ~he speci~ic pr~ble~ nf 
ideali~ei abstraction - as a rela~ively au-tonomous fiel-i or s:udy-
•vill oe .Jiscussei later. '~he im::;eiiate question is the related ·:>ne 
0f tl':e presumej "separation'' of spatial behaviotor from the economic 
system ~s a whole. Site-catchment analysis in determining site 
locations within certain rAdius, carrying-c3pacity ter~inus an1 
)epen-J.er:ce from 'Jne :r,?.in f::ctor of' survival belon-ss to tl'::1t sort of 
distinction. In fact, of course the two are intim::tely related ~t 
62 
ell levels. In the first place it is rarely valid to retain a 
co~plete distir:ction bet~een tt:e s~ecifically locationgl decision 
o: A popul~tion a~1 all its ot!:er ecor.o:nic -ieci~ions. Secon-Uy tl:ere 
is t::e fact ttnt tr,e nature of a ;-opubtion' s behavio'.Jr '''ill be 
influencei by its position ~ithin tte total econoffiic stru~ture. 
And thirdly. at another level, the sp::tial shape of the economy is 
tte result not only of speci~ic9lly spatial forces. hut also of the 
?.-spatial 'iynsmics of tre s;,-stem. the ~ocio-cultural (incluHng 
religion, kins:-.ip, iieology etc •. ). !-.aving a spatial :nar.ifestation. 
It is essentially t~i~ ~ns1c iistinction ani tte assumptions on wtich 
it is ~ase:iwhich'J!lii'y the various studies tt?.t have been termei 
''palaeoeconoa.ic'·, AnJ/or site catcr:JLent an?.lysis. Figgs et al (1967) 
in their stui~ of ?alaeolit~ic sites in Spirue! Greece, were the 
first to apply t~is form of analy~is- ~lthou~h in e general for~. 
Tte ex~loitation territory of a site was iefine1 as the territory 
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imme-iiatelJ· accessible to s site's in1labitants. 'I'he stu:lies of 
Eigc;s et al., exe:::~lif.r tl:e t~•TO ted:niques most commonly use1 for 
ieli~iting t~e territory t~ be exnmined in a site catchment analysis 
- nAffiely the use of circuf8r territories of fixed radii eni t~e use 
nf tiwe contours. ~ott :nenns of ietermininu t~e area to be stuiie~ 
have ~ince been wiiely used. ~alking one hour for agric~ltural 
~it..e..s a!'ltl t· .... o hours fo'!' non-agricultural sites !:as been used by a 
number of :="u:'!'opean historie!'ls althou['h circles of fixe-i raiii are· 
wore l . A . • b l - 63 common y use·i oy :nerlC!Hllsts ut R sn by "uropes!'"!s. This 
sort of analysi:o>. bese1 on central place tteO'!'j' is_ less cnnvincine, 
nevertteless. i!'l that it sho,vs less concern "!ith bantl spacing and 
population density a!'li is less sensitive to socio-economic in·iicators 
as :leterminants of site location ani instead emphasizes such con-
sid.erations es the av~ilabilit;-f, a":ml'dance, spa.~ing ard se::~sonelity 
of plant, anir.1al an:l rui-rH~ral rescurces as i:nportant in -~etermining 
site location. 
Linear spscing, or some otter measure of spaci!'lg, ani ~hiessen 
polygons ::Jre bot:: reali~tic approac~es to estim?.tion of cstchme!'!t 
size and shape. (in Hintliff's view 1981) Their utility~ however. 
is limited by several cor£iieretions. First they do assume C0!'1-
tem:;Joran ei t,y of u~less one can 1emonstrete this to be so, 
the result coulj be highly ~isleaiing. Seconi, ttey assume a 
comprehensive listing of t~e sites whose spacin~ is being examined. 
Tti~ couli be e prn~lem if enelysis i~ beine 1one of sites in an 
area ttat has ~ot been system~tic?.lly surveyed (as for example ~itt 
~UR~r~t~. transects, nr sn~e 0t!.er techni1ues yieliirc an qreally 
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no overlap of actually exploite1 area, no traie, no import~tion of 
resources, no labour proces~es, no pro'iuctive inter-relt~tions- in 
sum it assumes t~at tr.e are~ \'lit!:i!'l the polye-or. (or_ hexaeon O!' circle) 
i~ tte sole area exploite1. Porenver estimates have heen made for 
only one or two res~urces (reinieer exploitgtion for example) -
albeit i~portant ones, an~ most bRsic pl~nt ani mineral neeis were 
satisfied •ithin 5 km of the site (wten transhumance ~as not employe1). 
It is still a 1ocumentation of tte fact t~at resources reflectei et 
e site (including artefacts an:i stone tools techniques) may come 
fro~ a far broaier area than tte small analytic territories used by 
most palaeoeconomists. 
It is then impossible realistically to treat the spatial as 
a closed system. There is a body of knowledge based on primitive 
societies, their o;igin ani evolution, a!'d tl":e "!:p~tial'' expression 
of tteir demo-economic s~ste~ does tev~ to oe analysed. Chan~es in 
theoretical st:ructure are. brought a~nut in response to tr.e emercence 
of p:=-oolems, out t!'le \'lay in ·.•!!:ic'h tl:ese problems ere "seen" netermines 
tte nature of the respo~se to them ~ni the consequent t~eoretic 
64 developme~t. If the perspective of the whole subject is to be 
exsminei it is essentiel to step outsi1e of ttat perspective. - ... 
.l. " 
is only such ?. proceiure t~~t one can appreciate t~e nature of 
the subject for w~at it is ani envisage any possibility of ch~nge 
alonG tte dimensions of ctara~teristics ~hich typifies the subject 
as a whole. 
A hi~toricel approact proviies the necessary fre~e~ork for 
~uct an enal,ysil:', ~ot11 0:,· retaini!1C locicRl cete(;Ories. tm-1 b;y 
6'' ref~sin: to a6cept as iata sny priwo~iial o~ n!tura: coniitions. J 
~: 
C.::.;-~; .... ,~·~ 1 ,,. - -~·r:.·,~· ~~.,t ) 1 ~1- o:· t ;·,e ei_l·': )_ ro~r:1~-~;. t l£. ?1ece!_·, ::Ar_:,: 1 1y- ~Jr:·l-.cir ~·t.a .. 1 .... :,: . ..,;:_ l-O.LJ.!~-;JJ / '-' :, '-' •' ~· ti 
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the prehistoric economy, since the environment was the material 
base of the economy an1 set some limits on t~e economic possibilities. 
But different economies ,.;.ere established on t)-.e same material bRse 
-by different peoples with their own traditions and wit~ di!ferent 
levels of productive development. F.owever, the line of palaeo-
economic theory takes as given the natu~e of economic organization 
but ignores the historical context, and therefore the essential 
dynamic, of that form of organization. At the same time the 
theories themselves can be seen as part of a historical progression 
explaining an aspect of that given material world from which they 
stem. The historical perspective is thus twofold: firstly to set 
theories in their historical context, and thereby to illustrate 
both their reactive nature and the role they play in the context; 
secondly to see that the approacb to palaeoeconomy - that is the-
nature of the theories themselves - should also take-"population" 
(i.e. its object) in its historical perspective. It is also 
important to consider carefully the nature of the space in which 
location/settlement etc., is taking place, as most of the theories 
deal essentially with some form of abstract space. In the case 
of L~sch, for instance distance is the only quality of space 
con~i1ered as locationally significant and we have seen the results 
in recent palaeoeconomic studies. In fact, the ''space" of a 
populatiorr 's settlement or location is the product of a complex 
. . 66 h1stor1cal process. 
The scientific representation of economic and social reality 
does not emerge by abstraction from the spontaneous or elaborated 
repr"sentations of :ln·iivi:luaJ.s. It must on the cont!"a:ry. contest 
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reality. A tool has no social existence unless its rules of 
manufacture an1 use are known and communicated. These represen-
_ tations are also pro':iuctive forcee; a mArxist approach in the 
social science-~ therefore_ means to try to reconstruct, repro':iuce, 
the logic of the processes which give rise to the visible oraer of 
facts and institutions and which determine their possible trans-
formations. When analysing the material remains of a society, 1 
palseoeconomists fsll back on the empirical part of disciplines 
such as geology. geography, technology, botany. econom~cscand so on. 
Each discipline contributes its specialized information. and is 
necessary 8$ a first stage; the problem is that no attempt is made 
to discover the internal components and the structural relations 
which define the social and material formation of these societies. 
In fact Marxism reveals the existence of two levels of rationality. 
First, the intentional rationality of individuals and groups acting-
within determinate social relations and upon these social relations 
on the basis of their own representations of these relations. 
Beyond this, ttere is also an unintentional rationality which 
consists of the objective, ,..,properties .of tl:ese social relations 
and of their specific laws of transformation. Far from being a 
mere "abstract" reflection of the relation, is one of tr.e internal 
conditions of existence of a society. 
Proiuction is the objectification of human ideas and needs. 
Varx in Capital warned against a narrowly materialistic conception 
inherited fFO~ the abstract materialism of the natural sciences. 
In fact ttat point constitutes one of the most specific forms of 
tuost speC;ific - a!ld the mvat heavily criticized.· 'l'he practical 
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consequence of tt.is "abstract" materialism is to create a partly 
illusory relation which spontaneously grows up between individuals 
and their material con·iit;i.ons of existence, ''acting" upon an 
imaginary real-ity. Dobb (l:94_0),concentrating on the nature of 
abstraction) jiscusses this in some depth. • ." •• the acceptance or 
rejection of a theory depends on one's view of the appropriateness 
of the particular abstraction on which the theory is base1. ..In 
the fi!'st place, one msy build one's abstraction on the exclusion 
of certain features which are present in any actual situation 
either because they are the more variable or because they are 
quantitatively of lesser importance in determining the course of 
events. Secondly however, one may base one's abstraction •• simply 
on the formal procedure of combining the properties common to a 
heterogeneous assortment of situations and building abstraction out 
of analogy." As Dobb points out, such distillations of common 
I 
factors may form such a small part of the mechanics of any one 
situation that the real structure and motive power is lost. 
Such is t'he case with palaeoeconomics today. "ie learn certainly 
of ''bones and stones" but not of the labour processes on which a 
number of spe-cific means of production and reprod'..lction depend. 
I 
Moreover, the lack of systemic context, which is one effect 
of this mode of abstraction, is paralleled by an absence of 
historical perspective. In most of palaeoeconomic theory, (as in 
marginalist economics) the existence of numerous competitive "profit'' 
maximizers is assumed as . given and 
consequently as unalterable. The dynamic of t'he 
eystew as a whole is ignored. Thus, for instance, although . 
·~ 
hu~ter-gatherers'strat~gy 
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are studied, they are analysed as separate situations, as "existing" 
in different places, or in different sectors of the economy. A 
sort of static equilibrium is the rule and the aim. Internal con-
tradictions and the dynamics of develo~ment,-particularly the 
development of one from the conditions of the other, are ignored. 
Putting together some of the points made in this section, we 
see that there is a contradictio~ even here. On the one hand there 
is the pretension to trans-system distillation, on the other there 
are firm roots in a contemporary economic arrangement. This con-
tradiction arises not because a particular abstraction- pattern 
and concentration_upon certain characteristics is incorrect, but 
because -· the 
behaviour is a 
whole concept of an 
h . 67 mi sappre ens1on. 
a-historical formalism of human 
Behaviour itself is a result of 
historical conditions and position ~ithin the total system at any 
p~int of time. Different forms of economic system, and different 
structural positions within any one such system, will lead to 
different forms of behaviour. Although such criticisms by no 
means apply equally to all analyses employing a "palaeoeconomic" 
approach, it is evident that t~e interaction. between the objective 
material flows in a system and their social perception and 
expression still represents a central analytical problem; in 
dealing with set~lement patterns, their components such as territorial 
\ 
boundaries or other analogues such as archaeological sites, complex 
of culture traits or other information systems as stone-tools 
technology we are concerned with artifacts of a system. They do 
not themselves possess organization but reflect the articulation 
of units and their social "management•• within a society or a group. 
I 
I 
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FIG. 4.10. Procedures involved ~itt (or variablee affecting) 
the structure of a ''palaeoeconomic" system in 
general ani tools accordingly. 
discard 
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of economic ml3n, "designed to acl:ieve the goal of optimising 
yields while minimizing efforts" is an inadequate abstraction, or 
tr,at "settlement patterns with its la_rge and small foci must be 
viewed as part of _that strategy" is a false abstr~cUon, but that 
the questions which "they ask" perform the function primarily of 
allowing the expression of certain desired answers. There is a 
particular ideology determining even the definition of the objects 
studieq. /and the level of the main lines of interest - excluding the 
concrete labour-relations and contradictions bet~een man and nature. 
What is ~merging then, seems to be the necessity to view 
~ocio-economic behaviour centrally in a historical context, to 
extend and develop the conception of the "palaeoeconomic'' system 
by placing human social activities ani labour forces at the centre 
-or the analysis; that is the association of social, technological, 
environmental and cu~tural traits ani patterns of change under more 
concrete historical accounts of their internal dynamics and actual 
evolution. (Fig. 10) But whether such a reorganization on that 
level and a reconstruction which "respects" the laws of historical 
transformations is possible is (it s~ems}1 at the moment, an open 
question. 
4. 5 Summar;y_ 
It is probably fair to say that the formation of pslaeoeconomic/ 
demographic theories lies within one major overall "paradigm'' for. 
though separate lines of development exist. they have much in common 
in terms of their epistemological approach an1 of their function 
in ~eletion to t~e economic system of ~hich they are a product . 
. ·"·~(;:'>l~.{~~'~· 
~i~~i~;j~ 
0f t~2 tiXploitet~on of nature by pretistoric 
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societies brings together problems of tte reproduction of labour 
power, of demography and of production, essentially tr.at of the 
means of subsistence, sirice it is the metabolic transforffiation of 
tt.e -means of subsis-tence in the organ ism thet produces hucan energy. 
Until now however, tte production of human beings has not really 
been treated as an economic problem; demography has generally been 
regarded as surrendering to its own laws. In fact ttere are 
constant interactions between the individual bearers of energy, 
energy as the means of proiuction. and production of the means of 
subsistence and the means o~ reproduction of producers. 68 
Demograpty has often been consiiered more as a cause of 
biological sequences than subjected to conditions of production. 
Indeed, demography is dependent on production end circulation of 
food. This is a field of economic investigation to be thoughtover, 
taking into account the continuous conversion of subsistence into 
labour power, of labour power into productive agents and producers 
of subsistence. To build, in tte first place, a ''palaeoeconomy" 
capable of extending the analysi~ of the appropriation of nature 
to phenomena too oft•n considered as natural or accidental or 
aberrant, suet as famine, disease, low population etc., means to 
put men back at the "core" o!' their development. that is in their 
historical specificity, rejecting the principle 6f natural! eternal 
laws. 
Applying the principle of historical specificity to hunter-
gatherer societies does not mean that e~ery element in a local 
system is unique to a gi.ven mode. bu: only that the wi':ole structure 
and arrangement of ele~ents is historically unique, specific to a 
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course entails difficulties. It alno means that tte aggregate 
population result at any level ·operates inside tt.e relatione of 
production an::! thus ''dete.rmines" t~.e type of information we may 
-have about the members of a society ani the nAture of their syst~m. 
Since tte labour process itself - the process in ~hich the forces 
of production transform an object of labour through labour is the 
bearer of relations of production,in fact the labour process only 
exists and transforms itself in a specific process of production. 69 
Among those aspects of the labour process which are thus "informed" 
by these relations, the means of labour involve above all tools and 
their technical knowledge, which are therefore bearers of the 
relations of production to which they are a1apted, as are all the 
relations of cooperation. As we tave seen, for Marx a mode of 
production is an analytical concept describing the dialectical 
unity of forces and relations of production. To define a particular 
mode of production should tterefore be to specify both the forces 
of production - in terms of relations between people and the 
instruments of their labour - and the relations of production in 
terms of appropriation of territory and its resources,taking·a 
communal form in pre-class societies :whereas in class societies 
surplus labour and over-exploitation are the transformations that 
_set up new relations of production and develop with them. lfuat is 
important is not whether the appropriation is either heavy or 
moderate, whether compensation exists or not, but whether it relates 
to a totality of socio-economic relations in such a·way that 
production cannot be continued without it. 
All these raise a set of problems. In the pr~sent .state it 
,.., . ., 
". r 
~~~ 
··_.~ .. ·,. 
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wtich data about the prehistoric past can ma~e their own contribution 
to the creation of new theoretical-historical concepts but the 
interaction between the existing theory and archaeological data 
has tended to be a one-way pro_cess. There is an apparent difficulty 
of interpretation because of the unsatisfactory control over the 
samples, ···problematical techniques, and other factors related to pre-
historic variability for example within the sequence of use of sites 
and between sites in an area, in terms of changing relationships 
between the prehistoric inhabitants of the site and the changing 
environment, in terms of tl:.e continuous "use" of a site in spite 
of environmental changes, differences or similarities in technology 
both on inter-intra locational level. Arctseological data may be 
difficult to analyse, but only the most "insisting'' adherent of a 
certain ideology would deny that the prehistoric record can offer 
different issues and· explanations70 above the environmental/ 
ecological interpretations which to-day dominate research 
prehistoric economies and demographic patterns. A coherent palaeo-
economic perspective should therefore take into account of all the 
dimensions, viewing the basic necessities of existence in terms of 
both social and ecological context and conceptualize the linkages 
between them. Artifacts in this sense may not be very sensitive 
to environmental constraints, instead they should track more closel~ 
the production and reproduction of a set of social relations. We 
may note on this basis that we can contrast capitalism to all other 
modes of production as extra-economic factors also enter into the 
means of appropriation in non-capitalist modes of production, 
whereas in capitalism economic factors alone intervene and to this 
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easy to recognize. To this is related the fact that most of 
existing palaeoeconomic theor~ is able to an extent to explain 
"individual" scale decisi.ons according to the environme~t as in 
some way rational, but helpless in face of !he re~ulting systemic-
level irrationality, place1 as it is within an ideology which 
defines its object and mode of analysis in a ~ay which makes 
effective interpretation impossible. Finally, pertaps at this 
point, it may be useful to recall Engels: 71 "Having at the same 
time, ample opportunity to watch the mid1le classes ••• I soon came 
to the conclusion t:hEtt you are right •• in expectingc·no support 
~vhatever from thea;. Their interest is diametrically opposed to 
yours, though they always will try to maintain the contrary and 
to make you believe in their most hearty sympathy with your fates. 
Their doings give them the lie. I hope to have collecten more than 
sufficient evidence on the fact that •• the middle classes intend 
in reality notting else but to enrich themselves by your labour 
while they can sell its produce, and to abandon you to starvation 
as soon as they cannot make a profit by this indirect trade in 
human flesh." 
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global expansion. But at the heart of Western expansionism 
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world. The most important aspect of tbis disparity was _. 
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(and not the level of technology as such) enabled the West 
to impose its will on the much larger colonial populations. 
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of minorit~ rule by foreigners: racism an~ arrogance on the 
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anthropological descriptions of the indigenous populations 
and justifying their economic exploitation. 
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Pre-Capitalis~. Socio-~conomic Formations, The German Ideology. 
10. Value becomes whatever capitalism appears to value, in the 
fashion in which capitalism seems to value it. There is 
apparently no other reality; the superstructure an1 the 
basis represent a simple vertical harmony, in wr.ich sctema 
occRsio~al~y imperfect perfo~mers and t~e 
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need, therefore, for yet again more perfect - and dictatorial-
regimes of instructions. The observer who regards the 
capitalist system as the only admissible social super-
structure must regard wnatever valuation the capitalist 
circulation process puts upon commodities as the only value 
of interest for the real practical world. 
The result is empiricism, incluciing empiricist "economic 
theory''. 
11. In the"classical" economic tradition - that of Smith A, 
Ricardo D, t~al thus T, Mill JS, Uarshall A~ 
12. According toR. Firth (1972, 1980) there are three major ~ays 
in which capital is utilized in the economic process; as a 
productive asset, as a means of facilitating control over 
purchasing power, jnd as a fund for investment. While some 
scholars have expressed scepticism (only) over the applicability 
of the capital concept to preindustrial economies (~alton 1969, 
Sahline 1969, 1974, White 1959) there have been several studies 
that _have i~entified ani analysed each of the three functions 
of capital in such ec~nomies (Firth 1965, Firth and Yamey 
1964, Foster 1942, Bohannan 1968, Barth 1968, Barnett 1968, 
Pospisil 1968). For Pospisil for example it does not exist even 
,as a necessary precondition for a theory or an analysis of 
"primitive" economic forma tiona as: •• "We classify the 
various peoples of the world either as civilized or as 
primitive societies. While civilise1 people are popularly 
regardei as logical, having a 6omplex technology, ani an 
economy charactorimad by true money a~~ by mRrkets. primitive 
people have been creiited with only a prelogical mentality, 
and a crude technology that has its "logical'' consequences 
a simple, nonmoneta~y type of economy. Their economy has 
been consi1ered bj varinus writers to be eitter over-
indivi~ualistic or comcunistic. A~ will be apparent. the 
Kapauku society does not fit such oversimpltfiei generalizations. 
It combines, strangely enough. one of the ~orld's most 
primitive technologies with a rather sophisticatei and complex 
economic system. The latter in its main features resembles 
a simplified versi~n of capitalism ratter than any sort of 
primitive communism." 
It suffices to . recall the title of this article: "The 
Kapauku individualistic money economy", and that "one of the 
major pil~ars on which the Kapauku economy stands is the use 
of true money. Cowrie shell and two types of necklaces function 
in this society as the common medium of exchange and the 
common mea sure of value." 
Thus even for economic anthropologists like S. Cook (1973), 
although "there is a very healthy trend in economic anthro-
pology away from argument in favour of the applicability of 
formal economic and lowards its actual application to 
hypothetical ani real situations'' the result is tr.at this 
trend is represented. as follo•.ving "For example Lee has aiapted 
_the transactional models of input-outpu~ economies to the 
analysis of Kung Bushman subsistence; F.del has utilized 
econometrics to measure variations in the adoption of 
cooperatives by Jamaican fishing villages; Jby tes applied 
matrix analysis to Barth's iata on the division of labou~ 
the maximiaation principle to formulate a model of caste 
relations in In~ia, Pakistan and Ceylon. Cook has employed 
time series an'! supply an·i iewand analysis in a study of 
price and output variability in a pea-sant-artisan -stone-
working iniustry in the valley of Oaxaca; and Schneider has 
analysed economic relations among the Wahi Wanyaturu as a 
competitive decision-making process." The mBrgina1 revolution 
had significant implications for both the scope and methodology 
of ortho1ox economic theory. The analytical power of the 
"new" technique and the plausible simplicity of its basic 
assumption - that consumers and producers would naturally 
behave so as to maximise their satisfactions or profits in a 
competitive market - was immensely attractive to students of 
_"pure" economics. Neo-classical t'heorists accordingly narrowed 
the scope of their subject matter so as to be exclusively 
confined to a study of market processes. Consequently, although 
individual neo-classical theorists may have bee~ as strongly 
activated by political and_ social objectives as any of their 
predecessors among the classical economists, they concentrated 
most of their attention "qua" econom-ists on abstract theoretical 
issues which had no immediate connection with the urgent 
contemporary questions of practical policy. No doubt the 
differences between them were similar to the earlier 
differences between ~althus and Ricardo or between Senior 
and UcCulloch. But they were. on a di·fferent scale, the area 
over which they woul·l admit agreement generally was nar:::-ower 
ani tl:e resolution of any conflict harl wHer implications for 
general. Thus, for example, while deliberately refraining 
from drawing exclusive boundaries and while freely admitting 
ttat political economy shades off i~to otter social-sciences 
and draws heavily on the moral sciences, Keynes stresses 
again and again the need to distinguish sharply between what 
he called positive economics i.e. economic science, and all 
other conceivable aspects of political economy. The marginal 
revolution 1rew its inspiration from mathematical ratr.er than 
philosophical techniques of analysis and it ha1 the effect of· 
diverting the attention of economists from their search for 
the meaning of value - a search which had deep philosophical 
implications - ani to focus instead on market price. And in 
the event, the neo-classical theory of value became more 
than a theory of price~ it became a theory of the allocation 
of scarce resources to specific uses under the dual incentives 
of utility maximization for the consumer and profit ~aximization 
for the producer. 
The alternative open to them was much less attractive. The 
Uarxian alternative, which is di~cussed throughout t~e present 
work, lay too far outside their cultural tradition to be a 
serious competitor. A less heretical development of the 
Ricardian tradition might also have led in dangerous directions. 
The neo-classical attempt to develop a value-free economic 
science seemed right because tl;e totality of "bourgeois 
economists", as ~!arx would have ca1le1 them. accepted certain 
implicit commitments. 
V.'h<"ri. iJ1 t.he h:tl~-..·····>"?..1' p~ri.oci, a.1vance1 cspi ta..l.ist economies 
were confronted with problema of persistent unemploj~ent and 
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trade depression, so that increasing government intervention 
began to seem not only acceptable but actually desirable, 
the ideological co~mitments that had seemed so unquestionable 
to the pre-First World War era began to crack: and when in 
the post-Second World War era the problems of economic 
development in the underdeveloped countries were found to be 
cond.itioned at least as much by political and social as by 
economic factors, tr.en it became easier for the bourgeois 
economists to examine the ~arxian model on its scientific 
merits. 
Although for the economists tJ:nhs h~d happened by the .-l~te sixt_ies, 
for the majority of the anthropologists and archaeologists 
(with the exception of the neo-merxist French school) it does 
not seem that this had any serious effect at all, except some 
scanty references to marxist or pro-marxist "models". 
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16. 
17. 
Concerning competition it mAy be argued that for a particular 
"sector" (translated illtogroup, band in economic anthropology/ 
archaeology) increased competition (temporarily) squeezes 
profit margins, but this cannot be generalise1 t~ tte economy 
as a whole. For then capitalists benefit from the competition 
in the sectors from which they purchase inputs. On the other 
hand it shouli be remembered that the interests of capital are 
not fixed historically, (for example maximizing surplus 
appropriated from a colony) nor, even if they were, wouH they 
assume the same form. As we have seen, capital is increased 
in the process of production itself and this is reflected in 
the location of production (periphery coordinated with centre). 
This does not seem to us the case for the Kapauku, Tiv, or any 
other "primitive" society. 
Bettelbeim C 1969, Fini B 1980, ?ariack G-Karras J 1974, 
Kaniel F 1976, Rowthorn B 1974, 1976, Laclau E 1971. 
18. A reading of the marginalists is most useful since they have 
such an impact on the formation of the concepts ani methods 
of economic anthropology - A. !!ershell' s "Principles" are 
the first source but v:. Jevons '(1970) book is quite 
useful. For a survey and critique of much of neo-classical 
economics see Green F - Nore P 1977. See also, Deane._,. P:. 
(1978). 
le note in this respect tte extensive debate between 
Formalists end Substantivists which has domin~ted t~e Anglo-
,/, 
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to-day under a different for:n but not with different content. 
In spite of their opposition and differences in meaning, the 
two theories can be found e:nbedde1 in the very heart of 
empiricist epistemology moving within a frame of argumentation 
dealing essentially with questions of the applicability of 
classical economics to the study of primitive societies or, 
to put it in another wayl ~f the suitability of primitive 
societies to be "investigated" by the methods of capitalist 
economy. This is we think the main reason that they remained 
"intact" from the impetus thet the French school of economic 
anthropologists had given by refor:nula ting, un·ier marxist 
or neo-marxist ideas, the general methods, scope and approach 
to the economic processes of ''primitive populations. 
Samuelson P 1976. 
Semenov YU.I 1974. 
Thus for example, Polanyi understands by "economic" in its 
substantive sense above all production in general. Dalton 
most ·commonly uses this term in the senee of economic 
organization and speaks of types of systematic economic 
structure. Polanyi' s substantivism is best understood as an 
inversion of classical economic thoughtland his altruistic 
non-market economic man is the antithesis of the selfish 
market economic man of classical economics. On the other hand, 
while formalists such as Firth or Rerskovits were fa~ too 
conscious of the specificity of primitive economy to try eni 
theory 9 nevertheless they accepted that of the concepts of 
marginalism a few are applicable to primitive economy like 
the proposition that economic activity is rooted in the 
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application of limited m-eans to alternative ends, that thi"B 
application is regulated by rational choice and that the aim 
of individuals engaged in economic activity is the maximi2ation 
of satisfactions but with the distinction that thi-s choice 
depends upon social an:i moral values lying behind particular 
economic systems, contrasting thus the social ~i th the economic. 
(Firth 1965, Eerskovits 1952). Connected with this is the 
assertion that ''economic" anthropology deals primarily with 
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the economic aspects of the social relations of persons. The 
whole economic system of the people is run with this complex 
set of values in mind. From this it is seen, in the second 
place, that many of the wants upon which their economic life 
is based are of an immaterial kind (that is unconscious, 
keeping thus demographical variables to biological potentials). 
Where this leads us is tl:at in one way ?r another, ''facts" are 
inherent in man's nature, they ~annot be overt_hrown and as such 
ere inevitable or unavoidable under any socio-economic formation 
and any sort of relations. 
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one of the basic objectives of this, as far as it concerns 
the ethnography of kinship has been to show that the categories 
of near and distant (as Sahlins 1977 notes) vary independently 
of consanguineal distance and that these categories organize 
actual social practice. Sociobiologists have taken the equally 
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well-known tendency of "economic'' reciprocity to vary in 
sociability with kinship distance as cultural evidence of 
biological "nepotism" hence as a proof of kin selection. 
As one can see from the discussion on that matter this _ 
conclusion is based on an elementary misunderstanding of the 
ethnography. See Sahlins 1977, Godelier ~ 1972. 1975, 1978 
(a,b). Articles connected with the subject in the journals: 
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iiscussed. in Bailey's article: "Concepts, time-scales and 
explanation::> in 'Sconomic Prehistory", 1981, a. "It seems that 
there may be a number oi' different t;,·pes oi' "sor~ial" 
expl9nation, some of ~hich io not iiffer from those thet would 
377 
be advanced by pelaeoeconomists themselves .... If the ai!ll 
of these sociological excursions is to demonstrate that certain 
sorts of social for!llations are necessary to facilitate certain 
patterns of economic production, or to e!llphasize social 
flexibility as a general property inherent in human behaviour 
which allows the possibility of economic transfor!llations 
unique at the species level, then these are scarcely matters 
of great contention. If, however the aim is to demonstrate 
that changing social relations are an iniependent variable 
of sufficient force t~ deter or initiate long-ter~ econo!llic 
changes, this remains e hypothesis in need of testing against 
the prehistoric record." For the mo!llent anyway it see!lls that 
this science is pri!llarily committed (in Britain at least) to 
gathering e!llpirical d-ate - "not only because research· policy 
d e!lland s it." 
58. See !llainly Eiggs E.S 1972 and 1975 co!llprising articles which 
provide a highly reliable mirror of the Palaeoecono!llic 
approach a's iadvocated by Higgs et al. There is a tension 
running through !llOst discussions of the econo!lly an1 its 
relation to the non-econo!llic periphery, ~ith the exhortation 
that we need to "for!llulate !llOdels with specifically arctaeo-
logical objectives end data in !llind." This perspective 
(as Tilley, 1981 states) attempts to relate populatfon, 
resources and technology and to see how these fect~rs are 
related over long time periods. However, the only resources 
considered are categories of potential land use and animal 
an1 vegetable foodstuffs. There is no detailed consideration 
of resources which do not have direct subsistence potential 
or any reference to the exchange of commodities or intrA-
an1 intercommunity relationships except in relationship to 
tran~hum~nce sy~tews. Tris extremely restrictei arena of 
-
aiacussion is preiiceted on the assumption that arr.haeologists 
can deal only ineffectively with social and ineological 
parameters of human behaviour which in the long run have 
little significance. 
Note especially articles in Higgs 1975 ibid., by Barker G.W 
and Dennell-~ebley; Bintliff (19d1) following ani em?hasizing 
the palaeoeconomic approach through catchment analysis mainly, 
argues the t •• " it is most important to recall that the 
primary papers of CA by Higgs et al argu~i that most sites 
in less complex societies should be rewardingly investigated 
by CA. It is expected thst sites w~ll be found where the 
prejicted fit between catchment an1 site typ.e is clearly-
unsatisfactory, ani this shoulj stimulate specific research 
into particular nature of site occupation, the possible 
relationships with other sites an1 so on. CA ices however 
assume that most sites are in fact sufficiently iependent on 
local foodstuff availability to reflect the iisposition of 
notable quantities of such resources in their reconstructe1 
catchments. As far as I em a\•;are, this postulate has not ':lean 
refuted, and indeed my ista and that of most active field 
p~laeoeconomists consistently supports it." 
We think that this is a convincing statement about the 
perpetuation of the dominent mainstream of empiricism in the 
study of prehistoric societies, increasingly concentrating in 
the direction of locetional anBlysiE ani model-building. 
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59· .Althusser L-Balibar, :R 1970, Althusser L 1977. Bhut J.ll. 1961, 
Stoddard D.R 1981. 
-60. _We have given in previous chapt-ers of the pres_ent work .. many 
other related examples and references, suffice it to say at 
this juncture that although the excessive concentration on 
techniques of analysis may not be as cbaracteristic of the 
land-man school, nevertheless the methodology of the more 
"traditional" school is also inverted because there has been 
little d~velopment o~ their theory, ani above all, a strong 
attachment to the ideological position that the "facts'' somehow 
take on a meaning outside particular conceptual frameworks. 
61. ?or a very thoughtful examination of the ideological unier-
pinnings of human geography see Anderson 1973 ani Quaini M 1982. 
62. Glassow M.A 1978, Roper J.C 1979 
63. Roper, ibid. 
64. A very useful discussion on the subject is to be found in 
Harvey• s, 1977 article "Population resources an:i tte ideology 
of science" contair.e:i in Feet R 1977, Rsdical Geography. 
describes the methodology and the population resources relation 
an:i the political implication of populqtion-resources theory 
by examining and contrasting ~althus, ~arx and Ricario methods. 
He notes: ''l:arx utilizes a non-Aristotelian (dialectical) 
framework which sets him apart from Ricario ani Yalthus ~ho, 
in turn, are differentiAted from each other by the use nf 
abstr~ct analytics ani lofical em?iri~ism. res~ectively. ~ach 
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method generates a distinctive kind of conclusion. F.ach 
author also expresses an ideological position ••• " 
65. The neo-Malthusian results of these studies can be traced back 
to the 'Aristo~elian form in wh~ch the question is posed and 
the answers constructe1. Ani it is of course tte ability to 
depart from the Aristotelian view that gets ~arx away from 
both the short run and long run inevitabilities of neo-
Yalthusian conclusions. Varx envisages the proi~ction of new 
categories end concepts, of new knowledge ani understan~ing, 
through which the relationships bet~een the natural ani social 
system will be mediated. This relational ani iialecti~al view 
of things comes closest to impinging upon traditional concerns 
with respect to technological change. It has, of course, long 
been recognized, that Malthus was wrong in his specific 
forecasts bee au se he ignored t ei::.hnological change. Ricardo 
saw the possibilitfes of such change, but in the long run he 
saw society inevitably succu~bing to the law of diminishing 
returns. For Yarx technological change was both internal to 
and inevitable within society. (ibii) 
66. Varx K. ~runir~sse. ~arx-~ngels: Pre-capitalist socio-economic 
~ormetions: A CollectionlProgress 1979· 
67. Harvey~ 1977. ~assey ~ 1977. Rieser R 1977. Smirnov-8olosov-
~aximova (eis) 1984. 
68 • ~ e i 11 as sou x C, 19 7 5 , 19 7 7, 19 7 9 
69. }.:eillassoux ibi':l. ani Rey P.P 1}7). 
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70. Kabo V 1979, Tilley C 1981 
J 
71. Engels F. The condition of the wo~king class in ~ngland, 
opening text: To the ~orking-Classes of Great Britain. 
